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Beyond Price collects my essays in bioethics, most of which are unified by a 
rejection of the prevailing egoistic voluntarism about ending one’s own life 
and creating new ones — that is, about suicide and procreation.
Many now believe that it is not only permissible but virtuous to “take 
control” of one’s death and to exercise that control when life is no longer 
“worth it”. Feature articles in the press celebrate the courage of people who 
commit suicide because the benefits of longevity no longer repay them for 
the burdens of old age. And society is happy to be relieved of responsibility 
for euthanasia by those who take the initiative to self-euthanize.
In three essays (“Against the Right to Die?”, “A Right of Self-
Termination?”, and “Beyond Price”), I argue that having control over one’s 
death is itself a burden, and that the calculation of benefits and burdens 
is in any case inadequate to guide a decision in which the value of the 
person is at stake. I ultimately arrive at the conclusion that the choice of 
death should be guided not by self-interest but by love — which, I believe, 
regards the intact rational capacity to make the choice as a reason for not 
making it, at least not yet. 
Procreation is another site for the self-interested assertion of will, as 
infertile couples and single women create children by buying gametes 
from anonymous strangers. Although a large segment of our society denies 
that whether to abort a pregnancy is a private decision, there is oddly no 
party platform denying that it’s a private decision whether to have a child. 
I say “oddly” because what makes the privacy of abortion so controversial 
— that is, disagreement as to whether there is another person involved 
— should make it uncontroversial that procreation is not private. There 
obviously is another person involved: the child. 
No doubt, the living child is left out of account because it receives what 
the aborted fetus is denied, the so-called gift of life. I contend that life is not 
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.01
2 Beyond Price
a gift, and that “giving” it to a child is wrong if the child will be severed 
from half of its ancestry. Defending this contention requires some careful 
reasoning about personal identity and nonexistence, which I undertake 
over the course of four essays (“Family History” and the three parts of 
“Persons in Prospect”).
These seven essays are informed by Kantian and Aristotelian thought, 
though they are hardly faithful to the theories of Kant or Aristotle. The 
operative Kantian thought is expressed in this volume’s title. The thought 
is that rational nature is “beyond price” in the sense that it must not be 
weighed against self-interest. I expand on this thought by arguing that 
rational nature merits not only Kantian respect but also love, which is 
continuous with respect, in my view. The Aristotelian thought is that 
a person’s good is that which it makes sense to want out of friendship-
love for the person, and what it makes sense to want out of love is that the 
person fully express his or her capacities.
The subsequent three essays in the collection are about the harm 
of death. Over the twenty-odd years between the earliest paper in the 
collection (“Well-Being and Time”) and the latest (“Dying”), my attitude 
toward death has gradually changed. I no longer think that the question of 
how to feel about death has a single right answer. Although I don’t point 
it out in the essays themselves, Part III of “Persons in Prospect” provides 
the foundations for my conclusion in “Dying” that a single answer is 
unnecessary.
Although bioethics is usually classified under the heading of applied 
ethics, these essays are not “applied” in the usual sense. I don’t propose 
or defend any particular policies, much less legislation, on the issues that 
I discuss. Nor do I deal with the specifics of decision-making in particular 
cases. Although I argue that, other things being equal, children should 
know and be reared by their biological parents, I don’t go into the many 
possible degrees of knowledge, or the possible variations of child-rearing 
arrangements. In the case of assisted suicide, I even argue that philosophy 
cannot penetrate to the level of guiding particular decisions. 
In writing about these topics, I aim rather to figure out how to think 
about them, not what to think at the level of practical application. My topic 
is not metaethics, it’s not applied ethics, and it’s not normative ethics, either 
— not, at least, if normative ethics is the comparative study of normative 
theories such as utilitarianism, Kant’s categorical imperative, and virtue 
ethics. I think of my topic as the foundations of applied ethics, the goal being 
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to better understand the underlying notions of personhood, parenthood, 
autonomy, well-being, and so on, with an eye to how those notions will 
apply to practice in general.
Insofar as my views have practical consequences, they have sometimes 
been described as conservative, in the political sense of the word. For what 
it’s worth, my political sympathies are liberal. No doubt they influence my 
philosophical views, but philosophy sometimes leads me to conclusions 
that, however liberal in my eyes, are disdained by members of my political 
party. Those are the conclusions to which I prefer to devote my intellectual 
efforts, because they are more interesting to me than the ones on which 
I follow the party line. To that extent, I am a contrarian — not because I 
seek out perverse conclusions but rather because I find philosophy most 
interesting when it leads to conclusions that seem perverse, and I choose 
to write about what interests me. As Bertrand Russell said, “The point 
of philosophy is to start with something so simple as not to seem worth 
stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe 
it.”1 Arguing for the obvious is not worthy of a philosopher’s time.
The last essay in the collection is about life-writing — biography and 
autobiography — and it concludes with some autobiography of my own. 
I have the nagging sense that my mixing autobiography with philosophy, 
always self-indulgent, is sometimes unfair. I commit the fallacy of 
argumentum ad misericordiam by revealing unfortunate parts of my life 
history, as if soliciting philosophical agreement by appealing for personal 
sympathy. All I can say in my own defense is that I have included a lot 
of happy autobiography in my work, as in “Family History”, and that I 
actually regard all of my writing as autobiographical. Although I write 
about what it is like to be a human being, I am always aware of writing 
only about what it is like for me.
I have many debts to students and colleagues who commented on these 
papers and to institutions that invited me to present them. Those debts are 
acknowledged in the first footnote of each chapter (which also indicates 
whether I have made revisions beyond minor editorial emendations). I am 
indebted to my copyeditor, Katherine Duke, for transforming an unruly 
mob of documents into a well-behaved manuscript. And it has been a 
pleasure to work with Rupert Gatti, Alessandra Tosi, and Ben Fried on my 
second book with Open Book Publishers.
1  The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (Abingdon: Routledge Classics, 2010), p. 20.

2. Against the Right to Die1
In this chapter I argue that a widely recognized right to die would have the 
paradoxical effect of harming some people who never exercise it as well as 
some who exercise it and are better off for doing so. Even more paradoxically, 
recognition of such a right would make it difficult if not impossible to define 
a class of people to whom it should be accorded in practice. 
My arguments do not lead me to conclude that there is no universal 
right to die. Maybe there are some rights whose recognition is harmful to 
many people and whose proper subjects cannot practically be identified. 
Moreover, I do believe that some people are morally entitled to help in 
dying. What I do not believe is that this entitlement can or should be 
recognized as a universal right.
I
Although I believe in our obligation to facilitate some deaths, I want to 
dissociate myself from some of the arguments that are frequently offered 
for such an obligation. These arguments, like many arguments in medical 
1  The present chapter has been supplemented and in many respects superseded by my “A 
Right of Self-Termination?”, chapter 3 of this volume, and “Beyond Price”, chapter 4. It 
is an extensively revised version of a paper that was originally published in The Journal 
of Medicine & Philosophy 17 (1992): 665-681, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jmp/17.6.665. A 
subsequent version appeared in the second edition of Ethics in Practice: An Anthology, ed. 
High LaFollette (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2014), pp. 96-100. That chapter began 
as a comment on a paper by Dan W. Brock, presented at the Central Division of the APA 
in 1991. See his “Voluntary Active Euthanasia” (The Hastings Center Report 22 [1992]: 
10-22; reprinted in Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993], pp. 202-234). I received help in writing that paper 
from Dan Brock, Elizabeth Anderson, David Hills, Yale Kamisar, and Patricia White.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.02
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ethics, rely on terms borrowed from Kantian moral theory — terms such 
as ‘dignity’ and ‘autonomy’. Various kinds of life-preserving treatment 
are said to violate a patient’s dignity or to detain him in an undignified 
state; and the patient’s right of autonomy is said to require that we respect 
his competent and considered wishes, including a wish to die. There may 
or may not be some truth in each of these claims. Yet when we evaluate 
such claims, we must not assume that terms like ‘dignity’ and ‘autonomy’ 
always express the same concepts, or carry the same normative force, as 
they do in a particular moral theory.
When Kant speaks, for example, of the dignity that belongs to persons 
by virtue of their rational nature, and that places them beyond all price,2 
he is not invoking anything that requires the ability to walk unaided, to 
feed oneself, or to control one’s bowels. Hence the dignity invoked in 
discussions of medical ethics — a status supposedly threatened by physical 
deterioration and dependency — cannot be the status whose claim on our 
moral concern is so fundamental to Kantian thought. We must therefore 
ask whether this other sort of dignity, whatever it may be, embodies a 
value that’s equally worthy of protection.
My worry, in particular, is that the word ‘dignity’ is sometimes used to 
dignify, so to speak, our culture’s obsession with independence, physical 
strength, and youth. To my mind, the dignity defined by these values — 
a dignity that is ultimately incompatible with being cared for at all — is a 
dignity not worth having.3
I have similar worries about the values expressed by the phrase ‘patient 
autonomy’, for there are two very different senses in which a person’s 
autonomy can become a value for us. On the one hand, we can obey the 
categorical imperative, by declining to act for reasons that we could not 
rationally propose as valid for all rational beings, including those who are 
affected by our action, such as the patient. What we value in that case is 
the patent’s capacity for self-determination, and we value it in a particular 
way — namely, by according it respect. We respect the patient’s autonomy 
by regarding the necessity of sharing our reasons with him, among others, 
as a constraint on what decisions we permit ourselves to reach.
2  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1964), p. 102.
3  Here I echo some excellent remarks on the subject by Felicia Ackerman in “No, Thanks, I 
Don’t Want to Die with Dignity”, Providence Journal-Bulletin, April 19, 1990. I discuss the 
issue of “dying with dignity” in “A Right of Self-Termination?”.
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On the other hand, we can value the patient’s autonomy by making it 
our goal to maximize his effective options. What we value, in that case, is 
not the patient’s capacity but his opportunities for self-determination — his 
having choices to make and the means with which to implement them; and 
we value these opportunities for self-determination by regarding them as 
goods — as objects of desire and pursuit rather than respect.
These two ways of valuing autonomy are fundamentally different. 
Respecting people’s autonomy, in the Kantian sense, is not just a matter of 
giving them effective options. To make our own decisions only for reasons 
that we could rationally share with others is not necessarily to give them 
decisions to make, nor is it to give them the means to implement their 
actual decisions.4
As with the term ‘dignity’, then, we must not assume that the term 
‘autonomy’ is always being used in the sense made familiar by Kantian 
moral theory; and we must therefore ask ourselves what sort of autonomy 
is being invoked, and whether it is indeed something worthy of our moral 
concern. I believe that, as with the term ‘dignity’, the answer to the latter 
question may be “no” in some cases, including the case of the right to die.
II
Despite my qualms about the use of Kantian language to justify euthanasia, 
I do believe that euthanasia can be justified, and on Kantian grounds. In 
particular, I believe that respect for a person’s dignity, properly conceived, 
can require us to facilitate his death when that dignity is being irremediably 
compromised. I also believe, however, that a person’s dignity can be so 
compromised only by circumstances that are likely to compromise his 
capacity for fully rational and autonomous decision-making. So although I 
do not favor euthanizing people against their wills, of course, neither do I 
favor a policy of euthanizing people for the sake of deferring to their wills, 
since I think that people’s wills are usually impaired in the circumstances 
required to make euthanasia permissible. The sense in which I oppose a 
right to die, then, is that I oppose treating euthanasia as a protected option 
for the patient.
4  I discuss this issue further in “Love as a Moral Emotion”, Ethics 109 (1999): 338-374, pp. 
356-358, esp. nn. 69, 72. That paper was reprinted in Self to Self: Selected Essays (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 70-109.
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One reason for my opposition is the associated belief (also Kantian) 
that so long as patients are fully competent to exercise an option of being 
euthanized, their doing so would be immoral, in the majority of cases, 
because their dignity as persons would still be intact. I discuss this argument 
elsewhere, but I do not return to it in the present paper.5 In this paper I 
discuss a second reason for opposing euthanasia as a protected option for 
the patient. This reason, unlike the first, is consequentialist.
What consequentialist arguments could there be against giving the 
option of euthanasia to patients? One argument, of course, would be that 
giving this option to patients, even under carefully defined conditions, 
would entail providing euthanasia to some patients for whom it would be 
a harm rather than a benefit.6 This argument depends on the assumption 
that patients granted a right to die might mistakenly choose to die when 
they would be better off living. My argument makes no such assumption.
In order to demonstrate that I am not primarily worried about mistaken 
requests to die, I shall assume, from this point forward, that patients are 
infallible, and that euthanasia would therefore be chosen only by those for 
whom it would be a benefit. Even so, I believe, the recognition of a right 
to die would harm many patients, by increasing their autonomy in a sense 
that is not only un-Kantian but also highly undesirable.
This belief is sometimes expressed in public debate, although it is rarely 
developed in any detail. Here, for example, is Yale Kamisar’s argument 
against “Euthanasia Legislation”: 7
Is this the kind of choice … that we want to offer a gravely ill person? Will 
we not sweep up, in the process, some who are not really tired of life, but 
think others are tired of them; some who do not really want to die, but who 
feel they should not live on, because to do so when there looms the legal 
alternative of euthanasia is to do a selfish or a cowardly act? Will not some 
feel an obligation to have themselves “eliminated”…? 
Note that these considerations do not, strictly speaking, militate against 
euthanasia itself. Rather, they militate against a particular decision 
procedure for euthanasia — namely, the procedure of placing the choice 
of euthanasia in the patient’s hands. What Kamisar is questioning in this 
5  See “A Right of Self-Termination?” and “Beyond Price”, chapters 3 and 4 of this volume.
6  See Yale Kamisar, “Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-Religious Objections”, in 
Euthanasia and the Right to Death: The Case for Voluntary Euthanasia, ed. A. B. Downing 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1970), pp. 85-133.
7  Ibid., p. 95.
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passage is, not the practice of helping some patients to die, but rather the 
practice of asking them to choose whether to die. The feature of legalized 
euthanasia that troubles him is precisely its being an option offered to 
patients — the very feature for which it’s touted, by its proponents, as an 
enhancement of patients’ autonomy. Kamisar’s remark thus betrays the 
suspicion that this particular enhancement of one’s autonomy is not to be 
welcomed.
But what exactly is the point of Kamisar’s rhetorical questions? The 
whole purpose of giving people choices, surely, is to allow those choices 
to be determined by their reasons and preferences rather than ours. 
Kamisar may think that finding one’s life tiresome is a good reason for 
dying, whereas thinking that others find one tiresome is not. But if others 
honestly think otherwise, why should we stand in their way? Whose life is 
it anyway?
III
A theoretical framework for addressing this question can be found in 
Thomas Schelling’s book The Strategy of Conflict,8 and in Gerald Dworkin’s 
paper “Is More Choice Better than Less?”9 These authors have shown that 
our intuitions about the value of options are often mistaken, and their work 
can help us to understand the point of arguments like Kamisar’s.
We are inclined to think that, unless we are likely to make mistakes about 
whether to exercise an option (as I am assuming we are not), the value 
of having the option is as high as the value of exercising it and no lower 
than zero. Exercising an option can of course be worse than nothing, if it 
causes harm. But if we are not prone to mistakes, then we will not exercise 
a harmful option; and we tend to think that simply having the unexercised 
option cannot be harmful. And insofar as exercising an option would make 
us better off than we are, having the option must have made us better off 
than we were before we had it — or so we tend to think.
What Schelling showed, however, is that having an option can be harmful 
even if we do not exercise it and — more surprisingly — even if we exercise it 
and gain by doing so. Schelling’s examples of this phenomenon were drawn 
primarily from the world of negotiation, where the only way to induce one’s 
8  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
9  Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 47-61.
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opponent to settle for less may be by proving that one doesn’t have the option 
of giving him more. Schelling pointed out that in such circumstances, a lack 
of options can be an advantage. The union leader who cannot persuade his 
membership to approve a pay cut, or the ambassador who cannot contact 
his head of state for a change of brief, negotiates from a position of strength, 
whereas the negotiator for whom all concessions are possible deals from 
weakness. If the rank and file give their leader the option of offering a pay 
cut, then management may not settle for anything less, whereas they might 
have settled for less if he hadn’t had the option of making the offer. The 
union leader will then have to decide whether to take the option and reach 
an agreement or to leave the option and call a strike. But no matter which of 
these outcomes would make him better off, choosing it will still leave him 
worse off than he would have been if he had never had the option at all.
Dworkin has expanded on Schelling’s point by exploring other respects 
in which options can be undesirable. Just as options can subject one to 
pressure from an opponent in negotiation, for example, they can subject one 
to pressure from other sources as well. The night cashier in a convenience 
store doesn’t want the option of opening the safe — and not because he 
fears that he’d make mistakes about when to open it. It is precisely because 
the cashier would know when he’d better open the safe that his having the 
option would make him an attractive target for robbers; and it’s because 
having the option would make him a target for robbers that he’d be better 
off without it. The cashier who finds himself opening the safe at gunpoint 
can consistently think that he’s doing what’s best while wishing that he’d 
never been given the option of doing it.
Options can be undesirable, then, because they subject one to various 
kinds of pressure; but they can be undesirable for other reasons, too. 
Offering someone an alternative to the status quo makes two outcomes 
possible for him, but neither of them is the outcome that was possible 
before. He can now choose the status quo or choose the alternative, but he 
can no longer have the status quo without choosing it. And having the status 
quo by default may have been what was best for him, even though choosing 
the status quo is now worst. If I invite you to a dinner party, I leave you the 
possibilities of choosing to come or choosing to stay away; but I deprive you 
of something that you otherwise would have had — namely, the possibility 
of being absent from my table by default, as you are on all other occasions. 
Surely, preferring to accept an invitation is consistent with wishing you 
had never received it. These attitudes are consistent because refusing to 
attend a party is a different outcome from not attending without having to 
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refuse; and even if the former of these outcomes is worse than attending, 
the latter may still have been better. Having choices can thus deprive one 
of desirable outcomes whose desirability depends on their being unchosen.
The offer of an option can also be undesirable because of what it 
expresses. To offer a student the option of receiving remedial instruction 
after class is to imply that he is not keeping up. If the student needs help 
but doesn’t know it, the offer may clue him in. But even if the student does 
not need any help to begin with, the offer may so undermine his confidence 
that he will need help before long. In the latter case, the student may 
ultimately benefit from accepting the offer, even though he would have 
been better off not receiving it at all.
Note that in each of these cases, a person can be harmed by having a 
choice even if he chooses what’s best for him. Once the option of offering 
a concession has undermined one’s bargaining position, once the option of 
opening the safe has made one the target of a robbery, once the invitation to 
a party has eliminated the possibility of absence by default, once the offer 
of remedial instruction has implied that one needs it — in short, once one 
has been offered a problematic choice — one’s situation has already been 
altered for the worse, and choosing what’s best cannot remedy the harm 
that one has already suffered. Choosing what’s best in these cases is simply 
a way of cutting one’s losses.
Note, finally, that we cannot always avoid burdening people with options 
by offering them a second-order option as to which options they are to be 
offered. If issuing you an invitation to dinner would put you in an awkward 
position, then asking you whether you want to be invited would usually do 
so as well; if offering you the option of remedial instruction would send you 
a message, then so would asking you whether you’d like that option. In order 
to avoid doing harm, then, we are sometimes required, not only to withhold 
options, but also to take the initiative for withholding them.
IV
Of course, the options that I have discussed can also be unproblematic for 
many people in many circumstances. Sometimes one has good reason to 
welcome a dinner invitation or an offer of remedial instruction. Similarly, 
some patients will welcome the option of euthanasia, and rightly so. The 
problem is how to offer the option only to those patients who will have 
reason to welcome it. Arguments like Kamisar’s are best understood, I 
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think, as warning that the option of euthanasia may unavoidably be offered 
to some who will be harmed simply by having the option, even if they go 
on to choose what is best.
I think that the option of euthanasia may harm some patients in all of 
the ways canvassed above; but I will focus my attention on only a few of 
those ways. The most important way in which the option of euthanasia may 
harm patients, I think, is that it will deny them the possibility of staying 
alive by default.
Now, the idea of surviving by default will be anathema to existentialists, 
who will insist that the choice between life and death is a choice that we 
have to make every day, perhaps every moment.10 Yet even if there is a 
deep, philosophical sense in which we do continually choose to go on 
living, it is not reflected in our ordinary self-understanding. That is, we 
do not ordinarily think of ourselves or others as continually rejecting the 
option of suicide and staying alive by choice. Thus, even if the option of 
euthanasia won’t alter a patient’s existential situation, it will certainly alter 
the way in which his situation is generally perceived. And changes in the 
perception of a patient’s situation will be sufficient to produce many of the 
problems that Schelling and Dworkin have described, since those problems 
are often created not just by having options but by being seen to have them.
Once a person is given the choice between life and death, he will rightly 
be perceived as the agent of his own survival. Whereas his existence is 
ordinarily viewed as a given for him — as a fixed condition with which he 
must cope — formally offering him the option of euthanasia will cause his 
existence thereafter to be viewed as his doing.
The problem with this perception is that if others regard you as choosing 
a state of affairs, they will hold you responsible for it; and if they hold 
you responsible for a state of affairs, they can ask you to justify it. Hence, 
if people ever come to regard you as existing by choice, they may expect 
you to justify your continued existence. If your daily arrival in the office is 
interpreted as meaning that you have once again declined to kill yourself, 
you may feel obliged to arrive with an answer to the question “Why not?”
I think that our perception of one another’s existence as a given is 
so deeply ingrained that we can hardly imagine what life would be like 
without it. When someone shows impatience or displeasure with us, we 
jokingly say, “Well, excuse me for living!” But imagine that it were no joke; 
10  The locus classicus for this point is, of course, Albert Camus’s essay “The Myth of 
Sisyphus”, in The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, trans. Justin O’Brien (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1956), pp. 88-91.
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imagine that living were something for which one might reasonably be 
thought to need an excuse. The burden of justifying one’s existence might 
make existence unbearable — and hence unjustifiable.
V
I assume that people care, and are right to care, about whether they can 
justify their choices to others. Of course, this concern can easily seem 
like slavishness or neurotic insecurity; but it should not be dismissed too 
lightly. Our ability to justify our choices to the people around us is what 
enables us to sustain the role of rational agent in our dealings with them; 
and it is therefore essential to our remaining, in their eyes, eligible partners 
in cooperation and conversation, or appropriate objects of respect.
Retaining one’s status as a person among others is especially important 
to those who are ill or infirm. I imagine that when illness or infirmity denies 
one the rewards of independent activity, then the rewards of personal 
intercourse may be all that make life worth living. To the ill or infirm, then, 
the ability to sustain the role of rational person may rightly seem essential 
to retaining what remains of value in life. Being unable to account for one’s 
choices may seem to entail the risk of being perceived as unreasonable — as 
not worth reasoning with — and consequently being cut off from meaningful 
intercourse with others, which is life’s only remaining consolation.
Forcing a patient to take responsibility for his continued existence may 
therefore be tantamount to confronting him with the following prospect: 
unless he can explain, to the satisfaction of others, why he chooses to exist, 
his only remaining reasons for existence may vanish.
VI
Unfortunately, our culture is extremely hostile to any attempt at justifying 
an existence of passivity and dependence. The burden of proof will lie 
heavily on the patient who thinks that his terminal illness or chronic 
disability is not a sufficient reason for dying.
What is worse, the people with whom a patient wants to maintain 
intercourse, and to whom he therefore wants to justify his choices, are 
often in a position to incur several financial and emotional costs from 
any prolongation of his life. Many of the reasons in favor of his death are 
therefore likely to be exquisitely salient in their minds. I believe that some 
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of these people may actively pressure the patient to exercise the option of 
dying. (Students who hear me say this usually object that no one would 
ever do such a thing. My reply is that no one would ever do such a thing as 
abuse his own children or parents — except that some people do).
In practice, however, friends and relatives of a patient will not have to 
utter a word of encouragement, much less exert any overt pressure, once 
the option of euthanasia is offered. For in the discussion of a subject so 
hedged by taboos and inhibitions, the patient will have to make some 
assumptions about what they think and how they feel, irrespective of what 
they say.11 And the rational assumption for him to make will be that they 
are especially sensible of the considerations in favor of his exercising the 
option.
Thus, even if a patient antecedently believes that his life is worth living, 
he may have good reason to assume that many of the people around him 
do not, and that his efforts to convince them will be frustrated by prevailing 
opinions about lives like his, or by the biases inherent in their perspective. 
Indeed, he can reasonably assume that the offer of euthanasia is itself 
an expression of attitudes that are likely to frustrate his efforts to justify 
declining it. He can therefore assume that his refusal to take the option 
of euthanasia will threaten his standing as a rational person in the eyes of 
friends and family, thereby threatening the very things that make his life 
worthwhile. This patient may rationally judge that he’s better off taking the 
option of euthanasia, even though he would have been best off not having 
the option at all.
Establishing a right to die in our culture may thus be like establishing 
a right to duel in a culture obsessed with personal honor.12 If someone 
defended the right to duel by arguing that a duel is a private transaction 
between consenting adults, he would have missed the point of laws against 
dueling. What makes it rational for someone to throw down or pick up a 
gauntlet may be the social costs of choosing not to, costs that result from 
failing to duel only if one fails to duel by choice. Such costs disappear if 
the choice of dueling can be taken off the table. By eliminating the option 
of dueling (if we can), we eliminate the reasons that make it rational for 
11  See Thomas C. Schelling, “Strategic Relationships in Dying”, in Choice and Consequence: 
Perspectives of an Errant Economist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), pp. 
147-157.
12  For this analogy, see Lance K. Stell, “Dueling and the Right to Life”, Ethics 90 (1979): 
7-26. Stell argues — implausibly, in my view — that one has the right to die for the same 
reason that one has a right to duel.
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people to duel in most cases. To restore the option of dueling would be to 
give people reasons for dueling that they didn’t previously have. Similarly, 
I believe, to offer the option of dying may be to give people new reasons 
for dying.
VII
Do not attempt to refute this argument against the right to die by labeling 
it paternalistic. The argument is not paternalistic — at least, not in any 
derogatory sense of the word. Paternalism, in the derogatory sense, is the 
policy of saving people from self-inflicted harms by denying them options 
that they might exercise unwisely. Such a policy is distasteful because it 
expresses a lack of respect for others’ ability to make their own decisions.
But my argument is not paternalistic in this sense. My reason for 
withholding the option of euthanasia is not that others cannot be trusted 
to exercise it wisely. On the contrary, I have assumed from the outset that 
patients will be infallible in their deliberations. What I have argued is 
not that people to whom we offer the option of euthanasia might harm 
themselves but rather that in offering them this option, we will do them 
harm. My argument is therefore based on a simple policy of nonmalfeasance 
rather than on the policy of paternalism. I am arguing that we must not 
harm others by giving them choices, not that we must withhold the choices 
from them lest they harm themselves.
Of course, harming some people by giving them choices may be 
unavoidable if we cannot withhold those choices from them without 
unjustly withholding the same choices from others. If a significant number 
of patients were both competent and morally entitled to choose euthanasia, 
then we might be obligated to make that option available even if, in doing 
so, we would inevitably give it to some who would be harmed by having 
it. Consider here a closely related option.13 People are morally entitled 
to refuse treatment, because they are morally entitled not to be drugged, 
punctured, or irradiated against their wills — in short, not to be assaulted. 
Protecting the right not to be assaulted entails giving some patients what 
amounts to the option of ending their lives. And for some subset of these 
patients, having the option of ending their lives by refusing treatment 
13  The analogy is suggested, in the form of an objection to my arguments, by Dan Brock in 
“Voluntary Active Euthanasia”.
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may be just as harmful as having the option of electing active euthanasia. 
Nevertheless, these harms must be tolerated as an inevitable byproduct of 
protecting the right not to be assaulted. 
Similarly, if I believed that people had a moral right to end their lives, 
I would not entertain consequentialist arguments against protecting that 
right. But I don’t believe in such a moral right, for reasons to which I have 
briefly alluded but cannot fully expound in this chapter. My willingness to 
entertain the arguments expounded here thus depends on reasons that are 
explained elsewhere.14
VIII
I have been assuming, in deference to existentialists, that a right to die would 
not alter the options available to a patient but would, at most, alter the social 
perception of his options. What would follow, however, if we assumed that 
death was not ordinarily a genuine option? In that case, offering someone 
the choice of euthanasia would not only cause his existence to be perceived 
as his responsibility; it would actually cause his existence to become his 
responsibility for the first time. And this new responsibility might entail 
new and potentially burdensome obligations.
That options can be undesirable because they entail obligations is a 
familiar principle in one area of everyday life — namely, the practice of 
offering, accepting, and declining gifts and favors. When we decline a gift 
or a favor that someone has spontaneously offered, we deny him an option: 
the option of providing us with a particular benefit. And our reason for 
declining is often that he could not have the option of providing the benefit 
without being obligated to exercise that option. Indeed, we sometimes feel 
obligated, on our part, to decline a benefit precisely in order to prevent 
someone from being obligated, on his part, to provide it.15 We thus recognize 
that giving or leaving someone the option of providing a benefit to us may 
be a way of harming him, by burdening him with an obligation.
14  See my “Right of Self-Termination?” and “Beyond Price”, chapters 3 and 4 of this 
volume.
15  Of course, there are many other reasons for declining gifts and favors, such as pride, 
embarrassment, or a desire not to be in someone else’s debt. My point is simply that 
there are cases in which these reasons are absent and a very different reason is present 
— namely, our desire not to burden someone else with obligations.
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When we decline a gift or favor, our would-be benefactor sometimes 
protests in language similar to that used by proponents of the right to die. 
“I know what I’m doing”, he says, “and no one is twisting my arm. It’s 
my money [or whatever], and I want you to have it.” If he’s unaware of 
the lurking allusion, he might even put it like this: “Whose money is it, 
anyway?”
Well, it is his money (or whatever); and we do believe that he’s entitled 
to dispose of his money as he likes. Yet his right of personal autonomy in 
disposing of his money doesn’t always require that we let him dispose of it 
on us. We are entitled — and, as I have suggested, sometimes obligated — 
to restrict his freedom in spending his money for our benefit, insofar as that 
freedom may entail burdensome obligations.
The language in which favors are declined is equally interesting as that 
in which they are offered. What we often say when declining a favor is, “I 
can’t let you do that for me: it would be too much to ask.” The phrase ‘too 
much to ask’ is interesting because it is used only when we haven’t in fact 
asked for anything. Precisely because the favor in question would be too 
much to ask, we haven’t asked for it, and now our prospective benefactor is 
offering it spontaneously. Why, then, do we give our reason for not having 
solicited the favor as a reason for declining when it’s offered unsolicited?
The answer, I think, is that we recognize how little distance there is 
between permitting someone to do us a favor and asking him to do it. 
Because leaving someone the option of doing us a favor can place him 
under an obligation to do it, it has all the consequences of asking for the 
favor. To say “I’m leaving you the option of helping me, but I’m not asking 
you to help” is to draw a distinction without a difference, since options can 
be just as burdensome as requests.
IX
Clearly, a patient’s decision to die will sometimes be a gift or a favor 
bestowed on loved ones whose financial or emotional resources are 
being drained by his condition. And clearly, death is the sort of gift that 
one might well want to decline, by denying others the option of giving 
it. Yet protections for the option of euthanasia would in effect protect the 
option of giving this gift, and they would thereby prevent the prospective 
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beneficiaries from declining it. Recognizing a right to die would thus be 
tantamount to adopting the view that death is never too much to ask.
I don’t pretend to understand fully the ethics of gifts and favors. It’s one 
of those subjects that gets neglected in philosophical ethics, perhaps because 
it has more to do with the supererogatory than the obligatory. One question 
that puzzles me is whether we are permitted to restrict people’s freedom to 
benefit us in ways that require no active participation on our part. Someone 
cannot successfully give us a gift, in most cases, unless we cooperate by 
taking it into our possession; and denying someone the option of giving us 
a gift usually consists of refusing to do our part in the transaction. But what 
about cases in which someone can do us a good turn without any cooperation 
from us? To what extent are we entitled to decline the favor by means of 
restrictions on his behavior rather than omissions in ours?
Another question, of course, is whether we wouldn’t, in fact, play some 
part in the deaths of patients who received socially sanctioned euthanasia. 
Would a medically assisted or supervised death be a gift that we truly took 
no part in accepting? What if “we” — the intended beneficiary of the gift 
— were society as a whole, the body that recognized the right to die and 
perhaps even trained physicians in its implementation? Surely, establishing 
the right to die is tantamount to saying, to those who might contemplate 
dying for the social good, that such favors will never be refused.
These considerations, inconclusive though they are, show how the 
theoretical framework developed by Schelling and Dworkin might support 
remarks like Kamisar’s about patients’ “obligation to have themselves 
‘eliminated’”. The worry that a right to die would become an obligation to 
die is of a piece with other worries about euthanasia, not in itself, but as a 
problematic option for the patient.
X
As I have said, I favor euthanasia in some cases. And of course, I believe 
that euthanasia must not be administered to competent patients without 
their consent. To that extent, I think that the option of dying will have to be 
presented to some patients, so that they can receive the benefit of a good 
death.
On the basis of the foregoing arguments, however, I doubt whether we 
can formulate a general definition that distinguishes the circumstances 
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in which the option of dying would be beneficial from those in which it 
would be harmful. The factors that make an option problematic are too 
subtle and too various to be defined in general rules. How will the option 
of euthanasia be perceived by the patient and his loved ones? How will 
it affect the relations among them? Is he likely to fear being spurned for 
declining the option? Would he exercise the option merely as a favor to 
them? And are they genuinely willing to accept that favor? Sensitivity to 
these and related questions could never be incorporated into a rule defining 
conditions under which the option must be offered.
Insofar as I am swayed by the foregoing arguments, then, I am inclined 
to think that society should at most permit, and never require, health 
professionals to offer the option of euthanasia or to grant patients’ requests 
for it. We can probably define some conditions under which the option 
should never be offered; but we are not in a position to define conditions 
under which it should always be offered; and so we can at most define a 
legal permission rather than a legal requirement to offer it. The resulting 
rule would leave caregivers free to withhold the option whenever they 
see fit, even if it is explicitly and spontaneously requested. And so long as 
caregivers are permitted to withhold the option of euthanasia, patients will 
not be accorded a right to die.
XI
The foregoing arguments make me worry even about an explicitly 
formulated permission for the practice of euthanasia, since an explicit 
law or regulation to this effect would already invite patients, and hence 
potentially pressure them, to request that the permission be exercised in 
their case. I feel most comfortable with a policy of permitting euthanasia 
by default — that is, by a tacit failure to enforce the institutional rules that 
currently serve as barriers to justified euthanasia, or a gradual elimination 
of those rules without fanfare. The best public policy of euthanasia, I 
sometimes think, is no policy at all.
This suggestion will surely strike some readers as scandalous, because 
of the trust that it would place in the individual judgment of physicians and 
patients. But I suspect that to place one’s life in the hands of another person, 
as one does today when placing oneself in the care of a physician, may 
simply be to enter a relationship in which such trust is essential, because 
20 Beyond Price
it cannot be replaced or even underwritten by institutional guarantees. 
Although I do not share the conventional view that advances in medical 
technology have outrun our moral understanding of how they should be 
applied, I am indeed tempted to think they have outrun the capacity of 
rules to regulate their application. I am therefore tempted to think that 
public policy regulating the relation between physician and patient should 
be weak and vague by design; and that insofar as the aim of medical ethics 
is to strengthen or sharpen such policy, medical ethics itself is a bad idea.
3. A Right of Self-Termination?1
Getting cancer changed my feelings about people who smoke.
I remember hearing a fellow philosopher expound, with a wave of his 
cigarette, on his right to choose whether to live and die smoking, or to quit 
and merely survive. I was just beginning a year of chemotherapy, and mere 
survival sounded pretty good to me. But I was the visiting speaker, and my 
hosts were unaware of my diagnosis. Several of them lit up after dinner as 
we listened to their colleague’s disquisition — they with amused familiarity, 
I with an outrage that surprised even me and would have baffled them, if 
I had dared to express it. That I didn’t dare is a cause for regret even now, 
ten years after the fact.
1  Originally published in Ethics 109 (1999): 606-628, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/233924; 
reprinted in Death, Dying and the Ending of Life, ed. Margaret P. Battin, Leslie P. Francis, 
and Bruce M. Landesman (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 275-292. Work on this chapter 
was supported by a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities and by 
a sabbatical leave from the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts at the University 
of Michigan. An earlier and very different version was presented to the philosophy 
department and the Center for Ethics and Humanities in the Life Sciences at Michigan 
State University. I received helpful comments on that version from Elizabeth Anderson 
and Stephen Darwall, both of whom have also contributed significantly to my thinking on 
this subject through their published work. I also received comments from Bette Crigger 
and an anonymous referee for The Hastings Center Report. For comments on the present 
version, I am grateful to Sally Haslanger, Connie Rosati, Tamar Schapiro, and Brian 
Slattery. This article originally appeared in a published symposium that also included a 
commentary on it by Frances Kamm. I had asked the editor for an assurance that there 
would be no philosophical commentaries, because my article was not originally written 
for an audience of philosophers. When I received a draft of Kamm’s commentary and 
was asked to respond, I was extremely annoyed at the editor, and I am embarrassed to 
say that my response vented this annoyance on Kamm instead. I have therefore omitted 
that response from the present version.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.03
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One objection was already clear to me at the time. A few months with 
cancer had taught me that a tumor rarely invades a region smaller than an 
extended family.
Physically, the cancer was confined to my body, but even in that respect 
it was difficult to regard as mine. The tumor cells were growing in my bone 
marrow, which didn’t live up to its poetic billing as the core of my being. 
The marrow in my bones, I discovered, was as foreign to me as the far side 
of the moon: it was, in a sense, my far side — unseen, insensate — its depth 
inside me being a measure of remoteness rather than intimacy. Of course, 
this fertile gunk in my pelvis and skull was also my sole source of blood cells, 
and my life depended on it. But so did the life of my sons’ father, my wife’s 
husband, my parents’ son, my brothers’ brother, and I was never sure who 
among us would suffer the greater harm if that life ran out of gunk.
Listening to my host laugh at his future cancer, I wondered whether 
he realized how many others would share it. What I would have said on 
their behalf, however, wouldn’t have expressed my strongest feelings, 
which were felt on my own behalf, in a sense that I couldn’t articulate. I 
was somehow offended, insulted. Watching smoke curl from the lips of 
people unmindful of my mortality, I felt as I probably would feel listening 
to anti-Semitic remarks directed at another person by a speaker unaware 
that I, too, was a Jew. I was witnessing an insult to a group of which I was 
also a member.
This chapter isn’t about the right to smoke, of course; it’s about the right 
to die. Not surprisingly, however, these rights tend to be articulated in the 
same terms. A person claiming either right might describe it, for instance, 
as a right “to live and die in the light of … his own convictions about why 
his life is valuable and where its value lies”.
I can’t recall whether the speaker in my story used these exact words, 
but I seemed to hear his voice again when I read them in The New York 
Review of Books, under the title “The Philosophers’ Brief”.2 This brief had 
been submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in support of a challenge to 
statutes outlawing physician-assisted suicide. Reading it, I once again felt 
a collective slight, and this time I couldn’t miss which group was being 
slighted.
2  Ronald Dworkin et al., “Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’ Brief”, The New York Review 
of Books 44 (March 27, 1997): 41-47. The brief was submitted in the case of Washington et 
al. v. Glucksberg et al. 
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So I think that I can now explain why I was once offended by one 
philosopher’s defense of smoking, and the explanation leads me to reject 
The Philosophers’ defense of assisted suicide as well. As for assisted suicide 
itself, however, I don’t know what to think. The complexities of the issue 
have thus far defeated my attempts to arrive at a settled position. On the 
policy question of assisted suicide, then, I am neither Pro nor Con. I’m, like, 
Not So Fast.
The principle quoted above, which would settle the issue quickly, can be 
derived from two broader principles. The first principle is that a person has 
the right to make his own life shorter in order to make it better — to make 
it shorter, that is, if doing so is a necessary means or consequence of making 
it a better life on the whole for him. The second principle is that there is a 
presumption in favor of deferring to a person’s judgment on the subject of 
his own good. Together, these principles imply that a person has the right 
to live and die, in particular, by his own convictions about which life would 
be better for him.
For the smoker in my story, of course, shortening his life was not a 
means of making it better but rather a likely consequence of an activity that 
made it better, in his opinion, despite making it shorter, too. But in most 
of the cases for which assisted suicide is advocated, shortening a patient’s 
life is intended as a means of making it better, because the continuation 
of the patient’s life would detract from its overall value for him.3 When 
the first principle is confined to this latter context, it can be rephrased as 
the assertion of a patient’s right to end his life on the grounds that it is no 
longer worth living.
I think that this principle is mistaken. Before I criticize it, however, 
I should speak briefly to the second principle stated above, which I can 
accept. I think that a person’s considered judgment about his good is a 
judgment to which we generally ought to defer.
More specifically, then, I think that we generally ought to defer to a 
person on the question whether his life is worth living, since the living-
worthiness of a life measures the extent to which the continuation of that 
life would be good for the person living it. The person living a life is the best 
judge of the value that its continuation would afford him — not an infallible 
judge, of course, but usually more reliable than anyone else is likely to be. 
3  I discuss evaluations of this kind in “Well-Being and Time”, chapter 7 of this volume.
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Indeed, his judgment of this value is to some extent self-fulfilling, since his 
merely liking or disliking aspects of his life can to some extent make them 
good or bad for him.
The reasons for deferring to a person’s judgment about his good go 
beyond his reliability as a judge. Respect for a person’s autonomy may 
require that we defer to his considered judgment about his good even 
when we have reason to regard that judgment as mistaken. Letting him 
live his own life may sometimes entail letting him make his own mistakes 
about what’s good for him — including, perhaps, mistakes about whether 
it would be good for him to go on living. Forbidding a person to make such 
mistakes can be objectionably paternalistic, because it would usurp his role 
as the primary agent of his own affairs.
Thus, if a person had the right to end his life on the grounds that it 
wasn’t worth living (in accordance with the first principle, above), then 
he would have the right to be guided by his own judgment on that score 
(in accordance with the second principle). But I reject the principle that a 
person has the right to end his life solely on the grounds of the benefits he 
will thereby obtain or the harms he will avoid.
One reason for rejecting this principle is that a life confers benefits and 
harms on people other than the person living it. Does a person have the 
right to deprive his children of a parent simply because life isn’t worth 
enough to him?
I want to set aside this question, however, because it tacitly concedes the 
assumption that the values at stake in life-or-death decisions are relative 
to personal interests; it merely invites us to consider a wider circle of 
potential beneficiaries. The values that we need to consider, in my view, 
aren’t relative to personal interests and consequently have no beneficiaries.
One might insist that values must have beneficiaries, because they wouldn’t 
exist if there weren’t someone who could appreciate them: nothing would 
be good or bad in a universe devoid of sentient beings.4 But the fact that 
values wouldn’t exist without potential valuers does not entail that they 
must accrue to someone.
Values are relative to potential valuers because they are normative, in 
the first instance, for valuation.5 That is, for something to be valuable just 
4  See Peter Railton, “Facts and Values”, Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 5-31.
5  See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993).
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is for it to be such as ought to be valued in some way — respected, loved, 
admired, wanted, treasured, or the like. The very concept of value therefore 
contains the concept of a valuer, actual or potential.
The experience of valuing something can be beneficial, as in the case of 
appreciating the aesthetic value in a work of art. But the concept of value, in 
positing a potential valuer, doesn’t necessarily require that he would benefit 
from the experience. Things can be venerable, for example, whether or not 
there is any benefit in venerating them; and they can be awesome whether 
or not one would gain by holding them in awe. So the fact that value must 
be capable of registering with someone, who would thus appreciate it, does 
not mean that it must be capable of accruing to someone, who would thus 
gain by it. Value requires a potential valuer but not a potential beneficiary.
In fact, our appreciation of values that are relative to the interest of 
a beneficiary may depend on a prior appreciation of a value that is not 
relational in this sense. This dependence emerges when we try to explicate 
the concept of interest-relative value, or what is good for a person.
The concept of what is good for a person turns out to be fairly resistant to 
explication. We might initially think to equate what’s good for a person 
with whatever would be rational for him to care about. But this equation 
would end up implying that all rational concerns are self-interested, by 
definition. In order to allow for the possibility of rational selflessness, 
we have to acknowledge that not everything that would be rational for 
someone to care about is necessarily in his interest.
Various philosophers have therefore attempted to define what’s good 
for a person as a proper subset of the things that would be rational for him 
to care about, such as the subset including only those things which require 
his existence. It may or may not be a drawback in these definitions that they 
would exclude from a person’s good such things as posthumous fame. In 
any case, these definitions are still too inclusive, since the things involving 
a person’s existence that are rational for him to care about include, for 
example, particular sacrifices that he can make for other people.
The only convincing analysis of a person’s good, to my knowledge, is one 
recently proposed by Stephen Darwall, who argues that what’s good for a 
person is what’s rational to want for his sake.6 ‘For the sake of’ is a phrase that 
marks the subordination of one concern to another: to care about one thing 
6  Stephen Darwall, “Self-Interest and Self-Concern”, Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1997): 
158-178. This article is also the source for my statement of the problem in the preceding 
section.
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for the sake of something else is to care about the former out of concern for 
the latter. To want something for the sake of a person is thus to want it out of 
concern for the person himself. Darwall’s analysis says that a person’s good 
is what would be rational to want out of concern for that person.
Darwall argues — convincingly, to my mind — that a person’s good is 
a rational object of desire for anyone who cares about that person. By the 
same token, he argues that even the person himself is rationally obliged to 
care about his good only insofar as he cares about the person whose good 
it is — that is, himself.7
Think here of the familiar connection between how you feel about 
yourself and how you feel about your good. Sometimes when you realize 
that you have done something mean-spirited or shameful, you come to feel 
worthless as a person; you may even hate yourself; and one symptom of 
self-hatred is a loss of concern for your own welfare. It no longer seems to 
matter whether life treats you well or badly, because you yourself seem to 
be no good. Your desire for your good thus depends on your concern for 
yourself — and rationally so, according to Darwall’s analysis.
Note that self-loathing isn’t the feeling that you are worthless to yourself. 
Indeed, the value that things afford to you is precisely what no longer 
seems to matter, and so your having no value to yourself wouldn’t seem 
to matter, either. The reason why value accruing to you no longer seems to 
matter, however, is just that you don’t seem to matter, period. You have lost 
your appreciation for the value that things have in relation to your interest 
because you have lost a sense of embodying value in yourself.
Now, things could still be good for you, in Darwall’s analysis, even if you 
didn’t embody any value; since they could still be such as would be rational 
for someone to want if he cared about you, however baseless the latter 
concern might be. But things that were good for you would not actually 
merit concern unless you merited concern; and if you didn’t, then despite 
their being good for you, they wouldn’t ultimately be worth wanting, after 
all. As I put it a moment ago: What’s good for you wouldn’t matter if you 
didn’t matter.
This account of a person’s good therefore implies — rightly, again, in 
my opinion — that what’s good for a person is not a categorical value, any 
more than what’s good for a purpose. What’s good for a purpose is worth 
7  The points made here and in the following paragraph appear in Anderson, Value in Ethics 
and Economics, p. 26.
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caring about only out of concern for the purpose, and hence only insofar 
as the purpose is worth caring about. Similarly, what’s good for a person 
is worth caring about only out of concern for the person, and hence only 
insofar as he is worth caring about. A person’s good has only hypothetical 
or conditional value, which depends on the value of the person himself.8
Of course, we assume that a person’s good does matter. But we make this 
assumption only because we assume that people matter — that everyone 
has a value that makes him worth caring about. Darwall’s analysis of a 
person’s good reveals how our appreciation of value that accrues to 
someone depends on a prior appreciation of a value inhering in him. 
The latter value cannot be relative to personal interests, on pain of 
setting off a problematic regress. If this value were relative to someone’s 
interest, then it would matter only to the same extent as that beneficiary. 
This regress of values would continue until it reached a value that was not 
relative to anyone’s interest and that consequently mattered for its own 
sake. In fact, however, the regress never gets started, because we assume 
that every person already matters for his own sake, because he embodies 
an interest-independent value.
A value of this kind, which a person has in himself but not for anyone, is the 
basis of Kantian moral theory. Kant’s term for this value is ‘dignity’, and 
he attributes dignity to all persons in virtue of their rational nature. What 
morality requires of us, according to Kant, is that we respect the dignity of 
persons.9
The dignity of a person is a value that differs in kind from his interest. 
Unlike his interest, for example, his dignity is a value on which his opinion 
carries no more weight than anyone else’s. Because this value does not 
accrue to him, he is in no better position to judge it than others. Similarly, 
respect for a person’s autonomy does not require deference to him on 
questions of his dignity, as it does on questions of his good. On the contrary, 
respect for a person’s autonomy just is an appreciation of a value in him 
that amounts to a dignity, in Kant’s sense of the term, precisely because 
8  This point, too, is made by Anderson.
9  Here I am making a leap that requires more justification than I can provide in the present 
context. I am equating the value that we appreciate in caring about a person with the value 
that we appreciate, somewhat differently, in respecting that person in the Kantian sense. I 
defend this equation in “Love as a Moral Emotion”, Ethics 109 (1999): 338-374, reprinted in 
Self to Self: Selected Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 70-109.
28 Beyond Price
it commands respect. If a person denies embodying such a value, he can 
hardly claim that we should defer to him out of an appreciation for a value 
such as he denies. He cannot claim, in other words, that out of respect for 
his autonomy we should defer to his judgment that he possesses nothing 
worthy of our respect.
Nor is it paternalistic to challenge a person’s judgment about his dignity, 
as it is in the case of his good. Challenging a person’s judgment about his 
good is objectionable because it undermines his role as the agent of his own 
affairs; but his value as a person is not just his affair. Although his good is 
a value that accrues to him alone, in the first instance, his value as a person 
inheres in him among other persons. It’s a value that he possesses by virtue 
of being one of us, and the value of being one of us is not his alone to assess 
or defend. The value of being a person is therefore something larger than 
any particular person who embodies it.
That’s what I miss in so many discussions of euthanasia and assisted 
suicide: a sense of something in each of us that is larger than any of us, 
something that makes human life more than just an exchange of costs for 
benefits, more than just a job or a trip to the mall. I miss the sense of a value 
in us that makes a claim on us — a value that we must live up to.
I don’t deny that there are circumstances under which it would be better 
for one’s life to end and permissible to hasten its ending. What I deny is 
that one may end one’s life simply because one isn’t getting enough out of 
it. One has to consider whether one is doing justice to it.
If a person possesses no value that he must live up to, or do justice 
to, then his life becomes a mere instrument, to be used or discarded 
according to whether it serves his interest. His moral claim to his 
own life then looks something like this:
[A] patient’s right to life includes a right not to be killed. But that right gives 
[him] a protected option whether to live or die, an option with which others 
cannot legitimately interfere; it does not give [him] a duty to live. If a patient 
decides to die, he is waiving his right to live. By waiving his right, he releases 
others (perhaps a specific other person) from a duty not to kill him.
This can’t be right. It portrays morality as protecting a person’s options 
without protecting the person himself, except insofar as his own existence 
is one of his options. Surely, however, options are worth protecting, not for 
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their own sake, but for the sake of the person whose options they are. So 
how can morality treat the person as worth protecting only for the sake of 
protecting one of his options? If he doesn’t already merit protection, how 
can they? 
The quotation above is drawn from an essay by Frances Kamm, who goes 
on to answer Kantian objections as follows:10
Suppose life involves such unbearable pain that one’s whole life is focused 
on that pain. In such circumstances, one could, I believe, decline the honor of 
being a person. …We might acknowledge the great (and normally overriding) 
value of being a person … [and yet] allow that some bad conditions may 
overshadow its very great value.
Here Kamm is claiming that someone can view life as a mere option even 
while accepting the Kantian view of his value as a person. The problem 
with this passage is that it misstates the Kantian view.
When Kamm says that the value of a person normally “overrid[es]” the 
value of other goods, but can be “overshadow[ed]” by conditions that are 
exceptionally bad, she implies that it can be balanced against the person’s 
interest. And when she goes on to speak of this value as an “honor” that the 
person can decline, she implies that it is actually part of a person’s interest, 
since an honor accrues to a particular person, whose role as its beneficiary 
entitles him to accept or decline it.
But the dignity of a person isn’t something that he can accept or decline, 
since it isn’t a value for him; it’s a value in him, which he can only violate or 
respect. Nor can it be weighed against what is good or bad for the person. 
As I have argued, value for a person stands to value in the person roughly as 
the value of means stands to that of the end: in each case, the former merits 
concern only on the basis of concern for the latter. And conditional values 
cannot be weighed against the unconditional values on which they depend. 
The value of means to an end cannot overshadow or be overshadowed by 
the value of the end, because it already is only a shadow of that value, in the 
sense of being dependent upon it. Similarly, the value of what’s good for 
a person is only a shadow of the value inhering in the person, and cannot 
overshadow or be overshadowed by it.
10  Frances Kamm, “A Right to Choose Death?”, Boston Review 22 (1997): 20-23.
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These are abstract considerations, but they are concretely illustrated by the 
story with which I began. When my host claimed that he benefited more 
from the pleasures of smoking than he would be harmed by an early death, 
my first thought was that he had failed to consider harms and benefits to 
people other than himself. On second thought, however, I resented his 
assumption that harms and benefits were the only values at stake.
My host’s remarks implied that an early death, of the sort he was 
risking and I was hoping to forestall, would be a loss to him that could 
be offset by sufficient gains. But what would it matter how much I lost 
or gained if I myself would be no loss? My gains or losses would merit 
concern only on the basis of concern for me — which, being the basis of 
concern for them, could not then be offset by that concern. Hence, my 
gains or losses wouldn’t matter unless I had a value that could not be 
offset by theirs.
My host was implicitly denying the existence of such a value. For he 
claimed that death was worth worrying about only in respects for which he 
could be compensated by the pleasures of smoking. He was thus implicitly 
denying the interest-independent value of a person, without which it 
couldn’t really matter whether I lived or died.
Of course, he was denying the existence of this value in his own case, not 
in mine; but our cases were indistinguishable on this score. By implicitly 
denying his own interest-independent value, my host was somehow 
trivializing or denigrating himself as a person. Sometimes people’s self-
denigrating remarks just embarrass us, but in other instances they can be 
sufficiently principled to give offense. Recall my earlier reference to anti-
Semitism. Anti-Semitism can manifest itself in self-denigrating remarks, 
if it is the anti-Semitism of a self-hating Jew. My host’s disregard for his 
own value as a person offended me as another person, just as someone’s 
denigrating himself as a Jew would offend me as another Jew.
I think Kant was right to say that trading one’s person in exchange for 
benefits, or relief from harms, denigrates the value of personhood, respect 
for which is a criterion of morality (Kant would say, the criterion). That’s 
why I think that smoking is a vice — at least, when practiced for the 
reasons offered by my host. It’s also why I think that suicide is immoral 
when committed on the grounds that life isn’t worth living.
Mind you, I don’t go around snatching cigarettes out of people’s 
mouths. And I’m not sure that I would forcibly try to stop someone from 
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committing suicide solely because it would be immorally self-destructive. 
The impermissibility of someone else’s conduct doesn’t necessarily give 
me permission to interfere with it. By the same token, however, I think 
that encouraging or assisting others in impermissible conduct is itself 
impermissible. That’s why I think that the tobacco industry is engaged in 
an immoral enterprise. And it’s why I think the same of Dr. Kevorkian, who 
has done more than anyone to help people die by their own convictions.
Note that these moral judgments distinguish between self-destruction 
and mere self-harm. As I have said, I believe that people are sometimes 
entitled to act on mistaken judgments about their own interest; and to this 
extent, at least, they are entitled to harm themselves. But the behaviors that 
I have criticized don’t merely damage the agents’ interests; indeed, they 
may not damage the agents’ interests at all, if the agents are right about 
the costs and benefits involved. These behaviors are to be criticized, in my 
view, because they are premised on a disregard for the value of the agents 
themselves.
The same criticism would apply, for example, to agents who put up 
their own freedom as collateral in order to obtain loans. People have no 
right to sell themselves into slavery, no matter what their convictions, 
but the reason is not that they would thereby be harming themselves; the 
reason is that they would be violating their own personhood.
These moral judgments depend, of course, on my belief that a person has 
an interest-independent value; and they may consequently seem to impose 
my Kantian values even on people who don’t believe in them. Don’t people 
have the right to live and die by their own convictions as to the value of 
their lives?
If the question is whether people are morally permitted to end their 
existence solely because they find it unrewarding, then I have already 
answered in the negative, on the grounds that they would then be violating 
their own interest-independent value as persons. But of course the present 
question is meant to be taken differently, as suggesting that we defer to 
people’s judgments about whether they have an interest-independent 
value, in the first place. Under this interpretation, the question is not 
whether people are permitted to violate their own dignity but whether 
they are entitled to be believed when they insist that they have none. I have 
answered in the negative to this latter version of the question as well. The 
reasons for deferring to people about values relative to their interests do 
not apply in the case of interest-independent value.
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This answer may seem to beg the question, since it presupposes the 
existence of the very interest-independent value that is at issue. What I have 
now argued, however, is that we cannot avoid presupposing the existence 
of this value anyway, since it’s needed to account for the importance of 
interest-relative values. We cannot justify someone’s death on the grounds 
that it’s good for him, while also denying the existence of another value, 
embodied in him. For if he were himself a cipher, evaluatively speaking, 
then what’s good for him would be, in the same manner of speaking, good 
for nothing.
I admit that talk of someone’s value as a person sounds like religion rather 
than philosophy. Such talk is a secular version of religious talk about the 
sanctity of human life.
Historically speaking, however, most moral discourse has religious 
sources. The question for secular ethics is whether we can rationally accept 
the values bequeathed to us by religion while being skeptical of their 
theological basis. A question that’s equally pressing, though less widely 
acknowledged, is whether we can selectively accept some of these values 
while discarding others. My view is that our values will be incoherent so 
long as they lack a counterpart to the sanctity of human life.
This view will immediately seem to entail reactionary consequences, 
such as a rejection of euthanasia and abortion in any form. But a secular 
value that corresponds to the sanctity of human life needn’t be exactly the 
same value or yield exactly the same consequences. In particular, it need 
not attach to biological life or biological humanity per se; and so it needn’t 
rule out abortion, for example, simply because the fetus is both alive and 
human. What secular morality must regard as sacrosanct, I have suggested, 
is not the human organism but the person, and a fetus may embody one 
but not the other. 
Recognizing the interest-independent value of a person wouldn’t 
necessarily rule out euthanasia or suicide, either. On the contrary, 
recognizing such a value is essential to one familiar argument in favor of 
these practices — namely, the argument for dying with dignity.
The idea that dignity can justify a person’s death may seem incompatible 
with the Kantian conception of dignity as a value inhering in the person. 
Wouldn’t a person’s value always militate in favor of saving his life?
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This apparent conflict is due, however, to a confusion about the 
normative implications of dignity. Dignity is what Kant called a “self-
existent” value — a value to which we are obliged to respond only when it 
already exists, and then only by paying it reverence or respect. The value of 
persons does not oblige us to maximize the number of people in existence; 
it obliges us only to respect the people who do exist. And respecting these 
people is not necessarily a matter of keeping them in existence; it is rather 
a matter of treating them in the way that is required by their personhood 
— whatever way that is.11
The Kantian objection to suicide, then, is not that it destroys something 
of value. The objection is not even to suicide per se, but to suicide 
committed for a particular kind of reason — that is, in order to obtain 
benefits or escape harms. And the objection to suicide committed for this 
reason is that it denigrates the person’s dignity, by trading his person for 
interest-relative goods, as if it were one of them. This interpretation of the 
objection to suicide leaves open the possibility that a person’s dignity may 
justify suicide in other contexts, if suicide would constitute an appropriate 
expression of respect for one’s person. Kantianism would then be able to 
endorse the notion of dying with dignity.12
Actually, the phrase ‘dying with dignity’ is potentially misleading. We 
don’t think that a person’s death is morally acceptable so long as he can 
carry it off with dignity. Rather, we think that a person’s death is acceptable 
if he can no longer live with dignity. The operative concept is undignified 
life, not dignified death.
When a person cannot sustain both life and dignity, his death may 
indeed be morally justified. One is sometimes permitted, even obligated, to 
destroy objects of dignity if they would otherwise deteriorate in ways that 
would offend against that value. The moral obligation to bury or burn a 
corpse, for example, is an obligation not to let it become an affront to what 
it once was. Librarians have similar practices for destroying tattered books 
— and honor guards, for destroying tattered flags — out of respect for the 
dignity inherent in these objects.
11  The interpretation of Kant expressed in this paragraph is not uncontroversial. I defend it 
at length in “Love as a Moral Emotion”.
12  For a Kantian argument along these lines, see Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Self-Regarding Suicide: 
A Modified Kantian View”, in his Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 85-103.
34 Beyond Price
Of course, the value inhering in mere things, such as books or flags, must 
be different from that inhering in persons by virtue of their rational nature. 
But all of these values belong together as a class, the class of dignity values, 
whose defining characteristic is that they call for reverence or respect.13
These examples suggest that dignity can require not only the 
preservation of what possesses it but also the destruction of what is losing 
it, if the loss would be irretrievable.14 Dignity, unlike well-being, does not 
come in degrees that we are obliged to maximize; as we have seen, it is not 
a value whose existence we are obliged to promote at all. To treat a dignity 
value as capable of degrees, all of them worth preserving, would be to treat 
it like an ordinary good — which would in fact be disrespectful. Respect for 
an object of dignity can sometimes require its destruction.
The question, then, is what constitutes the loss of dignity for a person. The 
dignity in question has nothing to do with being dignified, with keeping up 
appearances, or with sustaining any particular social status. It has nothing to 
do with what people ought to admire or esteem in one another, or with what 
they actually respect. It is rather what they ought to respect, in the way that 
they can manifest only by treating one another morally. According to Kant, 
what people ought to respect in this way is one another’s rational nature.
Ironically, Kant’s view is borne out by Kamm’s example, in which “life 
involves such unbearable pain that one’s whole life is focused on that 
pain”. Kamm assumes that this case invites us to weigh the disvalue of 
pain against the value of being a rational agent. In fact, however, Kamm has 
described a case in which pain is more than painful, since it not only hurts 
the patient but also becomes the sole focus of his life. Pain that tyrannizes 
the patient in this fashion undermines his rational agency, by preventing 
13  Actually, I am inclined to think that the dignity of books or flags is borrowed from the 
dignity of personhood; but this question is beyond the scope of the present chapter.
14  I believe that this feature of dignity values explains why the permissibility of euthanasia 
and assisted suicide is limited mainly to cases of terminal illness. Felicia Ackerman 
has claimed that such a restricted permission is unstable (“Assisted Suicide, Terminal 
Illness, Severe Disability, and the Double Standard”, in Physician-Assisted Suicide: 
Expanding the Debate, ed. Margaret P. Battin, Rosamond Rhodes, and Anita Silvers 
[New York: Routledge, 1998], pp. 149-161). She argues that assistance in dying must 
be permissible either for all competent adults or for none. I agree with Ackerman that 
the arguments usually offered in favor of assistance in dying cannot be restricted to 
cases of terminal illness, although their proponents often adopt that restriction anyway, 
without justification. As Ackerman shows, e.g., the arguments of “The Philosophers’ 
Brief” support assisted suicide for everyone if they support it for anyone. But I think that 
the Kantian view can justify the restriction and that its ability to do so counts in its favor.
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him from choosing any ends for himself other than relief. It reduces the 
patient to the psychological hedonist’s image of a person — a pleasure-
seeking, pain-fleeing animal — which is undignified indeed. And Kamm is 
clearly envisioning that this severely reduced condition of the patient can 
be ended only by his death.
I suspect, then, that if euthanasia seems justified in Kamm’s example, 
the reason is not that relieving the patient’s pain is more important than his 
dignity as a person; the reason is rather that pain has already undermined 
the patient’s dignity, and irretrievably so. The example thus supports dying 
for the sake of dignity, not for the sake of self- interest.
I often wonder whether proponents of assisted suicide don’t overstate the 
moral significance of pain. Pain is a bad thing, of course, but I doubt whether 
it can justify anything close to euthanasia or suicide unless it is (as Kamm 
calls it) unbearable. And then what justifies death is the unbearableness of 
the pain rather than the painfulness.
What do we mean in calling pain unbearable? What is it not to bear pain? 
It certainly isn’t a matter of refusing to feel the pain, of shutting one’s eyes 
to it, as one might to an unbearable sight, or of walking away from it, as one 
might from an unbearable situation. Not to bear pain is somehow to fall 
apart in the face of it, to disintegrate as a person. To find pain unbearable is 
to find it thus destructive not just of one’s well-being but of oneself.
But then we make a mistake if we describe the patient in unbearable 
pain as if he were his rational old self, weighing the harm of pain against 
the benefits of existence. If his pain is truly unbearable, then he isn’t his 
rational self any longer: he is falling apart in pain. Even if he enjoys some 
moments of relief and clarity, he is still falling apart diachronically, a 
temporally scattered person at best.
I don’t think that we serve the patient well in these circumstances by 
claiming broad rights of self-determination in his name. He may indeed 
be entitled to help in dying, and he will certainly have to participate in the 
relevant decisions. But let us keep in mind that these decisions would be 
premature if the patient were not already in the twilight of his autonomy, 
where self-determination is more of a shadowy presumption than a clear fact.
I do not know how to frame a public policy or law that would distinguish 
between the cases in which I think that euthanasia or suicide is morally 
permissible and the cases in which I think it is not. Of course, the law would 
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not have to follow the moral vicissitudes of the practice so closely if they 
were covered by a right of self-determination. If there were a broad class of 
cases in which the patient had the right to decide for himself whether death 
was justified, then we could legalize euthanasia or assisted suicide in those 
cases, even though it might not be justified in all of them. If a patient then 
opted for death when it wasn’t justified, he would still be acting within his 
rights, which the law would have been justified in protecting.
But I do not believe that a person has the right, in general, to choose 
between life and death; nor do I believe that a person’s rights suddenly 
expand when he becomes terminally ill. So I don’t see how a case for 
legalization can be founded on rights of self-determination, and I am once 
again faced with the difficulty of legalizing death for the sake of dignity 
without also legalizing it for the sake of self-interest.
I certainly don’t think that the law should forbid activities simply because 
they have the potential of being self-destructive in some circumstances. I 
don’t think that mountain climbing should be outlawed — or smoking, 
for that matter. The problem is that killing, unlike mountain climbing 
or smoking, impinges on the dignity of persons essentially and not just 
in some unfortunate circumstances or cases. The result is that the law 
on killing, like the law on slavery, unavoidably expresses our collective 
valuation of personhood itself.
Supporters of euthanasia and assisted suicide sometimes liken them 
to the other intrinsically injurious treatments to which a patient may 
consent for his greater good — the cutting and stabbing and drugging and 
poisoning that are the physician’s stock in trade. Then they ask: What’s 
so special about killing?15 Isn’t killing just another medical intervention to 
which a patient should be allowed to submit when it serves his interest? 
My inclination is to answer this question with another: What’s so special 
about slavery? Isn’t enslavement just another cost that a person should be 
allowed to risk in pursuit of his interests?
Surely, there is something special about slavery. Though we may indeed 
have a right to live and die in light of our own convictions, it doesn’t extend 
to convictions about the price for which our freedom would be worth 
selling. Nor does it extend, in my view, to convictions about the price for 
which our lives would be worth ending. And self-interested reasons for 
15  Kamm asks this question in section 4 of “A Right to Choose Death?”
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ending our lives are, in the Kantian sense, reasons of price rather than 
dignity.
When it comes to the design of public policy on assisted suicide, I am 
inclined to think that considerations about the morality of the practice 
itself may be swamped by considerations about the collateral effects of 
legalization. As I have argued elsewhere, simply allowing people to opt for 
death may eliminate the conditions that make some people’s lives worth 
living, thereby creating new candidates for killing.16 Legalization would 
therefore do harm to people who are currently no more than bystanders to 
the debate.
These collateral harms might have to be tolerated if there were a 
fundamental right to choose between life and death. We can’t deprive 
all people of a choice to which they’re morally entitled just because some 
people would be better off without it.
What I have argued here, however, is that there isn’t a fundamental right 
to choose between life and death. There may still be a moral justification for 
death in some cases, but it doesn’t rest on a right of self-determination. And 
without such a right, the case for legalization must proceed more slowly — 
far more slowly than The Philosophers would like us to believe.
16  See “Against the Right to Die”, chapter 2 of this volume.

4. Beyond Price1
Kant argued that suicide is immoral when committed for the purpose 
of escaping from unhappiness. I have tried on one or two occasions to 
reconstruct Kant’s argument, by offering a particular interpretation of the 
Formula of Humanity, which says that a person has a value that makes 
him an end in himself.2 The statement that a person is an end, I interpret as 
expressing the fact that we ought to care about some things for the person’s 
sake, by caring about them out of concern for him. A person is an end in 
the sense that he is that for the sake of which — out of concern for which — 
some things are worth caring about. This conception of how a person can 
be an end yields an argument against escapist suicide, I argued, when it is 
combined with a particular conception of a person’s good, which is what 
the escapist attempts to serve by cutting his life short.
I borrowed the latter conception from Stephen Darwall, who contends 
that a person’s good consists in what it would be rational to care about 
for the person’s sake in the sense of caring about it out of concern for the 
1  This chapter is a substantially revised version of a paper that appeared in Ethics 118 (2008): 
191-212, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/523746. The first version of the paper was presented 
to a workshop on value at Columbia University. I am grateful to the participants for 
helpful discussion: Ruth Chang, Jonathan Dancy, Jim Griffin, Ulrike Heuer, Tom Hurka, 
Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, Maggie Little, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, Peter Railton, 
Joseph Raz, Jacob Ross, Michael Smith, and Larry Temkin. A subsequent version was 
presented to the philosophy department at the University of Miami and to the Legal 
Theory Workshop at Yale Law School. Thanks to Shelly Kagan and Ruth Marcus for 
additional comments on the latter occasion. Finally, it was presented to a conference 
organized by Jeanette Kennett at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics of 
the Australian National University.
2  “A Right of Self-Termination?”, chapter 3 of this volume; “A Brief Introduction to Kantian 
Ethics”, in Self to Self: Selected Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 
16-44; and “Reading Kant’s Groundwork”, in Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory, ed. 
George Sher (New York: Routledge, 2012), pp. 343-359.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.04
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person.3 Since this structure of concerns is the one that explains how a 
person can be an end, in my view, I suggested that a person’s good stands 
to the value of a person in a relation analogous to (though of course distinct 
from) that of means to an ordinary end, the former member of either pair 
being worth caring about for the sake of, or out of concern for, the latter. I 
then argued that escapist suicide entails a practical irrationality analogous 
to that of sacrificing an end for the sake of the means to it.
Such an irrationality is committed, for example, by people who grub 
for money. Money has value only as a means to happiness (let’s assume), 
but money-grubbers make themselves unhappy in the pursuit of money, 
thereby sacrificing happiness for the sake of something that is valuable 
only for its sake. A person makes a similar mistake, I argued, if he sacrifices 
himself for the sake of something that is valuable only for his sake by 
committing suicide to promote his own good. In either case, one thing 
(money, an end to unhappiness) is preferred to another (happiness, the 
person himself) even though it is worth caring about only out of concern 
for that to which it is preferred.
This analogy is open to two objections. Let me start with the one that I 
know how to answer.
The answerable objection goes like this. The reason why money is 
valuable for the sake of happiness is that it is instrumental to producing 
happiness, but the reason why relieving someone’s unhappiness is 
valuable for his sake is not that it’s instrumental to producing him. So 
whereas destroying happiness defeats the purpose of money, destroying 
oneself doesn’t clearly defeat the purpose of ending one’s unhappiness. 
Ending one’s unhappiness is good for oneself in a sense that doesn’t entail 
its having a purpose at all: its ultimate end is not a purpose but a person. 
What, then, is there to be defeated?4 
3  Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004).
4  Objections to my argument were first raised by Frances Kamm in “Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, the Doctrine of Double Effect, and the Ground of Value”, Ethics 109 (1999): 586-
605. I am now dissatisfied with the responses I made to Kamm in my appendix to “A 
Right of Self-Termination?”, which I have omitted from the version reprinted as chapter 
3 of this volume. I was prompted to revisit this debate by a discussion of the latter article 
at the Colloquium on Legal, Political, and Social Philosophy at New York University 
(led by Thomas Nagel and Ronald Dworkin), especially by Nagel’s comments on that 
occasion.
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The answer to this objection is that it misinterprets the analogy between 
a person and an ordinary end. Of course there is no instrumental relation 
between ending a person’s unhappiness and the person himself, but the 
instrumental relation between money and happiness is not what makes 
grubbing for money irrational anyway. What makes it irrational to seek 
money at the cost of happiness is that money is worth wanting only out 
of a desire for happiness. Seeking money at the cost of happiness thwarts 
the desire out of which money is worth caring about to begin with. The 
instrumental relation of money to happiness explains why the one is worth 
caring about out of concern for the other, but the irrationality in the case is 
generated by the resulting relation between these concerns, one of which 
depends on the other but is served in such a way as to frustrate it: the desire 
for money is served in such a way as to frustrate the desire for happiness, 
on which it depends. A similar relation obtains between ending one’s 
unhappiness through suicide and the value of the person himself: the one is 
worth caring about only out of concern for the other. A similar irrationality 
will be generated, then, if killing oneself thwarts the concern out of which 
ending one’s unhappiness is worth caring about, to begin with. 
But now comes the second objection, which is not so easily answered: 
How does killing oneself thwart the concern out of which ending one’s 
unhappiness is worth caring about? An end to one’s unhappiness is worth 
caring about, I claim, out of concern for one’s value as a person. But how 
is that latter concern frustrated when one pursues an end to unhappiness 
by means of suicide? This question becomes especially pressing in light of 
Kant’s view about a person’s value and its proper mode of appreciation. 
According to Kant, a person is a self-existent end, which is to be valued as 
it is, given that it exists, rather than as a thing to be brought into existence. 
And the mode of appreciation proper to such an end is respect, which is an 
attitude of self-restraint, inhibiting us from violating the person’s autonomy.
Well, killing a person does seem to violate his autonomy, to say the 
least. But when the victim is also the killer, his killing may be an exercise of 
his autonomy, too — so how can it qualify as a violation? Maybe escapist 
suicide, at worst, is a case of autonomy violating itself, a case toward which 
the attitude of respect must be, at worst, ambivalent. In that case, suicide 
would not exactly thwart the concern that underlies its own motivation.5
5  I am tempted to reply that escapist suicide is not autonomous, precisely because it is 
irrational. But I am trying to demonstrate its irrationality on the grounds that it thwarts 
the concern underlying its own motivation; if that concern is respect for autonomy, then 
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Surely, though, the argument was already in trouble once respect for 
autonomy was introduced. Respect was introduced in the role of that 
appreciation for a person’s value out of which it makes sense to care about 
the person’s good. But respect is simply the wrong attitude for that role. 
Rather than sort out whether suicide is more expressive than destructive 
of autonomy, let us consider alternative attitudes to which the motive for 
escapist suicide might more plausibly be subordinate.
Darwall proposes that the response out of which things are worth 
valuing when they are valuable for a person’s sake, is an attitude that he 
calls “sympathetic concern” for that person. This proposal will be vacuous, 
of course, if sympathetic concern must be defined as a concern for the 
person’s interests: to define a person’s interests as comprising whatever is 
worth valuing out of concern for his interests would be tautologous. But 
Darwall argues that sympathetic concern can be identified without being 
defined, since it is a natural kind of affective response, which can be singled 
out by paradigm instances. 
Yet I suspect that sympathy, like respect, is ill-suited to serve as the 
concern in relation to which a person’s interests should be defined. 
Although sympathy is not the same as empathy, it is an empathic response 
— a variant of empathy — and so it focuses on the feelings of its object. 
What sympathetic concern for a person disposes us to care about will 
therefore tend to be the state of his feelings, and the resulting conception 
of a person’s good must consequently have a bias toward hedonism. While 
I don’t think that the very concept of a person’s good should rule out 
hedonism, I don’t think that it should rule in its favor, either.
Moreover, what would make sense to care about out of sympathetic 
concern for a person is not necessarily what we would judge to be in that 
person’s interest. For example, parents who think that the welfare of their 
child requires them to administer punishment or harsh medicine may be 
inhibited from doing so precisely by sympathetic concern. In order to do 
what’s best for the child, they may have to overcome their sympathetic 
impulses — which suggests that sympathy is not always a reliable guide to 
the well-being of its object.6
I am at risk of arguing in a circle. For if escapist suicide is irrational because it thwarts 
respect for autonomy, and it thwarts that concern because it isn’t autonomous, then the 
reason why it isn’t autonomous cannot be that it is irrational.
6  Of course, one might argue that punishing the child would express a higher or better-
informed sympathy than sparing the child. But such an argument would seem to rely on 
a prior conception of the child’s interests, as a basis for privileging one form of sympathy 
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Suppose that the parent punishes the child, saying, “I’m doing this for 
your own good.” The parent would be unlikely to elaborate by saying, “So, 
you see, I’m doing it out of sympathy for you.” They both know that insofar 
as he feels sympathy, the parent is acting in spite of it. If he offers any 
elaboration on the claim to be acting for the child’s good, he is more likely 
to say, “So, you see, I’m doing this because I love you.” Thus, if the child’s 
good is that which is worth caring about out of some attitude toward the 
child, then the relevant attitude is not sympathy but love.7
Maybe this emendation to Darwall’s conception of well-being can yield 
an emendation to the argument that I rested upon it — my argument for a 
rational obstacle to escapist suicide. Fashioning such an emendation will be 
my aim in the rest of this chapter.
If a person’s good is to be analyzed as that which is worth caring about 
out of love for the person, then the relevant form of love must be carefully 
distinguished from the romantic or sexual emotion that goes by the same 
name — the love of falling or being “in” love — since romantic or sexual 
love is largely possessive, even self-seeking. The same goes for various 
other attitudes that tend to accompany love, such as attachment. We can 
feel attached to people without loving them, and we can love people to 
whom we are not especially attached.
There is a sense of the verb ‘to love’ that denotes a kind of solicitous 
behavior that characterizes the familial relationships with which the 
emotion is conventionally associated. The “loving mother” or “loving 
husband” of standard obituaries was loving in this sense — actively 
attentive, affectionate, caring. Many philosophers assume that the emotion 
of love must be the attitude that naturally motivates such behavior, hence a 
benevolent form of affection. There certainly is such an attitude, and there 
is nothing wrong with calling it “love”. 
Yet benevolent affection is an emotion that we can recognize animals as 
manifesting toward their young; it is also felt by children for their special 
toys, by gardeners for their flowers, and by philatelists for their stamps. 
This emotion is unlikely to reveal anything that we don’t already know 
as higher or better-informed than another; so it seems to reverse the order of analysis 
in Darwall’s account, by identifying the relevant valuing attitude in terms of well-being 
rather than vice versa.
7  The following discussion of love is an attempt to summarize and expand upon my 
discussion in “Love as a Moral Emotion”, Ethics 109 (1999): 338-374, reprinted in Self to 
Self, pp. 70-109.
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about the interests of these beloved objects. The philia of philately is not, I 
think, an emotion whose nature will help us to understand what is best for 
stamps. The philatelist does indeed take loving care of his stamps, but he 
does so under the guidance of some antecedent conception of what it is for 
stamps to be in good condition. He cannot simply love his stamps and let 
his heart be his guide.
Yet there is an emotion, also called love, which is indeed a guide to the 
interests of the beloved. This emotion is present in many loving relationships, 
where it can be difficult to disentangle from benevolent affection, but it can 
be absent from such relationships as well. People can take loving care of 
companions or wards with genuine feeling that nevertheless amounts to 
no more than fondness, because it falls short of that fiercer emotion that 
can only be called love. Conversely, they can feel the latter emotion for 
someone without being thereby moved to treat him lovingly, as becomes 
especially clear in relationships carried on at arm’s length. Students can 
love a teacher — or patients, a doctor — without having any inclination 
to cuddle or coddle him; there can be love between colleagues who would 
never presume to take care of one another; and even loving friendships can 
be characterized by a formality that rules out intrusions into one another’s 
lives. Finally, what I have described as the fiercer and more compelling 
form of love can coexist with, can indeed give rise to, the very opposite of 
benevolent affection, in the form of hostility or even hate. You can want to 
hurt someone you love, and both your love for him and your desire to hurt 
him can still be wholehearted.
This last possibility is not incompatible with my suggestion that love 
is a guide to the interests of the beloved. The suggestion is not that love 
necessarily involves a desire for the good of the beloved or — to correct the 
order of analysis — that a person’s good is that which loving him would 
necessarily involve a desire for. Rather, the suggestion modifies Darwall’s 
account by saying that a person’s good is that which is worth caring about, 
or which makes sense to care about, out of love for that person. And the 
acknowledgment that love needn’t involve a desire for the beloved’s good 
is perfectly compatible with the claim that it provides a natural motive or 
reason for such a desire. Or — to correct the order of analysis once again — 
the acknowledgment that what is wanted by a lover need not be good for the 
beloved is compatible with the claim that what is worth wanting, or makes 
sense to want, out of love for the person is indeed what is good for him.
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The question is what love makes it appropriate or rational to care about. 
More specifically, the question is what can constitute a person’s good by 
virtue of being that which loving him makes it appropriate or rational to 
care about — a question to which the answer must be more substantive 
than “the person’s good”. Here I want to adopt a suggestion from Connie 
Rosati, who has criticized Darwall’s sympathy-based account of well-being 
as follows:8 “When we appreciate the value, as it seems to us, of a work of 
art, we endeavor to preserve it in its valuable condition. Likewise, when 
we appreciate, as it seems to us, the value of a person, we seek to preserve 
the person in her condition as the valuable being she is. Just what attitude 
might capture this idea without itself involving concern for a person’s 
welfare, I will not venture to guess. But care or sympathetic concern seems 
not to be it.”
Clearly, loving someone is a way of appreciating his value. Rosati’s 
analogy therefore suggests that what it makes sense to care about out of 
love for a person is the preservation of the value or the valuable condition 
to which love is an appreciative response.
The next question, of course, is what sort of value or valuable condition is 
appreciated by love. Some philosophers would understand this question 
as equivalent to the question what we love people for; and they would 
answer it by citing the various qualities for which we love our parents, 
spouses, children, and friends — their fine characters, their fetching looks, 
their sense of humor, or their shared history with us. But I have difficulty 
believing that the value to which we respond in loving people is conferred 
on them by the miscellaneous qualities that we profess to love them for. As 
many philosophers have pointed out, we often profess to love people even 
for their flaws; but surely loving them doesn’t give us reason for wanting 
those flaws to be perpetuated.
My view is that loving a person “for” some quality is not a matter of 
responding to a value conferred on him by that quality.9 Rather, I claim, the 
8  Connie S. Rosati, “Darwall on Welfare and Rational Care”, Philosophical Studies 30 (2006): 
619-635, p. 626.
9  Of course, we can love someone without there being anything for which we love him. See 
D. W. Hamlyn, “The Phenomena of Love and Hate”, Philosophy 53 (1978): 5-20, p. 8: “To 
be loved full-stop is simply to be loved without there being anything that the love is for. 
In such a situation there is likely to be some explanation why the love came into being, 
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qualities for which we love someone are qualities that show us or remind 
us or symbolize for us that value to which we respond by loving him. They 
are signs of his value, not its substance. To find someone’s crooked smile 
endearing is not to find him more valuable in virtue of smiling crookedly; it 
is rather to find the smile emblematic of what is valuable about him, which 
would still be valuable even if his smile were straight.
The value that makes people proper objects of love is a topic that 
seems to be surrounded by paradox. In loving someone, we treasure him 
as special and irreplaceable; yet we love more than one person, and we 
believe that almost everyone is worthy of being loved by someone. If 
everyone is worthy of being loved, however, then everyone is worthy of 
being treasured as special, and so everyone must be special — in which 
case, there must be nothing special, or at least nothing especially special, 
about anyone. There’s a paradox for you. Here is another. We love our own 
children above all other children, and yet we don’t honestly believe that 
our children are more valuable than others. How can we be so selective in 
appreciating a value that we acknowledge to be virtually universal?
Niko Kolodny has argued that our reasons for loving a person lie in our 
relationship with the person — his being our parent, spouse, child, or 
friend. What makes someone special, according to this view, is that he is 
special to us by virtue of sharing a particular relationship with us. Everyone 
can be special, then, because everyone can be special to someone, with 
whom he shares a similar relationship.
Although I find much to admire in Kolodny’s discussion of love, I find his 
thesis unpersuasive. We probably cannot love people with whom we aren’t 
acquainted, but I think that we can indeed love acquaintances with whom 
we have no significant relationship — love them at first sight or from afar. 
We can also love people whose relationship with us we do not value at all, as 
when divorcing couples still love one another despite looking back on their 
marriage as a disaster from day one. People who are estranged from their 
parents or siblings generally say that refusing to have any further dealings 
with these people does not entail loving them any less.10
and it is possible with some objects of love for one to love them for the fact that and 
because of the circumstances in which the love came into being; but there seems to me 
no necessity that it should be like that — the circumstances may explain the continuance 
of the love but they may not be what the love is for. I suggest that love is possible where 
there is nothing that the love is for.”
10  See Hamlyn, “The Phenomena of Love and Hate”, p. 9: “It might be [said] that it must at 
least be true that the lover desires the beloved, wants to be with him/her/it, or something 
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At a more fundamental level, I find love as Kolodny conceives it to be 
self-centered, since it responds to a value that the beloved has, not because 
of what he is in himself, but because of what he is to us. Love so conceived 
is a response to a fundamentally egocentric value, a value that others have 
in virtue of the part they play in our lives. I doubt whether love is really so 
egocentric.
In responding to a related objection, Kolodny says: 11
Nevertheless, it may be replied, even if we are not valued only instrumentally 
on the relationship theory, we are still valued extrinsically and nonfinally. 
Our relatives value us, it might be said, in the way one might value a now 
useless pen that once belonged to Winston Churchill: as an [intrinsically] 
worthless object that merits a certain response only because it is associated 
with something of final worth. This analogy, however, is misleading in 
at least two respects. First, our relatives do not deny that we are finally 
valuable. However else they view us, they view us as persons, and hence as 
beings with final value. Second, it is not the case that our relatives’ valuing 
us is optional, given that they value their relationships to us. According to 
the relationship theory, their valuing us is constitutive of their valuing their 
relationships to us, in the sense that they cannot respond appropriately to 
the value of their relationships to us without also valuing us. Admiring 
Churchill, by contrast, does not require fetishizing his possessions.
Here Kolodny concedes that when people love us, they regard us as 
valuable in ourselves, because they regard us as persons. Yet according to 
Kolodny, this appreciation of our value as persons is distinct from people’s 
love for us, which is based instead on our relationship with them.
In my view, appreciation for someone’s value as a person is not distinct 
from loving him: it is the evaluative core of love. I do not mean that love 
is a value judgment to the effect that the beloved has final value as an end 
in himself. Love is rather an appreciative response to the perception of 
that value. And I mean “perception” literally: the people we love are the 
ones whom we succeed in perceiving as persons within some of the human 
organisms milling about us. Only sometimes in this throng do we vividly 
see a face or hear a voice or feel a touch as animated by the inner presence 
of that kind. I am not sure that even this has to be true. Suppose that someone has got 
to the point of recognizing the absolutely disastrous character of a relationship. It is 
possible for them to renounce it and any desire for its continuance while still loving the 
person concerned.” 
11  Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”, The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 
135-189, p. 156. I have substituted the word ‘intrinsically’ for ‘extrinsically’ in the original 
passage, on the assumption that the latter is a misprint.
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of a self-aware, autonomous other — a person who is self to himself, like 
us. Iris Murdoch says that “love is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real”12 — that someone other than oneself 
is real, I would say, in the case of love for a person. A sense of wonder at 
the vividly perceived reality of another person is, in my view, the essence 
of love. 
It is because the reality of other persons is not directly perceptible to 
us that we love people for their faces and voices — and even their flaws 
— which somehow alert us to the presence of another inner life alongside 
our own. Not every smile strikes us quite forcibly with the presence of the 
person behind it — not one in a million — which is why we love but one in 
a million, perhaps for his smile. We do not see most people for what they 
are, even if we know what they are. And what are they, that they are worthy 
of being loved, except other persons like ourselves?
This explanation for the selectivity of love still doesn’t solve the puzzle 
of everyone’s being worthy of love and hence worthy of being valued as 
special. Even if each of us can value only a few people as special, the thought 
that everyone deserves to be so valued seems to imply that everyone 
actually is special — in which case, no one is special, after all. 
The solution to this puzzle, I think, is to realize that what makes a 
person special is not a value that sets him apart from others; it’s a value that 
calls for appreciating him by setting him apart, a mode of appreciation that 
considers him alone. The key to this solution is that values are normative, 
in the first instance, not for actions or choices but rather for appreciative 
attitudes.13 To be valuable is to be worthy of being valued in some way 
— that is, worthy of being the object of some appreciative response. This 
conception allows us to understand a kind of value that is not merely 
incommensurable but constitutively incomparable, because it is properly 
appreciated by a response that essentially involves a refusal to make 
comparisons, an insistence on cherishing its object in isolation from others. 
Love is just such an attitude. We treasure the object of our love as special, 
not by comparing him favorably with alternative love objects, but rather 
by focusing appreciative attention solely on him, shunning any thought 
12  Iris Murdoch, “The Sublime and the Good”, in Existentialists and Mystics: Writings on 
Philosophy and Literature, ed. Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1997), 205-220, p. 215.
13  I borrow this conception of value from Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
 Beyond Price 49
of alternatives. Each person is special in the sense that he deserves to be 
valued singularly in this manner, as he is in himself. In this sense, each 
person can be literally beyond compare.
I believe that deserving to be valued singularly, without comparison, is 
what Kant had in mind when he spoke of a person as a self-existent end. The 
appearance of paradox in this doctrine is due to a confusion between being 
valued singularly, without comparison, and being evaluated as singular 
in comparison with others. The latter cannot be deserved by everyone, 
obviously, but the former can.
Thus far I have said that love is a noncomparative response to another’s 
personhood as vividly perceived through the medium of those 
characteristics which we are said to love the person for. But what can be 
said about the response itself? How do we respond to another person in 
loving him?
For an answer to this question, I draw on a comparison that many 
philosophers find counterintuitive — namely, a comparison between 
love and Kantian respect. The comparison shouldn’t be counterintuitive, 
I claim, because love is a moral emotion: in particular, it is the emotion by 
which moral sensibilities are first implanted in children and by which the 
moral sensibilities of adults are enlivened or, if necessary, revived. If loving 
someone were not somehow akin to respecting him, love could not be the 
moral education that it is.14
Now, Kant characterizes the response to a person that he calls respect 
by saying that it “checks” or “arrests” our self-seeking motives, which 
might otherwise move us to use the person merely as a means to our 
ends.15 I think that love resembles respect in being an arresting awareness 
of another’s value — a description that I intend to be understood both 
phenomenologically and functionally. Like wonder, awe, and amazement, 
these emotions give us the feeling of being pulled up short, brought to 
attention, riveted, transfixed. And in each of these emotions some other, 
distracting motivational tendency is actually being arrested, though it is not 
the same tendency in every case. Whereas respect arrests our self-interested 
14  Harry Frankfurt says, “The function of love … is not to make people good.” I disagree. 
(Or I would insist that making people good is, if not the function of love, at least one of 
its effects.) Frankfurt’s statement appears in “The Dear Self”, Philosophers’ Imprint 1, no. 
1 (2001), http://www.philosophersimprint.org/001000/
15  Actually, Kant says that what respect “checks” is our self-love, but Kant isn’t thinking of 
love at all, in my view. ‘Self-love’ for Kant means “self-interest”.
50 Beyond Price
designs on a person, love arrests our emotional defenses against him, 
leaving us emotionally vulnerable to him.16 In colloquial terms, loving 
someone lays our heart open to him, leaving us emotionally disarmed and 
susceptible to all manner of other emotions toward him.
This difference between respect and love is reflected in their motivational 
potentials. Because respect for a person checks our self-interested motives 
toward him, its motivational force tends toward restraint, abstinence, and 
noninterference. Because love for a person checks our emotional defenses 
against him, its motivational force favors involvement and engagement. 
Respecting someone, we take care not to do various things to him or to let 
various things happen to him; loving someone, we are open to caring about 
him in all sorts of ways.
The foregoing descriptions of love are too abstract to convey the feeling, 
of course; indeed, their abstractness serves only to make them seem 
phenomenologically false. I have tried to describe the feeling of love by 
saying that it is an arresting awareness of value, similar to other arresting 
responses such as wonder and awe, and that it arrests our emotional defenses, 
so that it results in an opening of the heart. I hope that these admittedly 
vague and metaphorical descriptions find at least some resonance in the 
reader’s experience of love. I have tried to think of a familiar experience 
that will similarly resonate with my claim that this arresting awareness of 
value is, more specifically, an awareness of personhood. Oddly enough, the 
best example I can find is one that doesn’t involve actual personhood at all: 
it’s the experience of loving a dog.
It’s not so odd, really. Precisely because a dog isn’t a person, we can more 
readily notice when we start to see him as one. If he’s the right dog and we 
have the right rapport with him, we come to see him looking back at us 
with what seems like intelligent self-awareness, which makes his habitual 
obedience seem more like respect for us, and his instinctual affection more 
like love. Looking into his eyes, we seem to see someone there, someone who 
can reciprocate these interpersonal emotions. And having seen someone 
there, we are susceptible to feeling that form of love which I have described 
16  I suspect that aesthetic appreciation is an arresting awareness in the same sense, 
responding to the beauty of an artwork, e.g., in a way that leaves us emotionally 
vulnerable to its content. I believe that Kant describes respect as an arresting awareness. 
What is arrested in respect, according to Kant, is self-love — though I believe that ‘love’ 
is a misnomer, since what Kant has in mind is self-interest.
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as fiercer than mere benevolent affection. We are also susceptible to feeling 
not just irritated by the dog, if he misbehaves, but betrayed, because we 
have trusted him, when we should have known that all there is to trust is 
his training.
I am quite sure that my feelings for my late poodle were a response to the 
experience of seeing someone there in his eyes. In clearheaded moments, I 
don’t believe that there really was someone there, but I am still under the 
illusion after his death, remembering him as I would a deceased person 
— not a lost toy for which I felt a fond attachment but a beloved personal 
presence, even though he was only a dog.
Murdoch’s description of love as the realization that something is real other 
than oneself may seem to imply that loving oneself is either unavoidable or 
impossible.17 If things other than oneself are the ones whose reality is difficult 
to realize, then perhaps one’s own reality is obvious and the realization 
constitutive of love is unavoidable in reference to oneself. Or perhaps one 
can never have the requisite realization in reference to oneself, because it 
must be the realization of reality in something else. In fact, however, I think 
that Murdoch’s description explains self-love more convincingly than the 
alternatives. Specifically, it better explains why loving oneself is possible 
but by no means easy, a moderately difficult accomplishment.
Of course, most people think well of themselves, and most also favor 
their own interests. If love were just a form of flattery or favoritism, then 
self-love would be virtually universal. But our test for whether people 
genuinely love themselves comes when we love them, thereby responding 
to their value in a way that models what self-love on their part would be. 
And when we love people, we frequently find that their self-flattery and 
self-favoritism fall somewhat short of love.
Genuine self-love is elusive because it requires a vivid awareness of 
one’s personhood, consisting in one’s rational autonomy. One can rarely 
avoid being vividly present to oneself as the conscious subject of feelings 
and behaviors, but one can easily be blinded to one’s own autonomy or to 
the moral valence of that capacity. One can consequently raise emotional 
defenses against oneself, defenses that take the familiar forms of repression 
and dissociation. One feels threatened by one’s unruly impulses, because 
one is blinded to one’s own capacity to tame them with the force of respect 
17  On the subject of self-love, see Frankfurt, “The Dear Self”. I will have more to say about 
this essay in the Appendix, below.
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and love, and so one is moved to deny having such impulses or being 
responsible for the behavior that might express them. Self-love enables one 
to accept the presence of unruly impulses, to accept oneself as subject to 
them, because it involves the vivid awareness of something in oneself that 
can be trusted to manage them. And self-love thereby facilitates the lifting 
of repression and the healing of dissociation.18
When I say that loving someone is a response to the value of rational 
autonomy, I am not saying that we love him for being rationally autonomous. 
My view, as I have said, is that the qualities “for” which we love someone 
are the qualities that serve as signs or symbols of his rational autonomy in 
our eyes. To my knowledge, this view is the only way to explain why we 
can love someone for his flaws.
Sometimes the recognition of a brushstroke as a flaw is what alerts us 
to its surroundings as a work of art, as having a value without which that 
stroke would be just another daub of paint. Similarly, an actor’s portrayal 
of a character’s weaknesses can be what makes the character seem real — 
really a person, that is, having those powers of rational autonomy against 
which human traits can stand out as weaknesses. A trait that would be 
merely a nuisance in another animal can be, in a person, the foil that casts 
his personhood into relief, the exception that proves the rule. We can love 
someone for his flaws, then, because our seeing them as flaws can be what 
alerts us to the fact that we are seeing a person, with the capacities against 
which they stand out as flaws.
My conception of love, when combined with the views of Darwall and 
Rosati, favors an Aristotelian conception of a person’s interests. What 
it makes sense to care about out of love for a person is the unimpeded 
realization of his personhood, which might be described as his flourishing, 
in that sense of the term which is used to translate Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’. 
Caring about the self-realization of the beloved is not intrinsic to the 
emotion of love itself; it is one of the further responses to which love makes 
us susceptible by disarming our emotional defenses. But it is the further 
response that most naturally ensues when our defenses have been disarmed 
in response to the value of the beloved in himself, since it is a desire to see 
that value brought to its fullest realization.
18  It also facilitates self-forgiveness.
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We can observe this aspect of love in the feelings of parents for their 
young adult children, who are just coming into the full realization of their 
personhood. What I found natural to care about out of love for my adolescent 
children was, to begin with, that they find direction — goals in pursuit of 
which to exercise their powers. Nothing makes parents of young adults 
fret more than seeing their children adrift.19 And once my children adopted 
some directions — and there were many different directions over the years 
— I found myself caring about their progress in those directions, no matter 
how little intrinsic value I might have been inclined to see there in advance. 
In a quick succession of years, I became deeply interested in lacrosse 
and Morris dancing, poetry slams and photography, and specifically in 
the accomplishments of a particular midfielder, Morris dancer, poet, or 
photographer, because these were the directions that my children had set 
for themselves. Of course, I eventually learned to appreciate some of these 
accomplishments intrinsically: I would realize with amazement that I was 
cheering as my son walloped a schoolmate with a metal stick, or that I 
was applauding choreography that previously would have struck me as 
no more than quaint. But I learned to appreciate these accomplishments, 
to begin with, because they were the ones that my children had chosen to 
cultivate. In other words, I learned to appreciate them out of love for my 
children.
These examples introduce three distinct but related values. First is the 
value of my children as persons. Next is the value of their good, which 
consists in whatever it makes sense to care about out of an appreciation 
for their value. I have suggested that the relevant mode of appreciation is 
love, and that what it makes sense to care about out of love for them is the 
realization of their autonomy — their exercise of the capacity to which my 
love is an appreciative response. In loving my sons, I respond to the powers 
constitutive of their personhood, and it then makes sense for me to care 
about their exercise of those powers, bringing their personhood to fruition. 
And their exercise of those powers, because it is that which it makes sense 
to me to care about out of appreciation of their value, is what constitutes 
their good.
19  Frankfurt makes a similar point in “The Dear Self”, p. 10. (I quote the relevant passage 
at n. 26, below.) See also Frankfurt’s essay “On the Usefulness of Final Ends”, in his 
Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 82-94.
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Finally, there is the value of the ends in whose pursuit my children 
realized their autonomy. Caring about their ends is not quite the same 
as caring about their interests, though the two are deeply entangled. 
Playing lacrosse wasn’t essential to my son’s good: he could have exercised 
his powers in many other pursuits instead. But of course his autonomy 
could be properly exercised only in pursuits of his own choosing, and 
lacrosse was what he chose. I might have thought that lacrosse was a bad 
choice — indeed, a choice inimical to his interests, if I had thought that it 
would expose him to serious injury that would damage his prospects for 
autonomous pursuits in the future. In that case, I would have seen a conflict 
of value between his interests and his ends. This conflict would have been 
of the maddening sort that arises between values that are at least partly 
traceable to a common source.
The value of my son’s end, playing lacrosse, was distinct from the value 
of his good, which was the realization of his autonomy. But these two values 
were at least partly connected, because his end derived some of its value 
from its being that in pursuit of which he chose to realize his autonomy — a 
direction in which he decided that his flourishing would unfold. I will have 
more to say about this connection in a moment.
Because respect and love respond to the value of a person, they are 
responses out of which we do or want things for the person’s sake, thereby 
taking the person as our end. But what we do or want for the person’s sake 
out of love is rather different from what we do or want out of respect. The 
difference is perhaps clearest in our stance toward the person’s ends.
Respect for a person restrains us from interfering with his pursuit of 
his ends, and it can also restrain us from taking a stance of indifference to 
whether he has the wherewithal to pursue them. But insofar as we merely 
respect someone, his success in attaining his ends doesn’t matter to us, so 
long as we leave him free to do his best. I have now suggested that love 
engenders a different attitude, leading us to care about the full realization 
of personhood in the beloved through his autonomous endeavors. I have 
illustrated this suggestion by describing our tendency to care about the 
endeavors of someone we love even if we see no intrinsic value in them.
I think that this manifestation of love occurs in the reflexive case as well 
— that is, in love for oneself. Of course, one is already motivated toward 
one’s ends simply by virtue of having adopted them, to begin with: they 
are things that one wants, or at least aims to attain. And yet there are plenty 
of things that one wants or aims to attain without feeling that they really 
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matter or that attaining them is of any importance. One doesn’t take them 
seriously or care about them deeply. But if one loves oneself, then one will 
care about one’s ends, not merely out of having adopted them as ends, in 
the first place, but also out of concern for the realization of one’s autonomy 
through the pursuit and attainment of whatever ends one has adopted. 
One will have, in other words, a second-order concern for one’s ends, out of 
love for the self who has chosen to invest his autonomy in pursuing them. 
And this second-order concern will transform one’s ends from objects that 
one merely desires or aims at into objects about which one genuinely cares.
(The idea of such a transformation by second-order attitudes will be 
familiar from the work of Harry Frankfurt. And I think that the point I have 
just made about self-love, in particular, is present in some of Frankfurt’s 
writings, though not in the writings primarily devoted to the topic of love. 
In the Appendix to this chapter, I examine the relation between Frankfurt’s 
views on the subject and my own.)
I now return, at last, to the argument against escapist suicide, which 
occasioned the foregoing reflections on love and personal good. Do these 
reflections provide materials for repairing the argument?
On the conception of personal good that I have developed, a person’s 
good does not include his happiness essentially: it includes his happiness 
only because happiness is one of his ends. His good consists in the full 
realization of his rational autonomy, which is what would make sense 
to care about out of appreciation for his value as a person. His happiness 
makes sense to care about out of love for the person only because it is one of 
the ends in pursuit of which he must fully realize his autonomy. Indeed, it 
makes sense for him to care about, rather than merely desire, only out love 
for himself, and only as one of many ends whose pursuit would bring his 
autonomy to full realization.
Here escapist suicide impinges on the relevant concerns in the irrational 
manner that I described at the outset. In caring about our own autonomy 
out of self-love, we care about its full realization, which cannot come in the 
pursuit of a single end such as happiness, much less in the exercise of a 
single, one-time choice such as suicide. Out of respect for a person we can 
restrain ourselves from interfering with a single choice on his part, but in 
loving the person we want to see his autonomy brought to fruition more 
broadly. And because our own happiness is worth caring about only out of 
self-love, it is worth caring about only out of an appreciative response that 
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extends to more than any one exercise of autonomy. Insofar as a person 
still has a variety of ends that he is capable of pursuing autonomously, 
they make sense for him to care about out of self-love. But of course suicide 
brings all of his pursuits to an end. Suicide therefore thwarts the concern 
out of which happiness is worth wanting in the way that entrenches it in 
the person’s good. In sum, self-interested suicide is irrational.
My own view is that hastening death becomes morally appropriate only 
in the context of deterioration or suffering that compromises autonomy to 
an extent that can make talk of suicide inappropriate. But my conclusion 
about self-interested suicide can be stated more generally so as to encompass 
end-of-life decisions that are not solely on the shoulders of the prospective 
decedent. The conclusion is that we should not favor ending someone’s 
life out of sympathy for him or concern for his happiness; we should favor 
ending his life only when we can do so out of love.
I think that sympathy or benevolence toward a loved one can tempt 
us to indulge his expressed wish for assistance in dying even when our 
love for him rebels at the thought. Such are the cases in which we should 
hesitate, in my view. We must of course distinguish carefully between 
loving perception of the person as he really is and attachment to him as 
he formerly was. Reluctance to let go of what is already gone should not 
determine our response. But neither should sympathy or benevolence, 
when they are not seconded by genuine, clear-sighted love.
I have elsewhere endorsed the slogan ‘death with dignity’, which I 
interpret as meaning “death while dignity is still mostly intact, before it 
suffers further, irrevocable deterioration”.20 Unfortunately, however, the 
word ‘dignity’ is not generally understood in the morally relevant, Kantian 
sense; it is often used to denote grounds of self-esteem, such as youth, 
good looks, and independence. Maybe, then, I should advocate retiring the 
slogan ‘death with dignity’ in favor of ‘death with love’, meaning “death 
only as love would allow”.
20  See “A Right of Self-Termination?”, chapter 3 of this volume.
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Appendix: Harry Frankfurt on Caring
On the topic of “caring”, Frankfurt says: 21
We often devote our time and effort and other resources to the pursuit of 
goals that we desire to attain because we are convinced of their intrinsic 
value but that we do not really consider to be of any importance to us. … 
Suppose someone is planning to attend a concert that is to be devoted to 
music he particularly enjoys. There are easily imaginable circumstances 
in which he might emphatically and sincerely declare that, although he 
certainly does want to go to the concert, it is not something that he regards 
as being at all important to him. Consider the following scenario. The 
prospective concertgoer is asked by a close friend for an important favor. 
Doing the favor will make it impossible for him to get to the concert. He 
agrees gladly to do the favor, but incidentally mentions to his friend that 
doing it will require him to change his plans for the evening. Upon hearing 
this, his friend becomes confused and apologetic, expresses a reluctance to 
impose upon his good-natured readiness to forgo the concert, and begins to 
withdraw the request for the favor. At this point, the music lover interrupts 
him, saying: “Don’t worry about the possibility that you may be taking 
too much advantage of my friendship for you. The fact is that going to this 
concert is not at all important to me. I really don’t care about missing it.”
In order for this person to care about going to the concert, according to 
Frankfurt, his desire to go would have to be such as to persist even if he 
decides not to, and “the persistence of his desire must be due to the fact 
that he is unwilling to give it up” — that is, “the fact that he is disposed to 
support and sustain his desire”.22 Caring thus has the hierarchical structure 
that is familiar from so much of Frankfurt’s work in moral psychology.
Frankfurt says that caring about things matters to us independently of 
whether they are intrinsically worth caring about. It matters because it is 
the means by which we give our lives coherence and unity, by supporting 
and sustaining some of our desires over time:23
Suppose we cared about nothing. In that case, we would be creatures with 
no active interest in establishing or sustaining any thematic continuity in our 
volitional lives. We would not be disposed to make any effort to maintain 
any of the interests, aims, and ambitions by which we are from time to 
time moved. … From our point of view as agents … whatever coherence 
21  Harry G. Frankfurt, “On Caring”, in Necessity, Volition, and Love, 155-180, p. 159. 
22  Ibid., p. 160.
23  Ibid., p. 162.
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or unity might happen to come about … would be merely fortuitous and 
inadvertent. It would not be the result of any deliberate or guiding intent on 
our part. Desires and volitions of various hierarchical orders would come 
and go; and sometimes they might last for a while. But in the design and 
contrivance of their succession we ourselves would be playing no concerned 
or defining role.
Because caring about things is our way of giving coherence and unity to our 
lives, Frankfurt believes, it has an importance beyond that of the particular 
things that we care about: “The value to us of the fact that we care about 
various things does not derive simply from the value or the suitability of 
the objects about which we care. Caring is important to us for its own sake, 
insofar as it is the indispensably foundational activity through which we 
provide continuity and coherence to our volitional lives. Regardless of 
whether its objects are appropriate, our caring about things possesses for us 
an inherent value by virtue of its essential role in making us the distinctive 
kind of creatures that we are.”24
The choice of objects to care about can thus be governed by the value of 
caring itself rather than the value of the objects:
What makes it more suitable, then, for a person to make one object rather 
than another important to himself? It seems that it must be the fact that it 
is possible for him to care about the one and not about the other, or to care 
about the one in a way which is more important to him than the way in 
which it is possible for him to care about the other. … The person does not 
care about the object because its worthiness commands that he do so. On 
the other hand, the worthiness of the activity of caring commands that he 
choose an object which he will be able to care about.25
Now, Frankfurt doesn’t say exactly why it matters or should matter to us 
that our lives have continuity, coherence, and unity. But he does say that it 
will matter to us insofar as we love ourselves: 26
Parents express their love … by doing what they can to ensure that their 
children actually have genuine interests and are therefore not condemned 
to lives that are chaotically fragmented and empty of meaning. Thus, their 
concern may extend also to helping their children to become capable of 
24  Ibid., pp. 162-163.
25  Harry G. Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About”, in his The Importance of 
What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 94.
26  Frankfurt, “The Dear Self”, p. 10.
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loving, to encouraging and assisting them to find love. This suggests that 
a person who loves nothing may nonetheless be able to show that he loves 
himself by attempting to alter whatever personal characteristics may impair 
his capacity to love and by making suitable efforts to find things to love. 
Frankfurt conceives of love as a selfless identification with, and concern 
for, the interests of the beloved. In the essay from which this last quotation 
is drawn, he says that “the true interests of anyone … are defined and 
determined by what he loves.”27 Yet he goes on to say, in the quoted passage, 
that love for someone gives rise to a concern for something beyond what 
he loves — a concern, that is, for his having something to love, so that his 
life will have coherence and unity. And the value for the beloved of having 
something to love in the first place cannot be explained by his loving 
anything antecedently. Hence, Frankfurt seems to presuppose a “true 
interest” on the part of the beloved that is prior to that which is defined 
and determined by what he loves. 
I would say that the interest in question is the interest that every person 
has in the fullest realization of his rational autonomy, which is in his 
interest because it is what would be most natural to want for his sake, out 
of love for him. A person most fully realizes himself as a person by having 
sustained and coherent pursuits, and so his caring about some pursuits 
in this fashion is what would make sense for anyone to want out of an 
appreciative response to his personhood. Like Frankfurt, I believe that it 
is what we want for our children, out of love for them; and I agree with 
Frankfurt that it is also what we want for ourselves, out of self-love.
27  Ibid., p. 8.

5. Family History1
When I received my maternal grandfather’s birth certificate from the 
General Register Office in London, I found that the space for the mother’s 
signature had been completed in the same official hand as the rest of the 
certificate. It read, “The mark of Golda, Mother” next to a tiny, tentative x. 
Golda’s mark, similarly annotated, appears on the birth certificates of my 
grandfather’s next older brother and younger sister, who were also born in 
London, each at a different address in the East End.
My great-grandparents had arrived in London, with two children, 
sometime before 1891, the date on the birth certificate of their first English-
born child. Different versions of family lore trace them variously to Minsk, 
Kobryn, and Brest-Litovsk, although the best guess may be that they moved 
from one location in Ukraine to another before deciding to leave altogether. 
After the birth of their fifth child, they left London for New York, the father 
sailing in 1895, the mother and children a year later. On the ship’s manifest, 
archived at Ellis Island, he is listed as Nathan Saltman, thirty-two years old, 
a cabinetmaker from Russia.
My grandfather attended the City University of New York and became a 
teacher in the New York City public schools. One of his daughters followed 
him into that profession; the other daughter, my mother, became a school 
librarian. I and my two brothers are university professors.
1  This is the accepted manuscript of an article originally published by Taylor and Francis 
in Philosophical Papers 34 (2005): 357-378, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/05568640509485163 
For comments and discussion, I am grateful to Jason Stanley, Connie Rosati, Thaddeus 
Metz, and Ward Jones. For information about donor conception, I am grateful to Diane 
Allen of InfertilityNetwork.org. Thanks also to Joanna Rose, Myfanwy Walker, Caroline 
Lorbach, Narelle Grech, Bill Cordray, Eric Blyth, and John Triseliotis.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.05
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I assume that my great-grandfather left Ukraine to escape conscription into 
the Czar’s army, or some equally unpalatable fate devised for the Jews. I 
do not know why the family left England for the United States. Judging 
from the changes of address recorded on the children’s birth certificates, I 
imagine that work in the Jewish furniture factories in the East End afforded 
only a precarious living. No doubt, the parents were looking for something 
better.
I and my brothers are the beneficiaries of that search: we have the 
“something better” that our great-grandparents were looking for. It has 
turned out to include the luxury of writing essays such as this for a living, 
three short generations after a time when births in the family were certified 
with an x.
That I am the great-grandson of Russian Jewish immigrants, that I enjoy 
the fruits of their strivings — this much I know with certainty. I also know 
that I inherited not just the fruits but the striving, too. What I don’t know is 
how to understand that latter piece of my inheritance. Was it passed down 
entirely through my mother’s upbringing by her father, and my upbringing 
by her? Or is the push in my personality a genetic endowment, from great-
grandparents who twice pushed on?
A formal photograph of Nathan and Golda, dated 1918 and signed 
“Sincerely, Ma and Pa”, hangs on the wall of our living room, next to a 
photo of my wife’s paternal grandmother as a child, with her parents 
and siblings. My great-grandparents stand in their best clothes, looking 
awkwardly resolute; my wife’s great-grandparents sit on a rustic front 
porch in Tennessee, looking more than a little like hillbillies. I think of these 
pictures as representing the eclectic ancestry of my children.
My children have inherited attitudes and lifeways from these ancestors, 
but they would have received such a cultural inheritance from anyone who 
had reared the people who reared them, or the people who had reared 
those people, and so on — anyone connected to them by the ancestral of 
the “parenting” relation, whether or not it corresponded to the relation of 
biological ancestry. Does it matter that their cultural inheritance came, in 
fact, from the same sources as their genes? If it had come from different 
sources, would their ancestry have mattered to them, divergent as it would 
then have been from their cultural past?
Naturally, my children’s ancestry would still have mattered in 
that it would have influenced many of their characteristics, from their 
appearance to their aptitudes. What I’m asking, though, is whether their 
ancestry would or should have mattered in their eyes. Would they have 
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had any reason to care about their progenitors — about knowing who 
their progenitors were or knowing them, as we philosophers say, by 
acquaintance?
Many adoptees think so. They go to heroic lengths to find their biological 
families, impelled by what they describe as a deep and unrelenting need.2 
But maybe they are just confused, because of living in a culture that is itself 
confused about the importance of biological ties. Maybe adoptees could be 
brought to see the insignificance of ancestry, if only they were sufficiently 
rational and realistic.
We had better hope so. For our society has embarked on a vast social 
experiment in producing children designed to have no human relations 
with some of their biological relatives. Conceived of anonymously donated 
sperm or eggs, these children are permanently severed from all or part of 
their biological past.3
2  A recent literature review concludes: “Following conservative estimates of more recent 
studies in countries with open records policies, about 50% of all adopted persons will, at 
some point in their life, search for their birth parents” (Ulrich Müller and Barbara Perry, 
“Adopted Persons’ Search for and Contact with Their Birth Parents I: Who Searches 
and Why?”, Adoption Quarterly 4 [2001]: 5-37, p. 8). These numbers have recently been 
increasing (p. 9), perhaps in response to greater awareness and acceptance of such 
searches.
The offspring of donated sperm and eggs have also begun to search for their 
biological families, often via the Internet. See, for example, the Donor Sibling Registry 
(http://www.donorsiblingregistry.com); the Donor Offspring, Parent & Sibling Registry 
and Search Page (http://www.amfor.net/DonorOffspring); the “Donor Offspring” page 
of the Donor Conception Support Group of Australia (http://www.dcsg.org.au); and the 
UK Donor Link Voluntary Information Exchange and Contact Register (http://www.
ukdonorlink.org.uk). See also David Plotz, The Genius Factory: The Curious History of the 
Nobel Prize Sperm Bank (New York: Random House, 2005). See also an op-ed entitled 
“Give Me My Own History”, David Gollancz (The Guardian, May 19, 2002, http://www.
theguardian.com/society/2002/may/20/comment.comment). On the similarities between 
donor conception and adoption, see Eric Blyth, Marilyn Crawshaw, Jean Haase, and 
Jennifer Speirs, “The Implications of Adoption for Donor Offspring Following Donor-
Assisted Conception”, Child & Family Social Work 6 (2001): 295-304.
3  In discussing gamete donation, I am going to gloss over the many variations in this 
practice, in which single adults, homosexual couples, or infertile heterosexual couples 
cause a child to be conceived with donated sperm, donated eggs, or both, often but not 
always with the help of in vitro fertilization or gestational surrogacy. Locutions designed 
to maintain strict neutrality among these variants would be unwieldy, and so I avoid them 
in favor of shorter but admittedly less precise locutions. For example, I generally speak of 
donor parents and custodial parents in the plural, although there may be only one of each. 
Generating the relevant disjunction of variants is left as an exercise for the reader.
Cases of gamete donation often have other potentially controversial aspects. For 
example, there is often only one custodial parent, or no custodial parent of one sex or 
the other. Creating children with the intention that they not have a custodial father, or 
alternatively a custodial mother, is potentially just as problematic as creating children 
divorced from their biological origins. But these problems are a topic for another paper.
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The experiment of creating these children is supported by a new 
ideology of the family, developed for people who want to have children 
but lack the biological means to “have” them in the usual sense. The new 
ideology has to do with the sense in which the resulting children will have 
families. It says that these children will have families in the only sense that 
matters, or at least in a sense that is good enough.
Clearly, it has turned out to be less than enough for any adopted person 
who goes in search of a biological family. The new ideology of the family is 
rarely mentioned in this context. The ideology isn’t mentioned, I imagine, 
because it isn’t needed to justify traditional adoption, in which people 
volunteer to replace biological parents who are unavailable, unwilling, or 
unfit to care for a child they have already conceived. The child needs to 
be parented by someone, and it cannot or should not be parented by its 
biological parents, for reasons that would outweigh any value inhering in 
biological ties. An ideology belittling the value of such ties is not needed to 
justify entrusting this child to adoptive parents.
The new ideology of the family is needed rather for cases in which people 
wanting to parent a child cause one to be conceived with donated gametes. 
That this child cannot be parented by one or both of its biological parents 
is not a disadvantage that its custodial parents volunteer to mitigate; it was 
a desideratum that guided them in creating the child, to begin with. Not 
being attached to a partner with whom they could be fertile, they needed 
a child who was correlatively unattached, a child already disowned by at 
least one of its biological parents. Rather than adopt a child whose ties to its 
biological parents had been ruptured after conception, they intentionally 
created one for whom those ties were ruptured antecedently. This choice 
would be morally problematic if biological ties were genuinely meaningful. 
Hence the need for an ideology that denies their meaning.
These remarks are admittedly polemical, and they will no doubt offend 
some readers. Whether there is anything to them depends on whether there 
is significant value in being parented by one’s biological parents or, more 
generally, having human relations with one’s biological relatives. The idea of 
such a value can hardly be considered unusual, given that it is enshrined in the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 7, paragraph 
l, states: “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have 
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as 
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possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”4 The rights 
enunciated in this provision strike me as important, and this essay takes a 
few tentative steps toward explaining why.
I take only a few steps because I want to skirt many of the considerations 
that catch the eye on a first glance at the topic. The topic of our biological 
origins is littered with mythical or symbolic thoughts, about blood and 
bone and seed and such. I want to pick my way around these thoughts, in 
search of some realistic and rational considerations. My reason for being 
so cautious is that doubts about reproductive technology are often written 
off to fear and superstition. I want to avoid raising any considerations that 
might be dismissed on those grounds.
My caution in this regard will lead me to overlook many considerations 
that I see as genuinely meaningful. What is most troubling about gamete 
donation is that it purposely severs a connection of the sort that normally 
informs a person’s sense of identity, which is composed of elements 
that must bear emotional meaning, as only symbols and stories can. To 
downplay the symbolic and mythical significance of severing a child’s 
connections to its biological parents is therefore to misrepresent what is 
4  The Convention is posted at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx 
See Eric Blyth and Abigail Farrand, “Anonymity in Donor-Assisted Conception and the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child”, International Journal of Children’s Rights 12 
(2004): 89-104. The Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
makes clear that the term “parents” in this clause includes biological parents in the first 
instance, and that the Convention therefore militates against the practice of anonymous 
gamete donation (Rachel Hodgkin and Peter Newell, Implementation Handbook for the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child [UNICEF, revised edition 2002], pp. 117-119).
For some social-scientific and legal perspectives, with further references, see 
Michael Freeman, “The New Birth Right? Identity and the Child of the Reproduction 
Revolution”, The International Journal of Children’s Rights 4 (1996): 273-297; A. J. Turner 
and A. Coyle, “What Does It Mean to Be a Donor Offspring? The Identity Experiences 
of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implications for Counselling and 
Therapy”, Human Reproduction 15 (2000): 2041-2051; Lucy Frith, “Gamete Donation and 
Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate”, Human Reproduction 16 (2001): 818-824; Truth 
and the Child: A Contribution to the Debate on the Warnock Report, ed. Nigel Bruce, Ann K. 
Mitchell, and Kate Priestley (Edinburgh: Family Care, 1988); Truth and the Child 10 Years 
On: Information Exchange in Donor Assisted Conception, ed. Eric Blyth, Marilyn Crawshaw, 
and Jennifer Speirs (Birmingham: British Association of Social Workers, 1998).
The material cited here argues that donor-conceived offspring should have access to 
information about their biological parents. In this paper I argue for a stronger conclusion 
— that donor conception is wrong. In my view, the reasons for concluding that children 
should have access to information about their biological parents support the stronger 
conclusion that, other things being equal, children should be raised by their biological 
parents. For many children already born, other things are not at all equal, and adoption 
is therefore desirable; but as I argue below, other things are indeed equal for children 
who have not yet been conceived.
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really going on, if not because the symbols and stories are literally true then 
at least because they are truly part of the human psyche.
But to speak of the human psyche in such terms is already to verge 
on superstition in the eyes of those who consider themselves enlightened. 
Although I will briefly reintroduce some of these terms at the end of my 
essay, I will first try to address the enlightened in their own rationalistic 
terms.
An argument against the use of donated gametes risks giving offense 
because it seems to raise doubts about particular children as to whether 
they should have been born. But talk about whether someone should or 
should not have been born is confused and confusing.5
‘Should’ and ‘ought’ express norms that tell us what to do. In addition to 
these norms recommending or requiring action, there are values attaching 
to objects and events, warranting various modes of appreciation for them. 
Events can be felicitous, deplorable, or regrettable, for example; persons, 
places, or things can be beautiful or ugly, admirable or contemptible, 
lovable or hateful, and so on. If you expect the world to deliver perfectly 
congruent norms and values — that is, if you expect that insofar as 
something is beautiful or admirable or lovable, its coming into existence 
will be a felicitous event, or its creation will be a right action — then you 
are bound to be disappointed. There are beautiful things whose creation 
is a grievous wrong (mushroom clouds), disgusting things whose coming 
into existence is fortunate (feces), regrettable events that are right to bring 
about (the death of an attacker), and so on.
Matters are further complicated by the possibility of conflict between 
values that attach to types and values that attach to individual tokens of 
them. My wedding ring may be precious to me even though it is of an 
inferior type, neither beautiful nor well-wrought nor of any significant 
monetary value; irises are gorgeous although one is just as good as another. 
If you expect the world to serve up only precious individuals of precious 
types, and vice versa, then you are bound to be disappointed once again.
To say that someone should or should not have been born mixes 
normative categories in a way that sows confusion about the object of 
5  The arguments of this section are superseded by “Persons in Prospect”, chapter 6 of 
this volume, especially part III, “Love and Nonexistence”. I now regard the present 
arguments as inadequate.
 Family History 67
assessment. Does this statement assess the person, the event of his coming 
into existence, or the act of creating him? And does it make an assessment 
with respect to him individually or with respect to some type that he 
instantiates?
Suppose we judge that people should not have more children than they 
can adequately care for. Have we implied that there are children who should 
not have been born? Yes, of course, if that statement means just that some 
children are born after their parents should have stopped having children. 
Yes, too, if it means that the birth of a child destined to be neglected is a 
regrettable kind of event. But we have not implied, of any particular child, 
that his existence should be regretted or that his birthday should not be 
celebrated. Loving an individual child and rejoicing in his existence is 
perfectly consistent with thinking it wrong for parents like his to have had 
so many children. And if you expect the world to spare you from this sort of 
evaluative complexity, then you are in for the biggest disappointment of all.
Much as we love disadvantaged children, we rightly believe that people 
should not deliberately create children who they already know will 
be disadvantaged. In my view, people who create children by donor 
conception already know — or already should know — that their children 
will be disadvantaged by the lack of a basic good on which most people 
rely in their pursuit of self-knowledge and identity formation. In coming to 
know and define themselves, most people rely on their acquaintance with 
people who are like them by virtue of being their biological relatives.
Philosophers should not have to be reminded that living things tend 
to resemble their biological relatives. After all, the philosophical term for 
indefinable similarities is ‘family resemblance’. Though much has been 
written by philosophers about family resemblance in this technical sense, 
little has been written about literal resemblance within families, which is, 
after all, the paradigm case of technical family resemblance.
The philosophical concept of family resemblance is that of a similarity 
that can be immediately recognized but not readily analyzed or defined. 
Many of our concepts have their extension determined by family 
resemblance among their instances. To have such a family resemblance 
concept is just to have the ability to know an instance when we see one, 
without being able to say how we know it.
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Although there is only one of me, I have a self-concept of the family-
resemblance kind. This self-concept is not the singular concept by which 
I pick out the one and only me; it’s my concept for the personal type of 
which I happen to be the only instance but to which a doppelgänger would 
belong, if I had one. I would recognize a doppelgänger under this concept, 
by our family resemblance.
Much of what I know about myself is contained in this family-
resemblance concept and cannot be articulated. I know that I am like this, 
where the import of ‘this’ is encoded in the self-concept of which anyone 
just like me would be an instance. Hence much of my self-knowledge is, so 
to speak, knowledge about my family resemblance to myself. This family-
resemblance knowledge about myself includes information not only about 
how I look but also about my personal manner, my styles of thinking and 
feeling, my temperament, and so on. This ellipsis is difficult to fill in without 
resort to figurative expressions, because family-resemblance information is 
unanalyzable by definition.
My concept of my self-resemblance contains much of my psychological 
knowledge about myself. Philosophers like to characterize folk psychology 
as a theory; in reality, however, most of folk psychology is an intuitive matter 
of knowing how to anticipate and deal with people like that — knowledge that 
is heavily dependent on family-resemblance concepts of personality types 
and behavioral styles. So it is with my folk-psychological self-understanding.
Finally, my family-resemblance concept of myself contains much of the 
self-knowledge by which I am guided in my efforts to cultivate and shape 
myself. I can articulate a few self-descriptions that indicate some directions 
of self-cultivation and contra-indicate others. I’m physically coordinated 
and I have a good sense of rhythm, so studying dance makes sense for 
me; I have a lousy memory and weak powers of mental computation, so 
studying chess is a bad idea. But many of my aspirations are directed at 
fulfilling family-resemblance concepts: they are aspirations to be like that, 
where ‘that’ denotes a type for which I have some paradigms or images but 
no explicit definition. And these aspirations are conditioned and channeled 
by family-resemblance knowledge as to how someone like this might or 
might not become like that.
I think that forming a useful family-resemblance concept of myself would 
be very difficult were I not acquainted with people to whom I bear a literal 
family resemblance. Knowing what I am like would be that much harder if 
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I didn’t know other people like me. And if people bear me a literal family 
resemblance, then the respects in which they are like me will be especially 
important to my knowledge of what I am like, since they resemble me in 
respects that are deeply ingrained and resistant to change.
The difficulty of knowing what I am like is the topic of some suggestive 
remarks by Bernard Berenson in his Sketch for a Self-Portrait:6
This self, what is it? For about seventy years I have been asking that question. 
Can one frame an idea of one’s own personality, map it out, make a picture 
of it that is in any measure convincing to an inquiring and fairly honest 
mind? In my case it has not been possible. I know what people think of me, 
favourably and unfavourably, and I have a sense of what composite image 
of me ends by taking shape in the minds of acquaintances. In my own mind 
and heart there is little correspondence with this image, although I have 
learned to accept it as that in me, of me, to which others approach as to a 
treaty-port in old China or Japan. To myself I am an energy of a given force 
of radiation, and of a certain power of resistance; and I seem to be the same 
in these respects that I remember being when I completed my sixth year.
… I wish I could have some image, a coherent image of my personality 
with a definite shape and clear outlines. It is hard enough to know how 
one looks, impossible to know what one is. We are left to infer it from 
what people say about us and what we accept, reject, repel and controvert 
in what we hear about ourselves. We cannot even get a notion remotely 
parallel to what we acquire by staring into a mirror. That is little enough, 
for we gaze fixedly, we pose, we search and ask ‘is that me?’ or ‘is it that or 
that?’; and when it happens once in a blue moon that we look into a mirror 
unexpectedly we seldom recognize the image there appearing as a reflection 
of ourselves. Yet how definite is this corporeal shape compared with any 
sense of one’s entire personality, so uncharted, of such wavering outlines, of 
such uncertain heights and depths!
I have at times wondered what my instinctive and instantaneous reaction 
would be if I could meet myself for the first time. This has all but 
happened. More than once it occurred that somewhat absentmindedly 
I was mounting a broad staircase which at the landing had a pier-glass 
rising from floor to ceiling. I seemed to see coming toward me a figure not 
particularly to my taste, not at all corresponding to the type I instinctively 
liked; and this figure had an abstracted effaced expression that I should 
rather sidle away from than be drawn to. All this before recognizing that it 
was myself.
6  Bernard Berenson, Sketch for a Self Portrait (London: Robin Clark, 1991). The following 
quotations can be found at pp. 23, 27, and 67-68.
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I find Berenson’s remarks suggestive on several points. First, Berenson 
conceives of his personality as having a “shape” or “outline”, like that of 
his physiognomy or physique. He thus suggests that his personality is an 
object not of analysis or description but rather of perceptual recognition, as 
if by family resemblance. Second, his psychological profile is inaccessible 
to introspection and therefore visible only from a detached perspective, as 
seen through other people’s eyes. Finally, the usual technique for viewing 
himself externally, by looking in the mirror, proves inadequate because his 
reflection usually shows him in the act of self-presentation, striking a pose 
that is unlike his spontaneous self.
Presumably, the same difficulties arise for external self-inspection of his 
personality, for which mirrors are harder to come by and poses harder to 
see through.
If I want to see myself as another, however, I don’t have to imagine 
myself as seen through other people’s eyes: I just have to look at my father, 
my mother, and my brothers, who show me by way of family resemblance 
what I am like. For information about my appearance, they may not be as 
good a source as an ordinary mirror; but for information about what I am 
like as a person, they are the closest thing to a mirror that I can find. 
If I want to know what a person like this can make of himself, I can look 
first at what my parents and grandparents made of themselves, or at the 
self-cultivation under way on the part of my brothers and cousins. The point 
is not that I necessarily can or should strive to be whatever my biological 
relatives have become, but rather that my own experiments-in-living (as 
Mill called them) are most informatively supplemented by experiments on 
the part of people who are relevantly like me. Our extended family is, as 
it were, a laboratory for carrying out experiments-in-living relevant to the 
lives of people like us.
When adoptees go in search of their biological parents and siblings, there is 
a literal sense in which they are searching for themselves. They are searching 
for the closest thing to a mirror in which to catch an external and candid 
view of what they are like in more than mere appearance. Not knowing any 
biological relatives must be like wandering in a world without reflective 
surfaces, permanently self-blind.
Children denied a knowledge of only one biological parent are not 
entirely cut off from this view of themselves, but they are cut off from one 
half of it. Their estrangement even from one parent, or from half-brothers 
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and -sisters, must still be a deprivation, because it estranges them from 
people who would be familiar without any prior acquaintance, people 
with whom they would enjoy that natural familiarity which would be so 
revealing about themselves. 
How odd it must be to go through life never knowing whether a sense 
of having met a man before is due to his being one’s father. How tantalizing 
to know that there is someone who could instantly show one a living 
rendition of deeply ingrained aspects of oneself. How frustrating to know 
that one will never meet him!
When people deny the importance of biological ties, I wonder how they 
can read world literature with any comprehension. How do they make any 
sense of Telemachus, who goes in search of a father he cannot remember? 
What do they think is the dramatic engine of the Oedipus story? When the 
adoptive grandson of Pharaoh says, “I have been a stranger in a strange 
land”, do they take him to be speaking merely as an Egyptian in the land of 
Midian?7 How can they even understand the colloquy between Darth Vader 
and Luke Skywalker? Surely, the revelation “I am your father” should 
strike them as a bit of dramatic stupidity — a remark to be answered with 
“So what?”
Of course, these stories embody the mythical and symbolic values 
that I have promised not to invoke; but they also, and independently, 
illustrate a bit of common sense about the self-knowledge drawn from 
acquaintance with biological relatives. Telemachus, Oedipus, Moses, and 
even Luke Skywalker illustrate the centrality of this knowledge to the 
task of identity formation, and the centrality of that task to a meaningful 
human life. Through the ages, people unacquainted with their origins have 
been regarded as ill-equipped for a fundamental life-task and hence as 
dramatically, even tragically, disadvantaged.
As the offspring of donated gametes reach adulthood, they are 
rediscovering and reiterating the age-old wisdom about the importance of 
biological ties. In footnote 2, above, I have cited several online registries 
through which thousands of donor-conceived adults are seeking to contact 
their biological relatives. Britain has recently outlawed anonymous gamete 
donation, on the grounds of a child’s right to know his or her parentage. 
7  Exodus 2:22. The speaker is Moses, who not only is a stranger among the Midianites, 
where he has fled from Pharaoh’s court, but has been a stranger all of his life, ever since 
his mother set him afloat on the Nile.
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Donor offspring are beginning to protest their status as strangers in a 
strange land.
Acquaintance with a child’s biological family can be a source of knowledge 
for people other than the child itself. The use of anonymously donated 
gametes can leave not just the child but also its custodial parents in the 
dark, and in ways that adversely affect their parenting.
Information relevant to self-cultivation is also relevant to the rearing of 
children. And that information is even more consequential for child rearing, 
because the growth of children is so dramatic in comparison with what is 
still possible once the age of self-cultivation has been attained. So much of 
what perplexes parents has to do with the nature whose unfolding they are 
trying to foster. How far can the child hope to reach and in which directions? 
What is the child unable to help being and what can it be helped to become? 
What will smooth its rough edges and what will just rub against the grain?
I would not want to have raised my son without having known my 
maternal grandfather, with whom he has so much in common. I would 
never have understood my daughter if I hadn’t known her uncles, on 
both sides. And raising my children without knowing their mother — that 
would have been like raising them with one eye closed. It’s not just my 
sympathetic knowledge of her that has helped me to understand them but 
also my understanding of her and me in relation to one another, since each 
child is a blend of qualities that were first blended in our relationship.
Some truths are so homely as to embarrass the philosopher who ventures to 
speak them. First comes love, then comes marriage, and then the proverbial 
baby carriage. Well, it’s not such a ridiculous way of doing things, is it? The 
baby in that carriage has an inborn nature that joins together the natures of 
two adults. If those two adults are joined by love into a stable relationship 
— call it marriage — then they will be naturally prepared to care for the 
child with sympathetic understanding, and to show it how to recognize and 
reconcile some of the qualities within itself. A child naturally comes to feel at 
home with itself and at home in the world by growing up in its own family.
Human families are disrupted in various ways, by death or divorce or 
poverty or social upheavals. In these circumstances a child is entitled to be 
raised by parental figures who love it and love one another, even if they 
are not its biological parents. The child is also entitled to feel that it is the 
social equal of other children and that its parents are the equals of other 
parents. Here again, however, different evaluations are easily conflated or 
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confused. To acknowledge that adopted children have missed something 
of human importance is not to disparage the children, their parents, or 
the love and mutual care among them. Similarly, we should not have to 
disparage anyone in order to acknowledge that the offspring of donated 
gametes will miss something important as well. And then the contrast 
between these cases — between compensating children for something they 
have already lost and creating children with the intention that they never 
have it — should lead us to question the morality of anonymous genetic 
donation.
The reason for resorting to donated gametes in many cases, of course, is 
the desire of an adult to have a biologically related child despite lacking a 
partner with whom he or she can conceive. And my arguments imply that 
having a biologically related child is of genuine value, as a potential source 
of self-knowledge for the parent. Yet whereas the parent will be just as fully 
related to the child as any mother or father, the child will know only half of 
its biological parentage. Surely, we don’t believe that parents are entitled 
to make themselves slightly better off in some fundamental dimension by 
impoverishing their children in the same dimension. Why, then, should 
they be entitled to enlarge their own circle of consanguinity by creating 
children whose circle will be broken in half?
The answer to this question cannot be that the children will be compensated 
by receiving the gift of life. The so-called gift of life cannot compensate a 
child for congenital disadvantages, because it doesn’t make the child better 
off than it would have been without them.8
Look at it this way. We cannot justify severing the child’s ties to one of 
its parents by pointing out that, in order to avoid doing so, we would have 
had to omit creating the child altogether. This justification would portray 
separation from a biological parent as the lesser of two evils for the child, 
preferable to the greater evil of never having existed. But never having 
existed would not have been an evil for the child, because a nonexistent 
person suffers no evils.
To be sure, the child of a genetic donor is usually glad to have been born. 
But the fact that a child would be glad to have been born cannot justify us 
8  I call it a “so-called gift” because it has no intended recipient. It is a “gift” that is launched 
into the void, where some as-yet-nonexistent person may snag it. Such untargeted 
benefits do not fit our usual concept of gift-giving. See also chapter 6, part II of this 
volume.
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in conceiving it.9 Congenitally handicapped people live rich and fulfilling 
lives into which they are glad to have been born, but a woman who is taking 
a teratogenic medication has an obligation not to conceive a child until she 
has stopped taking it. Waiting to conceive until she has stopped taking the 
medication will of course entail that the handicapped child she might have 
conceived will in fact never exist. Had she conceived that child, it might 
even have been thankful that she chose not to wait before conceiving. But 
the wrongness of deliberately conceiving a handicapped child cannot be 
mitigated by that child’s future thankfulness. To offer such a justification 
would be to confuse two distinct questions.
One question asks, about a particular individual, whether the 
disadvantages of his life are so great as to outweigh the value for him of 
living. This is the question that someone answers by being glad to have 
been born or, alternatively, wishing that he hadn’t been; but it is not the 
question that we face at the point of deciding whether to conceive a child. 
At that point there is no particular individual with respect to whom we can 
ask whether he would welcome or regret the kind of life we have to offer. 
So we have to compare there being a person who lives that kind of life, on 
the one hand, with there being so such person, on the other — abstractly 
quantified alternatives concerning no particular individual. Such a person, 
if he existed, would compare his living such a life with his never having 
lived — alternatives concerning him in particular. How he would choose 
between a disadvantaged life and nonexistence, as alternatives concerning 
him in particular, cannot dictate how we should choose between there being 
a person who faces such alternatives and there being none. Preferring a 
disadvantaged life as the only alternative to nonexistence may be a rational 
choice for him to make, and yet those alternatives may be such as no person 
should have to face. Indeed, the reason why there should be no person who 
has to face these alternatives is precisely that, once brought into existence 
facing them, he will find that his own individual nonexistence is the only 
alternative to his disadvantages.
Frankly, to criticize proponents of gamete donation for overselling the “gift 
of life” is to credit them with greater moral sensitivity than they generally 
show. Gamete donation is presented as affecting primarily the parents, by 
enabling them to “create families”.
9  Here I am introducing the “non-identity problem” first discussed by Derek Parfit in 
Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). I discuss this problem in 
parts II and III of chapter 6.
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But the party of the first part in these transactions is surely the child. For 
the parent, the birth is the beginning of a particular life-stage; for the child 
it’s the beginning of life itself — the beginning of a life that will extend far 
beyond the parents’ control or ken. The question “Is this a good way to 
get a child?” cannot dominate the question “Is this a good way for a child 
to have been gotten?” And the latter question cannot be finessed on the 
grounds that a particular child could not have been gotten any other way, 
since the alternative for that child would have been a benign nonexistence.
Nor can the former question be given precedence on the grounds that 
gamete donation is the only way for the prospective parents to get a child. 
The alternative of adopting an already existing child is often available, and 
I have argued that it is morally preferable, because it provides a custodial 
family for a child already and independently destined to be alienated from 
its biological family. As I have mentioned, creating a new child designed to 
suffer that alienation is often preferred to adoption precisely because of the 
parents’ interest in biological ties — an interest that they choose to further 
slightly in their own case by creating a person for whom the same interest 
will be profoundly frustrated. I regard this choice as morally incoherent.
What’s more, there is the question of what moral weight attaches to a 
person’s desire to procreate. Traditionally, that desire has been thought to 
ground a moral right to procreate only for those who are in a position to 
provide the resulting child with a family. According to the new ideology 
of the family, of course, virtually any adult is in a position to satisfy this 
requirement, since a family is whatever we choose to call by that name. 
But this new ideology is precisely what I am questioning. To defend the 
ideology on the grounds of a person’s right to procreate would be question-
begging. The right to procreate is conditional on the ability to provide the 
resulting child with a family; what counts as providing the child with a 
family in the relevant sense is a question that must be settled prior to any 
claim of procreative rights.10
10  Framing the considerations in this way makes clear their application to the case of 
single women who use artificial insemination to create children whom they intend to 
raise on their own. Children can of course be successfully reared by single mothers, if 
necessary. But children can be successfully reared, if necessary, in orphanages as well — 
a fact that cannot justify deliberately creating children with the intention of abandoning 
them to an orphanage. (Imagine a woman who would like to have the experience of 
conception and childbirth without incurring the responsibility for raising a child.) Just as 
the serviceability of orphanages cannot justify procreation in reliance on their services, 
so the serviceability of single parenting cannot justify the creation of children with the 
intention that they grow up without fathers of any kind.
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I am inclined to think that a knowledge of one’s origins is especially 
important to identity formation because it is important to the telling of 
one’s life story, which necessarily encodes one’s appreciation of meaning 
in the events of one’s life.11 I opened with the story of my Russian ancestors, 
whose search for something better I imagined to have culminated in my 
writing this essay. My family background includes many such stories, 
whose denouement I can see myself as undergoing or enacting. But do such 
family sagas have to be sagas of biological families? Let me approach this 
question by saying first what I think that stories do.12
Organizing events into the form of a story provides an understanding 
of them distinct from what would be provided by causal explanations. 
A well-constructed story recounts events in such a way as to lead us 
through a natural sequence of emotions, which is ultimately resolved in an 
emotional cadence that leaves us knowing how we feel about the events. 
We know how we feel because we have been through a sequence of feelings 
that is familiar to our emotional sensibilities; because we have arrived at a 
conclusory feeling, a state of emotional rest; and because our conclusory 
feeling takes all of the preceding events into its view. 
To understand events in this emotional sense is to grasp their meaning 
— that is, what they mean to us in emotional terms. My finishing an essay 
on family histories is a meaningless event in a string of meaningless events 
unless and until I can embed it in a story that makes it an occasion for 
feeling ambitions achieved, fears allayed, sufferings redeemed — or 
pretensions punctured, for that matter. Of course, my own life provides 
narrative context for many of the events within it; but my family history 
provides an even broader context, in which large stretches of my life can 
take on meaning, as the trajectory of my entire education and career takes 
on meaning in relation to the story of my ancestors.
Adoptees can certainly find meaningful roles for themselves in stories 
about their adoptive families. Even so, they seem to have the sense of not 
knowing important stories about themselves, and of therefore missing 
some meaning implicit in their lives, unless and until they know their 
biological origins.
11  The importance of narrative self-knowledge is stressed by David Gollancz in the essay 
cited in note 2, above.
12  See my “Narrative Explanation”, The Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 1-25.
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Here the temptation of symbolic and mythical thinking grows, and I still 
want to avoid succumbing to it. Insofar as there is a realistic basis for 
valuing biological-family history, I suspect that it is the same as the basis 
I have already identified for self-knowledge — namely, the resemblances 
that hold within biological families. What rests on this basis is different, 
however, in the case of historical narrative.
Whereas direct acquaintance with biological relatives helps me to know 
what I am like, knowledge of family history helps me to understand what 
it means to be like this. The quality that sometimes makes me a malcontent 
seems to have impelled Nathan and Golda into the role of emigrants. 
The quality that makes me a homebody seems to have drawn their every 
migration toward a better urban homestead for their growing family. These 
different descriptions of our shared qualities endow those qualities with 
different meanings, by assigning them to the protagonists of different 
scenarios — the emigrants versus the malcontent, the homesteaders versus 
the homebody. The scenarios typical of these protagonists work their way 
toward different emotional resolutions, with corresponding differences in 
meaning.
I know that I have it in me to be a malcontent homebody, a grumbling 
stick-in-the-mud. Do I also have it in me to spurn one home for the prospect 
of a better one? Nathan and Golda did, according to their story, and it’s 
because they did that am I here to ask the question, bearing their genetic 
legacy. Maybe, then, I should borrow a page from their book. The point, in 
any case, is that I could never have considered borrowing a page from that 
book if it had been permanently closed to me at birth.
How do I know that I have inherited these qualities from Nathan and 
Golda? I don’t: it’s all imaginative speculation. But such speculations 
are how we define and redefine ourselves, weighing different possible 
meanings for our characters by playing them out in different imagined 
stories. In these speculations, family history gives us inexhaustible food 
for thought. Why would we create children whose provision of possible 
self-understandings was poorer than our own?
I know that many people have no interest in their ancestry, no sense of 
kinship with their kin. These people define themselves in terms other 
than those which are descriptive of their relatives, and they pursue life 
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stories disjoint from their family’s history. But even these people benefit by 
knowing where they come from.
I think that someone who denies having anything in common with his 
biological relatives is either speaking figuratively or in denial. Almost all of 
us look and sound and feel and move like the people from whom we came: 
a genuine sport of nature is very rare. What is more likely is that a person’s 
similarities to his relatives lie in aspects of himself that don’t matter to him 
or that he dislikes and rejects. Not valuing commonalities is indeed a way 
of not having anything in common, figuratively speaking; it just isn’t a way 
of literally having nothing in common.
Someone who doesn’t value what he has in common with his relatives 
may think that he need never have known them in order to identify and 
cultivate those aspects of himself which he does value. But I doubt it. This 
person is likely to have defined himself as different from his relatives 
precisely because they served as ill omens of his possible futures, or at 
least as foils against which his contrasting qualities could attract his eye. 
Learning not to be like his relatives has still involved learning from them: 
if he had never known them, he might well have ended up more like them.
The point is that biological origins needn’t be worth embracing in order 
to be worth knowing. Someone who doesn’t know his relatives cannot even 
turn up his nose at them. The question for him is not “Shall I follow my 
forebears?” but “Am I following them?”, and to this latter question he can 
never know the answer. He can have neither the satisfaction of continuing 
in their footsteps nor that of striking out on his own, because their footsteps 
have been effaced. To tell him that those obliterated footsteps weren’t 
important for him is to tell what the experience of all times and cultures 
condemns as a lie.13
13  While this essay was in press, I learned of the following additional resource on donor 
conception: Since August 2005, New Zealand has required all donor-conceived births 
to be recorded in a Human Assisted Reproductive Technology (HART) Register (http://
www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-
Human-Assisted-Reproductive-Technology-%28HART%29-Register?OpenDocument). 
The HART Act requires that information about donors be made available to their 
offspring at age eighteen. In addition to the publications listed in note 3, see Jacqueline 
A. Laing and David S. Oderberg, “Artificial Reproduction, the ‘Welfare Principle’, and 
the Common Good”, Medical Law Review 13 (2005): 328-356; and Alexina McWhinnie, 
“Gamete Donation and Anonymity: Should Offspring from Donated Gametes Continue 
to Be Denied Knowledge of Their Origins and Antecedents?”, Human Reproduction 16 
(2001): 807-817. Thanks to Rupert Rushbrooke for these references.
6. Persons in Prospect1
I. The Identity Problem
Derek Parfit calls it the non-identity problem.2 It’s the problem of how 
to treat future persons given that any attempt to treat them better may 
result instead in their never being born. For example, the people who will 
have inadequate resources in the twenty-second century because of our 
wastefulness today will owe their existence to human couplings that never 
would have occurred if we had lowered our thermostats and showered 
less often. As those future people commute on foot or read by candlelight, 
they will have to acknowledge that we couldn’t have conserved resources 
for them, since our conserving would have prevented them from existing. 
Because the people affected by our wastefulness will not be identical to 
those who would have been affected by our conservation, there appear to 
be no future individuals for us to harm or benefit, whatever we do.
This description of the problem depends on an empirical assumption 
about the effects of our environmental policies on the makeup of the 
1  This series was first published in Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008): 221-288. It was 
written in conjunction with an undergraduate course on “Future Persons” taught at 
New York University in the fall of 2007. Thanks to the participants in the course and to 
Imogen Dickie, Jeff Sebo, and the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. Part I replaces the 
corresponding part in the published version.
2  Parfit first discussed the problem in “On Doing the Best for Our Children”, in Ethics and 
Population, ed. Michael D. Bayles (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1976), pp. 100-115. See 
also Robert Merrihew Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil”, Noûs 
13 (1979): 53-65; Gregory S. Kavka, “The Paradox of Future Individuals”, Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 11 (1982): 93-112 ; and Thomas Schwartz, “Obligations to Posterity”, in 
Obligations to Future Generations, ed. R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1978), pp. 3-13. I will deal primarily with Parfit’s discussion of the 
problem in Part IV of Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.06
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population. I will argue that even if this empirical assumption were false, 
the problem would remain. Even if we could ensure that the people affected 
by our conserving resources were identical to the people affected by our 
wasting them, neither group could be harmed or benefited by what we do. 
I call it the identity problem, to indicate that it is a variant of Parfit’s.
The Metaphysics of Survival
The identity problem, unlike the non-identity problem, hangs on controversial 
assumptions about the sameness of persons. It is fairly uncontroversial that 
two different pairs of gametes would result in the birth of two different 
persons, but it is more controversial whether one and the same pair of 
gametes would result in the birth of the same person irrespective of whatever 
else happened, which is the presupposition on which the identity problem is 
based. Moreover, Parfit himself believes that, even if the same person would 
be born from the same pair of gametes under different circumstances, that 
person would evolve, under different circumstances, so as to yield adults 
who weren’t related in the ways that make sameness matter.
How sameness-of-person matters, Parfit addresses in the context of 
sameness across time, which constitutes a person’s survival. When it comes 
to survival, according to Parfit, what matters — or, as he puts it, what is 
“worth caring about” — is the future existence of someone to whom we 
bear a relation of psychological connectedness and continuity. Parfit’s 
definition of psychological connectedness begins with Locke’s memory 
theory of personal identity: “Let us say”, Parfit says, “that between X today 
and Y twenty years ago, there are direct memory connections if X can now 
remember having some of the experiences that Y had twenty years ago.”3 
Parfit then expands on Locke’s theory like this:
We should … revise [Locke’s] view [of personal identity] so that it appeals 
to other facts. Besides direct memories, there are several other kinds of direct 
psychological connection. One such connection is that which holds between 
an intention and the later act in which this intention is carried out. Other 
such direct connections are those which hold when a belief or a desire, or 
any other psychological feature, continues to be had.
3  Reasons and Persons, p. 205. Parfit modifies this definition by adopting Sydney Shoemaker’s 
concept of “Q-memory” to cancel the possible implication that X’s remembering Y’s 
experiences already entails by definition that X is the same person as Y (pp. 219-223). I 
will assume that ‘memory’ means “Q-memory”.
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Parfit defines psychological continuity as the ancestral of connectedness. 
That is, X’s being psychologically continuous with Y consists in there 
being some (possibly empty) series of subjects S1, S2, … such that X is 
directly connected to S1, who is directly connected to S2, … who is directly 
connected to Y. Parfit describes this relation between X and Y as consisting 
in “chains of psychological connectedness”, which may overlap.
Initially, Parfit says that what matters in survival is a relation, labeled 
R, which is a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity. 
Parfit subsequently qualifies his view, by claiming that some psychological 
connections are more important than others. The more important 
connections, he claims, are the ones that involve features that are distinctive 
of the individual, or features that the individual values in himself.4
I suspect that Parfit introduces these qualifications partly because he 
equivocates on the phrase ‘what matters in survival’.5 Sometimes Parfit 
interprets the question “What matters in survival?” to mean “Why should 
one have a first-personal interest in surviving?”6 Sometimes he takes the 
question to mean “Why should one have any first-personal concern for the 
self who will survive?”7 These two questions exhaust Parfit’s ostensible 
topic, but he obscures this topic with other readings of the question what 
matters in survival. Sometimes he takes the question to mean “What is it 
about one’s present self whose survival in future selves is worth wanting?”8 
Sometimes he even takes it to mean “What kind of survival is worth 
wanting?”9
The latter readings of the question are not equivalent to the former. 
One’s grounds for taking a first-personal interest in future persons may 
4  For the importance of a feature’s distinctiveness, see pp. 300-301 and note 6 on p. 515. 
For the importance of a feature’s value to the subject, see p. 299. See also the discussion 
of “The Nineteenth Century Russian” on pp. 327-329.
5  This point was made by Paul Volkening Torek in an unpublished paper and in his Ph.D. 
dissertation, Something to look forward to: Personal identity, prudence, and ethics, University 
of Michigan, 1995. For the idea that “what matters in survival” is ambiguous in Parfit’s 
usage, see also Tamar Szabó Gendler, “Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments”, The 
Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002), pp. 34-54.
I also suspect that Parfit equivocates on the term ‘continuity’. In some contexts, he 
uses ‘continuity’ for the ancestral of connectedness. But because he emphasizes the 
connections that consist in the mere persistence of a trait or attitude, he sometimes 
understands ‘continuity’ to mean “qualitative continuity”, in the sense that denotes the 
absence of abrupt qualitative changes. See, e.g., p. 301 of Reasons and Persons.
6  See, e.g., p. 260.
7  See, e.g. pp. 282-283.
8  See, e.g., pp. 284, 394, 392.
9  See p. 301.
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not depend on their having features of oneself that one has an interest in 
preserving, or their living lives that one has an interest in living. Conflation 
of these issues crucially affects Parfit’s discussion of problem cases — in 
particular, the one that he calls the “Branch-Line Case”.10
In the Branch-Line Case, Parfit imagines a “scanner” that, at the press 
of a green button, destroys and analyzes his entire body, including his 
brain. The scanner is linked to a “Replicator” that assembles a molecule-
by-molecule copy of him on Mars. He then imagines that the scanner is 
upgraded to a model that leaves his original body intact, so that there are 
duplicate versions of him, one on each planet. Finally, he imagines that the 
upgraded scanner has damaged his heart and that he will consequently die 
within a few days. Having received this dire prognosis, he speaks with his 
Replica on Mars by interplanetary videophone:11
Since my Replica knows that I am about to die, he tries to console me with 
the same thoughts with which I recently tried to console a dying friend. It 
is sad to learn, on the receiving end, how unconsoling these thoughts are. 
My Replica then assures me that he will take up my life where I leave off. 
He loves my wife, and together they will care for my children. And he will 
finish the book that I am writing. Besides having all of my drafts, he has all 
of my intentions. I must admit that he can finish my book as well as I could 
….
If we believe that my Replica is not me, it is natural to assume that my 
prospect, on the Branch Line, is almost as bad as ordinary death. I shall deny 
this assumption. As I shall argue later, being destroyed and Replicated is 
about as good as ordinary survival.
Parfit later explains his view of the case as follows:12
It may be slightly inconvenient that my Replica will be psychologically 
continuous, not with me as I am now, but with me as I was this morning 
when I pressed the green button. But these relations are substantially the 
same. It makes little difference that my life briefly overlaps with that of my 
Replica.
If the overlap was large, this would make a difference. Suppose that I am 
an old man, who is about to die. I shall be outlived by someone who was 
once a Replica of me. When this person started to exist forty years ago, he 
was psychologically continuous with me as I was then. He has since lived 
10  This case is first introduced on pp. 199-201. It is discussed again on pp. 287-289.
11  p. 201.
12  p. 289.
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his own life for forty years. I agree that my relation to this Replica, though 
better than ordinary death, is not nearly as good as ordinary survival. But 
this relation would be about as good if my Replica would be psychologically 
continuous with me as I was ten days or ten minutes ago.
Parfit does not explain why the survival of a forty-year-old Replica would 
be less desirable than that of a Replica produced within the past ten minutes. 
He seems to imply that the survival of the forty-year-old Replica would be 
less desirable because he has “lived his own life for forty years” and would 
be less likely to carry on the life that will be cut short at Parfit’s death. At 
the Replica’s creation forty years ago, he might have finished the book that 
Parfit was writing then, but he now lacks the beliefs, desires, and intentions 
that would enable him to finish the book that Parfit is writing now and will 
not survive to finish. Parfit’s judgment in this case thus illustrates his view 
that what matters in survival is the continuation of that in oneself or one’s 
life which one finds important.
Parfit concludes his discussion of the Branch-Line Case with the 
admission that his judgment is counterintuitive:13
… I admit that this is one of the cases where my view is hardest to believe. 
Before I press the green button, I can more easily believe that my relation 
to my Replica contains what fundamentally matters in ordinary survival. 
I can look forward down the Main Line where there are forty years of life 
ahead. After I have pressed the green button, and have talked to my Replica, 
I cannot in the same way look forward down the Main Line. My concern for 
the future needs to be redirected. I must try to direct this concern backwards 
up the Branch Line beyond the point of division, and then forward down the 
Main Line. This psychological manoeuvre would be difficult. But this is not 
surprising. And, since it is not surprising, this difficulty does not provide a 
sufficient argument against what I have claimed about this case.
Parfit’s claim, remember, is that although the Replica on the Branch Line 
will not be meaningfully related to the Original on the Main Line after forty 
years, the two are meaningfully related, at least for a short while, after the 
lines diverge.
Of course, none of these considerations come into play in the non-identity 
problem, which proceeds from the assumption that differences in our 
environmental policies would lead to the creation of different persons to 
13  Ibid.
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begin with. But I want to consider policies that would be consequential for 
future generations without greatly affecting their composition.
For example, whether we stockpile nuclear weapons or ban them may 
someday make the difference between life and death for billions, but 
unless and until it makes that difference, it may affect the lives of only a 
few thousands. Across most of the world, the same people will copulate 
at the same times and under the same conditions irrespective of whether 
nuclear warheads are lurking on submarines under the sea. And the 
products of those unions will go on to live the same lives, unless and until 
the submarines fire their weapons. If the nuclear holocaust occurs in 2150, 
most of its victims will be the same people as would have been born if we 
had banned nuclear weapons in 2015. We might therefore think that they 
will have been harmed by our failure at arms control.
I think otherwise. The sameness of persons across these scenarios would 
not entail that people in one scenario would have been harmed — not, at 
least, in the ways that matter, according to Parfit. In order to see why, let’s 
return to Parfit’s Branch-Line Case.
When Parfit contemplates that case, in what sense does he find himself 
directing his concern “up” one line and “down” the other? Clearly, ‘up’ 
and ‘down’ in this case represent the direction of time. Parfit later says that 
psychological continuity is a transitive relation in either temporal direction 
but not “if we allow it to take both directions in a single argument”.14 That 
is, the reason why Parfit is not psychologically continuous with any of 
his Replicas is that the psychological connections between them run first 
backward in time, up to the point of division, and then forward, down the 
“Main Line”. But why should this change of temporal direction make any 
difference? Parfit doesn’t say. He simply admits that when directing his 
self-concern through time, he has difficulty switching directions.
I suggest that concern for his “Main Line” Replica is difficult for Branch-
Line Parfit because the direction of time is also the direction of causation, 
which is the direction in which information can be conveyed. The change 
of direction severs internal communication between Parfit and his Replica, 
in the sense that their psychological connections cannot carry information 
between them. Parfit’s conception of psychological connections has all 
along implied that they are channels of information, but he has chosen 
14  p. 302.
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instead to emphasize the relations of resemblance between their input 
and output — between experiences and the corresponding memories, 
intentions and the corresponding actions, psychological features and 
their subsequent instantiation — rather than the fact that these inputs 
and outputs are connected in ways that convey information.15 Yet Parfit’s 
difficulty in feeling concern for his Replica seems to indicate that internal 
communication with earlier or later selves is significant.
I now turn to an explanation of why such communication is significant. 
After that, I will return to the non-identity problem.
Selfhood in Dreams
Last night I dreamed that I was Wittgenstein brandishing a poker at Karl 
Popper. (I am prone to nightmares.)16
15  See pp. 286-287, where Parfit discusses the case in which psychological continuity and 
connectedness have a cause that isn’t reliable. Parfit says that a Replica to whom one 
is unreliably connected is just as good as one to whom one’s connection is reliable. He 
compares this case to that of a medication that effects a cure sometimes but not reliably: 
“This effect is just as good, even though its cause was unreliable.” This analogy suggests 
that what matters in survival are the effects of one’s causal connections to future selves, 
not the connections themselves.
16  This and the next several sections draw on material from my “Self to Self”, The 
Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 39-76; reprinted in Self to Self: Selected Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 170-202. That paper draws in turn on Bernard 
Williams’s “Imagination and the Self”, in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–
1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 26-45. Parfit makes a similar 
point on p. 221:
Since Jane seems to remember seeing the lightning, she seems to remember herself seeing the 
lightning. Her apparent memory may tell her accurately what Paul’s experience was like, but 
it tells her, falsely, that it was she who had this experience.
There may be a sense in which this claim is true. Jane’s apparent memories may come to 
her in what [Christopher] Peacocke calls the first-person mode of presentation. Thus, when she 
seems to remember walking across the Piazza, she might seem to remember seeing a child 
running towards her. If this is what she seems to remember, she must be seeming to remember 
herself seeing this child running towards her.
We might deny these claims. In a dream, I can seem to see myself from a point of view 
outside my own body. I might seem to see myself running towards that point of view. Since it 
is myself that I seem to see running in this direction, this direction cannot be towards myself. I 
might say that I seem to see myself running towards the seer’s point of view. And this could be 
said to be the direction in which Jane seems to remember seeing this child run. So described, 
Jane’s apparent memory would include no references to herself.
Though we could deny that Jane’s apparent memories must seem, in part, to be about 
herself, there is no need to do so. Even if her apparent memories are presented in the first-
person mode, Jane need not assume that, if they are not delusions, they must be memories of 
her own experiences…. 
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Now, when I say, “I dreamed that I was Wittgenstein,” my first use 
of ‘I’, in “I dreamed”, refers to me, David Velleman, who groaned in his 
sleep and then woke up remembering a nightmare. What about my second 
use of ‘I’, the one in “I was Wittgenstein”? That use of ‘I’ occurs within 
a that-clause reporting the content of my dream. That is, I had a dream 
with the content “I am Ludwig Wittgenstein brandishing a poker at Karl 
Popper.” I might even have included this content in the dream itself, since 
I might have dreamed of declaring, “Here am I, brandishing a poker at 
Karl Popper!” The reference that ‘I’ would have had within the dream itself 
(“Here am I…”) determines the reference of ‘I’ in my dream-report (“…
dreamed that I was…”). To whom would the first ‘I’ have referred?
I didn’t dream that David Velleman was Wittgenstein. While dreaming, 
I was temporarily oblivious to the existence of David Velleman — oblivious, 
in fact, to my own actual existence under any name or description 
whatsoever.17 Had I dreamed of saying “Here am I”, the pronoun ‘I’ would 
have referred to the speaker of those words, and the speaker of those words 
would have been, not the actual David Velleman, but the dreamed-of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein. Indeed, I could have dreamed of saying, “Here am I, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, brandishing a poker!”
Yet I couldn’t report the dream by saying, “I dreamed that Ludwig 
Wittgenstein was Ludwig Wittgenstein brandishing a poker at Karl 
Popper.” In “I dreamed that I was Wittgenstein,” the second ‘I’ refers to 
Wittgenstein, but it can’t be replaced by an expression that refers to him as 
Wittgenstein. And of course it doesn’t refer to me, David Velleman. What 
accounts for the use of ‘I’ in my dream-report?
What accounts for it is that the dream was about Wittgenstein from the 
first-personal point of view. In the dream, everything was represented from 
Wittgenstein’s perspective. The meaning rule for the pronoun ‘I’ is that it 
refers to the speaker, who is the subject of the perspective from which the 
pronoun is spoken. The dream represented everything from Wittgenstein’s 
perspective, and the pronoun ‘I’ spoken from the same perspective would 
have referred to Wittgenstein. And when I, David Velleman, report the 
content of the dream, I refer to Wittgenstein as ‘I’ in order to indicate 
that the dream was from his perspective — that he (and not Popper, for 
example) was the “I” in the context of the dream.
17  For help with this analysis of first-person reference in dreams, I am indebted to Imogen 
Dickie.
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Selfhood in Memories
Now consider a veridical memory: I can remember when my grandfather 
took me to the Empire State Building as a child. To whom does ‘me’ refer 
in this memory-report?
Of course, you will say that ‘me’ refers to David Velleman. But at the 
moment, that answer begs the question, since we are trying to evaluate 
theories of personal identity, which aim to explain how one and the 
same person, David Velleman, could have a six-year-old self in 1958 and 
a sixty-two-year-old self today — or, in other words, how that six-year-
old and this sixty-two-year-old could belong to one and the same person. 
Conveniently for us, the six-year-old went by the name of Jamie. So we can 
ask our question like this: When I say, “I remember when my grandfather 
took me to the Empire State Building”, does ‘me’ refer to David or to Jamie?
Obviously, it isn’t a sixty-two-year old who appears with his grandfather 
in my memory. In my memory, my grandfather (he was called Chick) 
is taking a six-year-old to the Empire State Building — the six-year-old 
named Jamie. But if I say that I remember when Chick took Jamie to the 
Empire State Building, I would leave out the bit about Jamie’s being me. 
My memory isn’t about Chick taking some six-year-old to the Empire State 
Building and calling him Jamie. I remember him taking the six-year-old 
me. But of course the expression ‘the six-year-old me’ describes the very 
phenomenon that we’re trying to understand. How could a six-year-old 
have been a past self of this sixty-two-year-old; how could he have been me?
One answer would be that my memory simply contains the thought that 
the character in my memory was me, the one having the memory — as if 
in having the memory, I point to the six-year-old and think “That’s me.” 
Another answer would be that my memory is accompanied by the thought 
that it is a memory, meaning that it represents an experience that I, the 
rememberer, once had — as if in having the memory, I think, “Here’s an 
experience from my past.”
Neither of these answers seems satisfactory. I can have a memory without 
realizing that it is a memory, and yet it can still be about the time when my 
grandfather took me to the Empire State Building. And if I remembered 
instead a time when my grandfather took my whole kindergarten to the 
Empire State Building, I could mentally point to any one of the children and 
think “That’s me,” but that’s not the sense in which I do in fact remember 
that my grandfather took me.
88 Beyond Price
I propose that the sense in which I remember that he took me is the same 
as the sense in which I dreamed that I was Wittgenstein. The memory 
represents things from the perspective of the child being taken to the 
Empire State Building. I have a memory from a perspective in which ‘me’ 
would refer to Jamie — a perspective in which Jamie was “me”. In the 
context of my dream, “I” was Wittgenstein; in the context of my memory, 
Jamie is “me”.
Here is a difference between the memory and the dream. The memory 
gets to be “of” or about me in a different way from that in which the dream 
was “of” or about Wittgenstein.
The perceptual experiences that made up my dream — the sights and 
sounds — didn’t pick out Wittgenstein and Popper as the people involved. 
They were just perceptual experience from the perspective someone or 
other, as brandishing a poker at someone or other. In what sense, then, 
was it a dream about Wittgenstein and Popper? The dream-experiences 
must have been somehow accompanied by the thought “Wittgenstein 
brandishing a poker at Popper”.18 In this respect, a dream is like a game 
of make-believe. I can pretend to be Wittgenstein brandishing a poker at 
Popper, but I can’t do it just by waving a poker at you. I have to say, “Let’s 
pretend I’m Wittgenstein …” or something of the sort. I have to stipulate 
who “I” am in the make-believe; similarly, there must have been some 
silent thought stipulating who “I” was in my dream.
Not so with a memory. My memory is about Jamie without stipulation. 
Why? Because the memory is a record of an experience, and the experience 
was Jamie’s, hence a context in which Jamie was “me”. If Jamie had taken 
a photograph with his Brownie camera, it would have been an image of 
the Empire State Building as photographed by his camera. If I retrieved 
that picture from my album and scanned it into my computer, the image 
on my screen would also be an image of the Empire State Building as 
photographed by Jamie’s camera. Similarly, Jamie’s visual experience and 
its traces in my visual memory are both images of the Empire State Building 
as seen by Jamie. He and I don’t need to accompany those images with the 
thought “Empire State Building as seen by Jamie”. That’s what the images 
are, whether we think so or not.
18  The thought “I am Wittgenstein”, as entertained by the “I” of the dream, would not have 
been sufficient, since it would have been compatible with the dream’s being about a 
madman who thought he was Wittgenstein.
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So whereas the visual images in my dream are about Wittgenstein only 
by courtesy of some stipulating thought, the visual images of my memory 
are really about Jamie, because he experienced them and I am retrieving 
traces of them. Consequently, Wittgenstein can’t be the “I” of my dream 
unless I know who he was, so that I can (while dreaming) have a thought 
specifying him as the one whose experiences I am dreaming. But Jamie can 
be the “I” of my memories even if I have no idea who he was — even if I 
have amnesia about my so-called “identity”. Jamie can be the “I” of my 
memories so long as he is the one whose experiences I am remembering, in 
the sense that I am retrieving traces of them from memory.
Here is another way to put the contrast. I can dream of Wittgenstein in 
the first person, but only by picking him out in the third person, so as to 
specify (while dreaming) that he is the “I” of my dream. By contrast, I can 
remember Jamie in the first person without any further thought, simply 
because my memory is a context in which he really is “me”. You might say, 
I’m on first-personal terms with Jamie. To be on a “first-name basis” with 
someone is to be in a position to call him by his first name without being 
introduced; to be on a first-person basis is to be in a position to refer to him 
in the first person without stipulation.  
I suggest that the psychological connections that matter for personal 
survival are connections of genuine first-person reference — connections 
of the sort that enable me to think about Jamie in the first person without 
further thought. I can think about him as “me” simply because I have first-
personal thoughts that are “of” him in actual fact.
The relevant connections are causal. Like photographs, experiences are 
“of” whatever they are received from, and their copies are of the same things 
by virtue of the causal process of copying. Note, in fact, that causation is 
more important than resemblance. After scanning a photograph into my 
computer, I can apply all sorts of visual effects to it without changing what 
it is an image of. A distorted image of the Empire State Building is still 
an image of the Empire State Building. Similarly, a faulty memory of the 
Empire State Building can still be a memory of the Empire State Building, 
provided that it is causally derived from an experience (even a distorted 
experience) of the Empire State Building.
Here, then, is a clue to the flaw in Parfit’s reasoning about the Branch-
Line Case. Shortly after the branch in the road, Parfit and his Replica are 
psychologically very similar, having inherited the same memories, beliefs, 
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desires, plans, and traits from their common predecessor. But Parfit and 
his Replica are not causally connected with one another: neither one can 
inherit traces of the other’s experiences, and so neither can be the “I” in the 
other’s thoughts. In short, they aren’t on first-personal terms. Hence they 
aren’t connected in the way that matters for personal survival.
Selfhood in Anticipation
Consider now a different connection that conducts first-person reference 
through time. I think I’ll take my grandchildren to the Empire State Building. 
I have grandchildren, and I’m going to take them to the places where my 
grandfather took me (with some regrettable exceptions, like the old Yankee 
Stadium). Here I am referring to a particular future grandfather. We need a 
name for him, so that we can ask what makes him my future self. My eldest 
grandchild calls me Boppa, so let’s give the name ‘Boppa’ to the future 
grandfather who will take his grandchildren to the Empire State Building, 
among other landmarks.
I may be forming a plan — that is, a thought designed to initiate the 
outing that it represents. Alternatively, I may simply be predicting rather 
than planning the outing. If I’m predicting it, however, I am not merely 
predicting it; I’m predicting it with a feeling of anticipatory excitement. In 
either case, my thought is one that can be resolved, or given closure, by the 
outing that it represents — resolved or given closure either when my plan 
is carried out or when the associated excitement is discharged.
The reason why my present thought can be resolved in the future 
is that it will be stored in my memory, ready to reemerge in Boppa’s 
consciousness at a later date, when its sense of determination or expectancy 
can be discharged by the corresponding action or experience. Boppa will 
find himself with the thought “I am going to take my grandchildren to 
the Empire State Building,” and he will be in a position to see it through 
to its practical or experiential fulfillment by interpreting the first-person 
pronoun without any further thought — hence as referring to him. Indeed, 
my present thought includes this future resolution of itself. It represents a 
future outing as implementing or verifying this very thought as retrieved 
from memory.19 So when Boppa interprets the first-person pronoun as 
19  See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception: “[W]ith my immediate past, I 
have also the horizon of futurity which surrounded it, and thus I have my actual present 
seen as the future of that past. With the imminent future, I have the horizon of past which 
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referring to him, he will be interpreting the pronoun as was intended when 
the thought was formed. I don’t mean that the pronoun was intended 
to refer to Boppa; I mean that it was intended to refer to whoever would 
retrieve the thought from memory and then be in a position to interpret the 
pronoun, without further stipulation, as referring to him.
In this respect, my thought is like a message in a bottle.
Suppose that I am stranded on a desert island and I launch a bottle 
containing a note that says, “If you find this message and bring it to my 
wife in New York, she will reward you with $10,000.” To whom does ‘you’ 
refer in the context of my note? It refers to whoever finds the note. (If the 
note is never found, my use of ‘you’ fails to refer.) Alone on my desert 
island, I have no one to whom I can refer in the second person — no one 
with whom I am, so to speak, on second-personal terms. In casting my 
message on the waters, I am hoping to get onto second-personal terms with 
someone, by succeeding in my attempt to refer with the pronoun ‘you’. 
That referential hope is part and parcel of my hope to communicate with 
someone by way of the message.
So it is with my thought of a future outing. I represent the outing as 
taken by someone who has retrieved this very thought and can resolve it 
without any further thought about who is meant by ‘I’. I hope that there 
will be a subject to take himself without further thought as the “I” in the 
context, just as I hope that there will be a reader to intercept the second-
personal reference in my message. If my hope for the thought is fulfilled, 
I will have succeeded in thinking with it about a future subject in the first 
person. What I am hoping, then, is to get onto first-personal terms with 
someone in the future, someone who will fulfill my present intention or 
expectation.
The case of my future-directed thoughts goes beyond this analogy in 
one important respect. Just as I can frame a first-personal thought that 
Boppa will be able to interpret in the future as referring to him, he will be 
able to think first-personally about having himself formed that thought in 
the past. That is, he will be able to think “I planned …” or “I expected …” 
and thereby think of me without stipulating that I am who he means by ‘I’. 
He will therefore fulfill an intention or resolve an emotion that he conceives 
will surround it, and therefore my actual present as the past of that future” (Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin [London: Routledge, 2003], p. 82).
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as having belonged to himself — that is, to someone with whom he is on 
first-personal terms.
Selfhood in Other Possible Worlds
What matters in survival, I suggest, is being able to think about the future 
as resolving this very thought. What matters is being able to have thoughts 
that aren’t closed off in the sense of being barred future closure. Of course, 
I care whether the future will answer my thoughts in the sense of bearing 
them out, by making them come true. But I care even more, and more 
fundamentally, whether my thoughts will be answered in the sense that 
future actions or experiences will be felt as fulfilling them, as if concluding 
a musical call-and-response. I don’t just care that my hopes will be fulfilled; 
I care that they will survive to be discharged in a sense of gratification. I 
don’t just care that my fears will not be realized; I care that they will be 
allayed or relieved. 
I also care about communicating on first-personal terms with the subjects 
of those experiences. I think about their life “from the inside” not just by 
thinking about it from their point of view but also by conceiving of that 
point of view as one in which this very thought will emerge from memory, 
so that the thought itself will be “inside” the anticipated experiences, and 
my present self will be internally accessible to their subjects as “me”. My 
thought therefore presents itself as inside the point of view from which it 
represents future events.
This inside view of their experiences has an intimacy that I value. One 
important aspect of intimacy is the ability to dispense with referential 
cues. We recognize long-married couples, for example, by their telegraphic 
style of conversation, in which they use pronouns without antecedents — 
without even following one another’s gaze — because of already knowing 
what is salient to one another. Similarly, I can think of a future self as “me” 
and rely on him to know that I meant him — that is, the self to whom he 
will naturally attach the reference.20 Because referential cues are the means 
of coordinating different points of view, doing without them gives the 
impression of occupying a single point of view. Like a long-married couple, 
then, I and my future self seem to share a single point of view because of 
being referentially in sync.
20  This intimacy would be lacking if I were going to undergo fission, as in the Branch-Line 
Case. I discuss this issue in “Self to Self”.
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If I am right about what matters in survival, then the relevant aspect 
of psychological connectedness is not the one that interests Parfit. What 
interests Parfit, as we have seen, is the relation of resemblance between 
the termini of psychological connections: the experiences and their 
corresponding memories, the intentions and the corresponding actions, 
the acquired attitudes or traits and their persisting instantiation. These 
psychological causes and effects often perpetuate various features of mine, 
and Parfit believes that those features which are distinctive of me, or valuable 
to me, count more than others in constituting what matters in survival. 
As I have argued, however, the aspect of psychological connectedness that 
really counts is the causal relation that establishes an informational channel 
to carry anticipations forward to their anticipated cadences, and to carry 
future-directed references forward to find their referents, including the 
future “me”. Whether the same connections preserve any of my features is 
relatively unimportant. 
My account of what matters in survival thus explains why Parfit has 
difficulty caring first-personally about his Replica in the Branch-Line Case. 
He can neither store thoughts to be retrieved by his Replica nor retrieve 
thoughts that are stored by him, and so he can neither experience his 
future as responding to the Replica’s thoughts nor expect the Replica’s 
future to be experienced as responding to his. The causal tides can carry 
no internal messages between them. Even if the Replica finishes Parfit’s 
current book-project, its completion will not discharge the hopes that Parfit 
has now, on the Branch Line, and so Parfit can no longer aim his hopes at 
such an experienced fulfillment. As far as he is concerned, his book will be 
finished by someone else — someone who is like him, perhaps, but who is 
not himself, because of being in no position to complete the phrases of his 
current mental life.
I thus arrive at the conclusion that Parfit’s difficulty in caring first-
personally about a Replica is unsurprising for reasons that do not deprive 
the difficulty of philosophical significance. On the contrary, his difficulty in 
caring first-personally about his Replica is unsurprising for the very good 
reason that he and his Replica are not on first-personal terms.
My conclusion has implications that reach beyond the realm of science 
fiction. A person’s Replicas are not the only candidate selves from whom 
he is causally isolated in a way that blocks internal communication, thus 
preventing them from being his selves in fact. Also causally isolated from 
the person are his other possible selves — himself as he or his life might 
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have been. I will describe this merely possible person as himself in other 
possible worlds.
Before embarking on this topic, I will need to regiment my language 
carefully. From now on, I will use the term ‘selves’ for those subjects who 
are connected to me by the relation that conveys first-personal concern. Since 
the present question is whether inhabitants of other possible worlds can bear 
that relation to me, it amounts to the question whether I have other possible 
selves at all. The candidates for selfhood in this case are inhabitants of other 
possible worlds who are numerically identical to the person I am — that is, 
to David Velleman. I am not questioning whether David Velleman exists in 
other possible worlds: I think he does. What I am questioning is whether 
David Velleman as he might have been is any self of mine.21
But what shall we call him in relation to me? We can’t refer to him 
as another possible self, since his selfhood with me is the relation that is 
currently in question. I propose that we call him my identical.
I often wonder what would have become of me if I hadn’t decided to go 
back to graduate school in 1978. Maybe I would have become a freelance 
writer. There are possible worlds in which I did become a freelance writer: 
in some of them I am living just a few blocks from where I live today. I 
wonder whether I have children in those worlds. And so on.
The James David Velleman living in those worlds diverged from my 
actual path in 1978, and since then he has followed a very different path from 
mine. My relation to this identical is therefore similar to Parfit’s relation 
to his Replica in the Branch-Line Case. In order for my concern to reach 
the other possible David Velleman, it would have to travel “backwards 
up the Branch Line”, rewinding my years as a philosopher, back to the 
moment of my decision to go to graduate school, “and then forward down 
the Main Line”, playing out the life I would have lived if I had decided to 
become a writer instead. In my view, this maneuver cannot convey genuine 
self-concern, because it does not follow a possible channel of information 
21  In considering this question, I needn’t worry about the metaphysical dispute between 
counterpart theorists and theorists who posit strict transworld identities. Whether 
another possible David Velleman is related to me in the way that justifies self-concern 
doesn’t depend on whether he is strictly identical to me or merely more similar to me 
than anyone else in his world. (I do wonder, however, whether the inaccessibility of 
transworld identicals to self-concern played a role in David Lewis’s intuitions when he 
developed his counterpart theory.)
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between me and its object, and so it cannot direct my concern to someone 
meaningfully conceived of as “me”.
In short, my relation to the person I would have been in another possible 
world does not include what matters in survival. Although I am the same 
person as the David Velleman who became a freelance writer, he is not a 
self of mine in the sense that calls for me to identify with him, or to identify 
my interests with his. He and I may be numerically identical, but — as 
Parfit himself puts it — identity is not what matters.22
Back in 1978, of course, I was in a position to look down many alternative 
paths and to form first-personal thoughts that would have succeeded in 
picking out the traveler on any one of them, had he been the one to end 
up carrying the traces of those thoughts, available for later retrieval from 
memory. Looking forward, then, I could have entertained self-concern for 
many different possible future selves, concern that might in each case have 
turned out to be about a future person. 
After the point of decision, however, alternative paths were closed to me 
not only in practice but also in first-personal thought. Whatever befalls the 
travelers on those paths is what would have befallen David Velleman, if I had 
decided differently, but his being David Velleman is, so to speak, nothing 
to me: it doesn’t matter in the same way as my being the one who might 
undergo different fates in the future, depending on what I now decide.
The Irrationality of Grudges and Regret
Here is a reason for not regretting what might have been — a reason other 
than the ordinary, pragmatic reason that nothing can be done about it. It is 
not just practically useless to have regrets about what might have been; it’s 
metaphysically confused, because the world as it might have been does not 
include anyone for whom I can have first-personal concern. I can perhaps 
envy the people for whom things might have gone differently, as I envy 
22  Thanks to Elena Weinstein for making this connection. As Matt Hanser has pointed out 
to me, this conception of what matters in survival helps to explain why, as Lucretius 
observed, we want to die later but don’t regret not having been born earlier. We cannot 
complete psychological cadences for the past selves who would have been born earlier, 
but we can start psychological cadences for our longer-lived future selves to complete. 
Some explain the difference by arguing that we would not have been identical with 
a person born earlier. (See Thomas Nagel, “Death”, in Mortal Questions [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991], pp. 4-10.) I think that the explanation does not 
depend on the necessity of our origins. Even if we could have been identical with an 
earlier-born person, our relation to that person lacks what matters in survival.
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any other person. But I cannot think of them as my more fortunate selves, 
because they aren’t selves of mine in the relevant sense, and so I cannot 
regard what they have as something that I myself might have had.
At issue here is only a particular kind of regret, namely, regret about 
what might have been. Another kind of regret, often called agent-regret, is 
about what my actual selves did in the past. There is no confusion in regret 
over past mistakes, since I am first-personally related to the agents who 
made them. The confusion begins when I regret not having today what I 
might have had if I hadn’t made those mistakes back then.
The person who might have been better off today if I had done differently 
in the past — that person is inaccessible to my self-concern. Of course he 
is who I might have been — that is, who could have been a future self 
of my past self, because he is on first-personal terms with someone with 
whom I am still on first-personal terms. But as it turns out, selfhood is not 
transitive: another future self of my past self is not a self of mine. The fate 
of a merely possible self of mine is no more pertinent to me than anyone 
else’s, since I can only imagine undergoing that fate.
Thus, I shouldn’t regret not having what I could have had, because no 
self of mine could have had it. I can rationally envy the David Velleman 
who could have had what I don’t. I can also rationally gloat over what 
I have that he wouldn’t have. Envy and gloating are appropriate with 
respect to others. But regret is a first-personal emotion, and what I could 
have had could have been had only by someone with whom I am not on 
first-personal terms.
But suppose that someone stole my identity and emptied my bank account. 
I am now reduced to poverty, daydreaming about the comfortable life I 
would have had if only my passwords had been longer. Surely, the thief 
harmed me, and we are tempted to say that the harm consists precisely 
in my being poorer than I might have been. But according to my view, it 
seems, I have no grounds for resenting the harm, because I am not first-
personally related to the David Velleman who would have been better off.
My view still leaves me grounds for resentment, however — namely, 
that the thief harmed my past self by depriving him of a comfortable future. 
When I complain, “I could have been better off,” I don’t mean, “I have a 
better-off possible self”; I mean, “I (in the past) had the chance of being 
better off in the future.”
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The moral upshot is that resentment should wane as time passes. If, 
on the contrary, my resentment should be proportional to the difference 
between my present actual self and other present possible David Vellemans, 
then it should increase as time passes, since those other David Vellemans 
would have had capital to invest and I didn’t. The difference between our 
financial circumstances has therefore grown over time, and so should my 
resentment, if rational resentment is proportional to the difference between 
contemporaneous possible David Vellemans. But rational resentment 
is rather vicarious resentment on behalf of my past self, who recedes 
further and further into the past, hence further and further from my first-
personal concern. In short, rationality favors letting bygones be bygones, in 
proportion to how far bygone they are.
The Identity Problem
An extension of this reasoning leads to the conclusion that I cannot 
rationally resent past actions that were taken before I was born. Resentment 
of past actions must be based on their having deprived my past selves of 
something they might have had, including possible futures. But the David 
Vellemans born in possible worlds that had already diverged from ours 
are merely my identicals, not my selves, since there is no possible channel 
of internal communication between us. And I don’t have any prenatal 
selves who might have looked forward to alternative futures consisting of 
my actual life and the lives of those counterfactual David Vellemans. So 
I have no past selves who were deprived of those futures. In sum, I am 
not on first-personal terms with anyone who could have been deprived of 
anything by actions taken before I was born. 
Non-identity is thus inessential to Parfit’s problem. Recall that the non-
identity problem is how our wasting resources today can harm people 
who will be born in the future, given that our conserving resources would 
have prevented those people from being born. The people who will inherit 
a depleted Earth from us wouldn’t have been born to enjoy the plentiful 
Earth that we might have left behind us instead. How, asks Parfit, will they 
have been harmed by their inferior inheritance?
But it now turns out that even if the people who inherit the depleted 
Earth would still have been born to enjoy the plentiful one, they will have 
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no complaint against us on self-regarding grounds, since they will have no 
first-personal relationship to their counterfactual counterparts. They will 
be no worse off than they might have been, because the people who would 
have been better off are their mere identicals, not their selves.
Parfit thinks that the non-identity problem raises a moral objection to 
evaluating the effect of our actions on future generations in what he calls 
person-affecting terms — that is, in terms of whether our actions today will 
make future persons better or worse off than those same persons would 
otherwise have been. The moral objection to person-affecting evaluation 
is that it yields the morally unacceptable conclusion that we cannot harm 
future generations by depleting the Earth’s resources, polluting the 
environment, wrecking just institutions, or doing anything else that would 
cause different people to be born.
I have argued that person-affecting evaluation is not only morally 
unacceptable but metaphysically confused, and that it is confused even 
with respect to courses of action that would not affect who is born. People 
simply cannot be harmed or benefitted by actions taken before their 
births. The circumstances into which they are born, including the range of 
their possible futures, cannot make them better or worse off than anyone 
first-personally related to them would have been; nor, of course, do they 
have any past selves who could have been harmed or benefitted in that 
way. People’s initial endowments at birth are the baseline against which 
all harms and benefits to them must be assessed.
Parfit thinks that the alternative to person-affecting evaluation is to 
evaluate our effect on future people in terms of the average or total welfare 
they would enjoy, irrespective of who they would be. Unfortunately, those 
methods of evaluation lead to other morally unacceptable conclusions. 
The result seems to be a stalemate between methods of evaluation, none of 
which we can accept.
The way out of the stalemate, of course, is to abjure consequentialist 
evaluation of any kind. The right way to think about our obligations to 
future generations is to think, not about providing for their well-being, but 
about respecting their humanity, an approach that does not take account of 
who or how many they are. I will develop this approach in Parts II and III 
of this series.
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II. The Gift of Life23
They will arrange for the suckling of the children by bringing their mothers 
to the nursery when their breasts are still full, taking every precaution to see 
that no mother recognizes her child.
—Plato, Republic V.ii.460e
Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and 
mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born 
like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their 
relationship to one another.
—Aristotle, Politics II.iii.1262a
Many people are grateful to their parents for giving them a gift consisting 
in life itself. Life itself is an odd sort of gift, since there is no one around 
antecedently to serve as its intended recipient.24 Life is at best a benefit that 
prospective parents toss into the void in the hope that someone will turn 
out to have snagged it, to his own surprise as much as anyone’s. But once 
parents have performed this random act of kindness, they may be thought 
to have no further obligation to the future beneficiary, for whom they have 
already done more than anyone will ever again be able to do. 
Of course, babies are needy creatures, and their biological parents 
generally bear the burden of seeing to it that their needs are met. This 
allocation of childcare duties may be no more than a social convenience, 
however, taking advantage of the biological fact that at least one of the 
parents is bound to be on the scene when the needy creature makes its 
appearance. Maybe alternative childcare arrangements would be just as 
good, if only they could be institutionalized, as Plato famously imagined. 
If proximity to the birth is all that biological parents have going for them 
as caregivers, Plato’s scheme for community nurseries may be worth 
considering.
23  This part was presented to the Legal Theory Working Group at The Baldy Center for 
Law & Social Policy, University of Buffalo, and to the Legal Theory Workshop at the 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law. I also had helpful discussions or correspondence 
on the topic with Jules Coleman, Daniela Dover, Robin Jeshion, Arthur Ripstein, Brian 
Slattery, and Paul F. Velleman.
24  As Matthew Hanser pointed out, no one can act with the intention of bringing a 
particular person into existence (“Harming Future People”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 
[1990]: 47-70, p. 61).
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Aristotle criticized this scheme as unrealistic. Children who are not seen 
as the sons and daughters of anyone in particular will not be properly cared 
for, he thought; and in any case, people will seek out their own parents, 
children, and siblings, despite all efforts to keep them apart. As Aristotle 
realized, human beings have a natural tendency to find and associate with 
their biological relatives.
Today we can explain this tendency in evolutionary terms, since it 
enables each human organism to promote the propagation of his genotype 
and to benefit from the like tendency of his relatives. But the aims of 
natural selection need not be ours. If the human tendency to congregate in 
biological families is a vestige of natural selection, then it may be like the 
capacity for murderous jealousy, for example — a natural tendency that 
human society has no reason to accommodate. Certainly, the human affinity 
for consanguines is implicated in such regrettable human phenomena as 
racism and xenophobia. Maybe it should be killed in the cradle, as Plato 
suggested.
Still, that’s not what modern-day readers of The Republic think; they 
think that Plato’s scheme for child rearing is inhumane. Why do they 
think so? What would be wrong with permanently separating parents and 
children at birth?
I think that associating with relatives is more than a biological imperative; 
it’s a personal need, imposed on persons like us by our predicament as 
human beings. Because I believe that biological ties have value, I also 
believe that there are good reasons for assigning the duties of child-rearing 
to biological parents in the first instance. Indeed, I believe that the act of 
procreation generates parental obligations that cannot be contracted out to 
others, except when doing so is in the best interests of the child.25
These obligations arise because being begotten is not, as many believe, 
the original birthday present. As Seana Shiffrin has argued in a brilliant 
paper on claims of wrongful life, being brought into existence is at best 
a mixed blessing, and those who confer it are not entitled to walk away 
congratulating themselves on a job well done.26
25  For a different defense of the same position, see Rivka Weinberg, “The Moral Complexity 
of Sperm Donation”, Bioethics 22 (2008): 166-178.
26  Seana Valentine Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance 
of Harm”, Legal Theory 5 (1999): 117-148. Brad Inwood has directed me to Seneca’s De 
Beneficiis, Book 3, Sections 29-38. For example: “[I]t is a pretty trivial benefit for a father 
and mother to sleep together unless there are additional benefits to follow up on this 
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Shiffrin argues that bringing someone into existence is a morally 
equivocal act, because it entails imposing harms on the person as well as 
bestowing benefits. Shiffrin argues further that a fundamental asymmetry 
between harms and benefits prevents the harm imposed by procreation 
from being justified by the benefit bestowed. And Shiffrin attempts to 
explain the asymmetry by proposing a philosophical account of harm, 
although she does not develop it fully.27
Now, although I agree with Shiffrin that bringing someone into 
existence is a morally equivocal act, I do not think that it can be equivocal 
because of conferring a mixture of harms and benefits. For as I explained in 
Part I, I believe that a person can be neither harmed nor benefited by being 
brought into existence. I will therefore devote the first half of this part to 
paraphrasing Shiffrin’s arguments in slightly different terms, by drawing 
out elements, already implicit in them, of an Aristotelian conception of 
human well-being. I will then draw some conclusions that are congruent 
with Shiffrin’s and a few more that I doubt whether she would endorse.
The best way to explain Shiffrin’s conception of harm, I think, is to apply it, 
not to cases of harm per se, but to the philosophical problem of distinguishing 
between pain and suffering. That pain and suffering are distinct is obvious 
from the many cases of pain that do not occasion suffering (stubbed toes, 
skinned knees), as well as cases of suffering that do not necessarily involve 
pain (loneliness, boredom).
What makes the difference between pain and suffering is coping. 
Suffering occurs when someone cannot or does not cope with adversity of 
some kind. To cope with pain or other adversity is to exercise, or to give 
oneself the sense of exercising, some degree of control over the adversity 
itself or, at least, over one’s reactions to it. Coping is therefore a way of 
exercising one’s will in the face of adverse circumstances, by managing 
one’s response to them and maybe also by managing the circumstances 
themselves.
initial gift and to consolidate it with additional services to the child. It is not living which 
is the good, but living well. And I do live well. But I could have lived badly” (Section 38, 
Inwood’s translation).
27  That the goods and ills of existence are in some sense asymmetric is an intuition discussed 
by several philosophers. See, e.g., Trudy Govier, “What Should We Do About Future 
People?”, American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 105-113; David Benatar, “Why It Is 
Better Never to Come Into Existence”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 345-
355; and Michael Tooley, “Value, Obligation and the Asymmetry Question”, Bioethics 12 
(1998): 111-124. The issue is also discussed by Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 391.
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When someone fails to cope, we describe him as going to pieces, falling 
apart, breaking down — all expressions that reflect damage not just to the 
body or to personal projects but to the self.28 Failure to cope entails damage 
to the self because it entails a defeat or disabling of the will. The person 
is thrown into a condition of helplessness in the face of some obstacle or 
assault. Stripped of his agency, he is damaged in his very personhood. 
The fact and the experience of this damage to the self are constitutive of 
suffering.29
This brief account of suffering echoes Shiffrin’s account of harm. She 
suggests that harm consists in a condition toward which a person finds 
himself in a position of passive subjection — the position, as Shiffrin puts 
it, of an “endurer”. She thus reverses the order of explanation between 
the badness of harm and our unwillingness to undergo it. It’s not that 
we’re unwilling to undergo something harmful because it’s bad; rather, 
something is bad enough to qualify as harmful if and because we find 
ourselves undergoing it unwillingly.
Shiffrin also briefly suggests a corresponding account of benefit. What 
she says is that unsought benefits are not as good as benefits that the 
recipient has chosen to pursue and has succeeded in obtaining. She thereby 
suggests that, while being passively withstood is constitutive of harm, 
being actively sought and attained is at least characteristic of benefit.
These remarks about harm and benefit ground Shiffrin’s explanation 
of the asymmetry between the harms and benefits entailed in the gift of 
life. In Shiffrin’s view, the asymmetry arises from the fact that the gift of 
life is never sought or even accepted by its recipient. He simply becomes 
aware, long after the fact, of having been stuck with it. Even if the recipient 
welcomes this gift retrospectively, his will was nevertheless preempted 
when it was given to him, since he had no chance to refuse or accept. The 
harms that accompany this gift are consequently aggravated by having 
been imposed on him willy-nilly, with the result that he is already in a 
relation of passive subjection to them from the start. And the associated 
28  For this account of suffering, see Eric J. Cassell, “Recognizing Suffering”, The Hastings 
Center Report 21 (1991): 24-31. See also Kathy Charmaz, “Loss of Self: A Fundamental 
Form of Suffering in the Chronically Ill”, Sociology of Health & Illness 5 (1983): 168-195.
29  Because coping is an exercise of the will, it requires choice on the part of the subject. 
That’s why we can sometimes think that people have chosen to suffer, although we’re 
never quite sure. There is no clear line between inability and unwillingness to cope, but 
there certainly are cases in which someone could cope but chooses not to; or maybe he 
cannot choose to cope.
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benefits are somewhat undermined by lacking the features of choice and 
successful effort that belong to the most significant benefits. 
Thus Shiffrin. Much as I admire her attempt to explain the asymmetry 
between the goods and ills of existence, I do not believe that a balance of 
goods and ills can account for what is morally equivocal about procreation. 
Still, I think that her explanation points us in the right direction, by pointing 
us toward an Aristotelian conception of human well-being.
According to Aristotle, human well-being consists in the exercise of 
capacities that are in excellent condition, and pleasure is that complete 
absorption in the exercise of one’s capacities which their being in excellent 
condition tends to facilitate.30 The excellent condition of one’s capacities 
is what Aristotle called aretê. His claim that pleasure consists in being 
absorbed or engrossed in exercising one’s capacities has been confirmed by 
research into what psychologists call “flow”.31
Aristotle’s conceptions of well-being and pleasure are hospitable 
to Shiffrin’s account of harm and its asymmetrical relation to benefit. 
Anything that casts a person into a state of passive subjection will prevent 
him from exercising his capacities, and it will also deprive him of the 
enjoyment of becoming absorbed in their exercise. Conversely, any good 
that is acquired through the exercise of the relevant capacities will bring 
with it a bonus of flourishing and “flow”, like a destination that lies at the 
end of an engrossing journey.
I think that Aristotle’s conceptions of human well-being and pleasure 
also carry implications for the value of the so-called gift of life, because 
they imply that human happiness takes work. It takes work in the form of 
exercising one’s proper capacities; more importantly, it takes work because 
the relevant capacities must be acquired by practice and habituation. In this 
respect, humans are unlike other animals, whose well-being consists mostly 
in the exercise of capacities that are innate. A cat is born already equipped 
for the activities that will constitute its flourishing; a human being must be 
educated and trained for his most rewarding activities.
30  ‘Well-being’ and ‘flourishing’ are not precise equivalents for Aristotle’s ‘eudaimonia’, 
since they can be achieved at a particular time, whereas eudaimonia can be achieved 
only over the course of an entire life.
31  Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1990).
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According to the Aristotelian view, then, a human child is born with 
the general, second-order capacity to acquire the further, specific capacities 
whose exercise will eventually constitute its flourishing as an adult. The 
gift of life is therefore the gift of an opportunity — the opportunity to do 
the work and thereby gain the reward of human well-being.
This opportunity is accompanied by a corresponding threat and a 
corresponding risk. The threat is that if the child doesn’t undertake the 
work prerequisite to flourishing, it will suffer harm. And we can now see 
that it will be harmed quite literally, because without the capacities needed 
for human flourishing, the child will find itself in a position of passive 
subjection to its circumstances, lacking the resources to cope with them. 
The corresponding risk is that even if the child accepts the challenge of 
flourishing, it may nevertheless fail. (The streets of every large U.S. city are 
littered with individuals who are not coping with their circumstances, or 
are coping only poorly, and who are consequently faring poorly.)
The opportunity wrapped up in the gift of life is thus an offer of the sort 
that the child cannot refuse. To be born as a human being is to be handed 
a job of work, with a promise of great rewards for success, a threat of great 
harm for refusal, and a risk of similar harm for failure. The scene on which 
a human child appears willy-nilly is the scene of a predicament, a challenge 
with very high stakes. Hence the so-called gift of life is indeed a mixed 
blessing, as Shiffrin claims.
Shiffrin and other philosophers tend to view parental obligations as arising 
from the harms and benefits that parents confer on children by bringing 
them into existence. As I argued in the previous part, however, parents are 
metaphysically incapable of conferring either harms or benefits in that way. 
The Aristotelian spin that I have now put on Shiffrin’s arguments enables 
me to conceive of parental obligations in different terms.
What is equivocal about procreation is not that it confers both benefits 
and harms on the resulting child; what’s equivocal is that it throws that 
child into a predicament, confronts it with a challenge in which the stakes 
are high, both for good and for ill. Moreover, it is a challenge that no child 
can meet without the daily assistance of others over the course of many 
years, since the human infant is not at all equipped to acquire the necessary 
capacities on its own. In my view, those who create a child thereby incur an 
inalienable obligation to provide the necessary assistance.
Consider the hackneyed example of a child who is drowning at the deep 
end of a swimming pool. People lounging around the pool obviously have 
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an obligation to rescue the child. But the obligation to fish the child out 
doesn’t fall on the bystanders equally if one of them pushed the child in. 
The one responsible for the child’s predicament is not just a bystander like 
the others, and he bears the principal obligation.
Obviously, if the responsible party cannot or will not help the child, 
then others are obligated to act. The child has a right to be saved by 
somebody if not by the person who caused its predicament. But just as 
obviously, the person who pushed the child into the pool should have 
considered beforehand, not just whether someone or other would come 
to its assistance, but whether he himself was willing and able to fulfill 
the obligation of assistance that he was about to incur. You shouldn’t go 
pushing children into the deep end if you aren’t willing to get wet.
Likewise with procreation and parenting. In my view, parents who 
throw a child into the predicament of human life have an obligation to 
lend the assistance it needs to cope with that predicament, by helping it to 
acquire the capacities whose exercise will enable it to flourish and whose 
lack would cause it to suffer. By choosing to create a child, perhaps even by 
choosing to have sex, adults take the chance of incurring this obligation. To 
risk incurring the obligation without intending to fulfill it is irresponsible; 
actually to incur it and then not to fulfill it is immoral.
I will shortly consider whether it is morally permissible for biological 
parents to delegate this obligation to others. Is the obligation incurred 
through the act of procreation an obligation to see that the child receives 
the needed assistance in coping with the human predicament? Or is it an 
obligation to render that assistance oneself, in person?32
32  Jeff Sebo has directed me to Henry Sidgwick’s remarks on the subject: “This … we might 
partly classify under … duties arising out of special needs: for no doubt children are 
naturally objects of compassion, on account of their helplessness, to others besides their 
parents. On the latter they have a claim of a different kind, springing from the universally 
recognized duty of not causing pain or any harm to other human beings, directly or 
indirectly, except in the way of deserved punishment: for the parent, being the cause of 
the child’s existing in a helpless condition, would be indirectly the cause of the suffering 
and death that would result to it if neglected. Still this does not seem an adequate 
explanation of parental duty, as recognised by Common Sense. For we commonly blame 
a parent who leaves his children entirely to the care of others, even if he makes ample 
provision for their being nourished and trained up to the time at which they can support 
themselves by their own labour. We think that he owes them affection (as far as this can be 
said to be a duty) and the tender and watchful care that naturally springs from affection: 
and, if he can afford it, somewhat more than the necessary minimum of food, clothing, 
and education” (The Methods of Ethics [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1981], p. 249).
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Of course, parental obligations must sometimes be transferable in 
practice. A child has a right to grow up in the care of parents who are willing 
and able to care for it. If its biological parents do not rise to the task, then 
the child has a right to adoptive parents who are willing and able to take 
their place. Thus, the mere unwillingness of biological parents to discharge 
their obligations may be sufficient to ensure that those obligations may be 
transferred to others, in deference to the rights of the child.
But this practical accommodation does not mean that the biological 
parents are morally permitted to abdicate their responsibilities at will. We 
do not think that parents are permitted to relinquish a newborn for adoption 
because of a last-minute social engagement, for example, or dismay at the 
size of its ears.
More importantly, we don’t think that adults are permitted to conceive 
a child with the prior intention to put it up for adoption. A woman may not 
decide to conceive simply in order to have the experience or health benefits 
of pregnancy, we think, no matter how confident she may be of finding 
suitable adoptive parents to take over her subsequent responsibilities. 
Thus, we regard parental obligations as transferable, morally speaking, 
only under exigencies that make their transfer beneficial for the child rather 
than convenient for the parents.
In one case, however, we tolerate a practice equivalent to creating a 
child for adoption. Those who “donate” their sperm and eggs play their 
role in conceiving children whom they have no intention of parenting. 
Indeed, they play their role in conception precisely on the condition 
that they will never be called upon to deal with the resulting children, a 
condition readily accepted by those who purchase their gametes, which 
would be unacceptable if they came with parental strings attached.33 Why 
do we condone the antecedent intention to transfer parental obligations in 
this case?
Before I discuss the transferability of parental obligations, I want to discuss 
a different question raised by donor conception, about the provision that 
one must be able to make for future children in order to be justified in 
creating them. People should not create children for whom they cannot 
provide adequately; but what is an adequate provision? In particular, does 
33  My discussion of donor conception will be confined to the typical case of anonymous 
donation between strangers. Cases of donation within families, or of “open” donation, 
are significantly different in respects that would call for different treatment.
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an adequate provision require an opportunity for the child to know and be 
reared by its biological parents?
Here I am using the word ‘adequate’ in a sense that is relativized to a 
particular decision, namely, the decision whether to create a child. Most 
adoptive parents make more than adequate provision for their adopted 
children, but the relevant standard of adequacy is premised on the children’s 
already existing and needing a home. My question is what provision for a 
child is adequate to justify the decision to create it in the first place. And my 
view is that the standard of adequacy applicable to the procreative decision 
is different from the standard applicable to decisions made after the child 
already exists.
My arguments in Part I imply that the adequacy of a child’s initial 
provision is not relative to what could have been provided to the selfsame 
child. The child will not be in a position to identify his interests with those 
of the better- or worse-provisioned children he might have been. From the 
child’s perspective, the better or worse starts he could have had in life will 
not be a matter of self-interest, because his self-concern will extend only 
to his actual present and possible future selves, not to children inhabiting 
possible histories that will already have diverged from reality. When the 
child compares the hand he has been dealt at birth with those he might have 
been dealt, he will not be able to see himself as ahead or behind in the game 
of life; he will only see himself as starting a life that amounts to a whole 
new game. Hence, what could have been provided to him in particular is 
not especially relevant to the standard of an adequate provision.
A standard that philosophers sometimes apply to procreative decisions 
is whether the resulting child would have “a life worth living”. In Part 
III of this series, I will argue that this phrase has no meaning that can 
apply to procreative decisions. ‘A life worth living’ can mean “a life worth 
continuing”, but procreative decisions concern whether a life should be 
started, not whether to continue it. Alternatively, ‘a life worth living’ can 
mean “a life not to be regretted”, but I will argue that people are biased 
against regretting their existence by considerations that depend on their 
already existing, considerations that are irrelevant to the decision whether 
to bring them into existence. In any case, what’s barely preferable to 
nonexistence is not enough for a child by the standard of adequacy that I 
consider appropriate.
The standard that I consider appropriate does not peg a child’s initial 
provision at any particular level of happiness or well-being. Hence, it 
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is not what philosophers call a person-affecting standard; it is rather a 
personhood-respecting standard.34 An adequate initial provision for a child, 
in my view, is one that expresses due consideration for the importance of 
human life.
When creating human life, we are obligated to show due consideration for 
it, not just for its individual possessors. The importance of human life itself 
forbids us to treat it lightly in creating it.
Human life is important because it is a predicament faced by a creature 
that matters — that is, by a person, whose success at facing it will entail 
the flowering of personhood, and whose failure will entail a disfigurement 
of that value, in the form of damage to the self. Just as we are obligated to 
realize the value of personhood in ourselves, so we are obligated, in creating 
human lives, to create ones in which that value is most likely to flower and 
least likely to be disfigured. In this respect, the importance of human life is 
like the importance of art — the kind of importance that makes something 
worth creating well if worth creating at all.
Due consideration for the importance of human life requires us to 
ensure that the human race does not go extinct, but it does not require us to 
create any particular human lives, or any particular number of them. With 
respect to individual lives, it mainly requires that we avoid creating lives 
that will already be truncated or damaged in ways that seriously affect the 
prospects for personhood to be fully realized within them.
I claim that a life estranged from its ancestry is already truncated in this 
way. This claim is no less than universal common sense — though it is also 
no more, I readily admit. I cannot derive it from moral principles; I can at 
best offer some reflections on why we should trust rather than override 
common sense in this instance.
When I say that my claim is universal common sense, I mean that 
people everywhere and always have based their social relationships, in the 
first instance, on relations of kinship, of which the basic building block is 
the relation between parent and child. Not every society has favored the 
nuclear family, of course, but virtually every society has reared children 
among their kin and in the knowledge of who their biological parents are. 
The universal consensus on this matter is enshrined in the United Nations 
34  For a similar view, see Rahul Kumar, “Who Can Be Wronged?”, Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 31 (2003): 99-118.
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Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 7, paragraph 1, states: “The 
child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”35
When people deny the importance of biological ties, I wonder how they 
can read world literature with any comprehension. How do they make any 
sense of Telemachus, who goes in search of a father he cannot remember? 
What do they think is the dramatic engine of the Oedipus story? When the 
adoptive grandson of Pharaoh says, “I have been a stranger in a strange 
land,” what do they think he means? How can they even understand the 
colloquy between Darth Vader and Luke Skywalker? Surely, the revelation 
“I am your father” should strike them as a piece of dramatic stupidity — a 
remark to be answered, “So what?”
As the stories of Telemachus, Oedipus, Moses, and even Luke Skywalker 
illustrate, people unacquainted with their origins have been seen 
throughout history as dramatically, even tragically, disadvantaged. There 
must be some reason why people living at different places and times, under 
very different conditions, have converged on the opinion that a relationship 
with biological parents is essential to the minimally adequate provision for 
a child. To be sure, other articles of age-old consensus have been rejected 
fairly recently in history — the permissibility of slavery, for example. But 
they have been rejected on the basis of soul-searching reflection, whereas 
the rise of donor conception has been driven by the procreative preferences 
of adults, with little thought for the children involved.
Ironically, the preferences of these adults are often based on the same 
common sense that ought to raise questions on behalf of the children. The 
reason for resorting to donor conception, after all, is usually the desire of 
an adult to have a biologically related child despite lacking a partner with 
whom he or she can conceive. Yet whereas the parent will be just as fully 
related to the child as any mother or father, the child will know only half 
of its biological ancestry. These adults seek to enlarge their own circle of 
consanguinity by creating children who will never know half of theirs. 
Where is the common sense in that?
As I have said, I cannot prove that knowing and being reared by biological 
parents is part of the minimally adequate provision for a child; the best I 
35  For more on the Convention, and some social and legal perspectives on this issue, see 
footnote 3 in chapter 5 of this volume (“Family History”), and the works cited therein.
110 Beyond Price
can do is to make plausible the venerable and worldwide conviction to that 
effect. People have tried living in vastly diverse ways, but they have almost 
always settled on lifeways that accord central importance to biological 
family ties. Let me offer some considerations that may explain why.
Part of the task facing a human being is to find goals and activities in 
pursuit of which to develop and exercise the capacities relevant to human 
flourishing. A human being needs to find work, employment: he needs, as 
we say, to get a life. A cat does not need to get a life: it instinctively does 
what it needs to do in order to do well. Getting a life is a task peculiar to 
the human being, who is not born to do anything in particular, and must 
therefore figure out what to do with himself.
A human being accomplishes this task by becoming a self worth 
doing one thing rather than another with. That is, he forms an identity — 
a complement of traits and attitudes, reflected in a self-image by which 
to guide their expression in practice. The task of identity formation 
is not optional for a human being. As soon as he acquires the cognitive 
wherewithal to ask “Who am I?” and “What am I like?”, he is obliged to 
start coming up with answers, in order to form a specific identity for which 
there will be specific ways of flourishing.36
The task of forming an identity is carried out on raw materials that 
are not infinitely plastic. A human being begins life with a somewhat 
determinate temperament and set of aptitudes, which can be kneaded 
into many different shapes but not into just any shape whatsoever. These 
individual raw materials are present at birth, as determined by the child’s 
genetic endowment (and perhaps by the intrauterine environment as well).
Research on twins and adoptees has shown that many psychological 
characteristics are heritable to a considerable degree. Genetic differences 
are responsible for a proportion of the variance between people not only in 
IQ (somewhere above fifty percent) but also for the variance in their traits 
of personality such as extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and 
openness to experience (around fifty percent); in whether their interests 
are artistic, social, enterprising, or conventional (around thirty percent); 
in their inclination toward authoritarian or conservative attitudes (around 
36  As Sophia Moreau has pointed out to me, there are cultures in which one’s identity 
is largely dictated by social convention. Even within these cultures, however, the 
individual remains responsible for a significant degree of self-definition. From our 
cultural distance, the nineteenth-century British housemaid seems to have been stamped 
with a prefabricated identity; below stairs, however, that housemaid may have been no 
less self-defined than we are today. 
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fifty percent); and even in their degree of religiousness (around thirty 
percent).37 These measures of heritability are manifested, for example, in 
greater similarity between identical twins than between fraternal twins, or 
between biological siblings reared apart than between unrelated children 
reared together. In many cases, the effects of genetic endowment tend to 
increase with age, possibly because the influence of guardians wanes. As 
people approach adulthood, in other words, they come into their genetic 
inheritance.
Thus, the predicament into which you were born, though generically 
human in many respects, was also highly individual, because it required 
you to fashion an identity out of a genetically inherited supply of raw 
materials. The possibilities and constraints inherent in those materials 
gradually came to the fore as you grew up and formed your adult identity.
A few people in the world had already coped or were already coping 
with predicaments similar to yours in its distinctive features — namely, 
your biological parents and siblings. Not only did each of your parents form 
an identity out of a genetic endowment half of which was to become half 
of yours, but also they jointly forged an identity as a couple, by reconciling 
between themselves the manifestations of what were to become the two 
halves of your genetic endowment. Or that’s what they did if they were a 
couple. For that very reason, however, you stood to benefit from their being 
a couple; and for similar reasons, you stood to benefit from their rearing 
you together with your biological siblings, if any.38
37  My argument does not rest on any particular quantitative measures of heritability. I 
cite these statistics only for the sake of suggesting a rough order of magnitude to which 
psychological traits are probably heritable. In considering the statistics, keep in mind that 
what accounts for variance among individuals does not necessarily account for variance 
among groups. For example, individual variance in skin color is largely heritable, but the 
variance between lifeguards and coal miners is almost entirely due to environment.
The statistics cited here are drawn from Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., “Genetic Influence 
on Human Psychological Traits: A Survey”, Current Directions in Psychological Science 
13 (2004): 148-151. On the heritability of values and religious attitudes, see Laura B. 
Koenig and Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr., “Genetic and Environmental Influences on the 
Traditional Moral Values Triad — Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Religiousness 
— as Assessed by Quantitative Behavior Genetic Methods”, in Where God and Science 
Meet: How Brain and Evolutionary Studies Alter Our Understanding of Religion, Volume I: 
Evolution, Genes, and the Religious Brain, ed. Patrick McNamara (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2006), pp. 31-60.
38  My arguments in Part I imply that the benefit in question consisted, not in a counterfactual 
life history that would have been preferable, but rather in an improvement that could 
have been brought about in your actual future prospects. Of course, if your parents 
conceived you with the intention of transferring their parental obligations to others, then 
this benefit may have been ruled out before you existed, hence before you had any future 
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This claim depends on an assumption about heritability that is politically 
incorrect, I know. We are supposed to believe that every child is born with 
the capacity to fulfill any arbitrary human aspiration. In private, however, 
most parents realize that part of their job is to help their child form realistic 
aspirations, folded into an identity in which it can truly flourish; and they 
realize that their ability to do so is greatly enhanced by their ability to 
recognize in the child various traits, inclinations, and aptitudes that they 
have seen before, either in themselves or in other members of the family.
In the first instance, of course, family resemblance is physical, and family 
members usually value the physical resemblances among them. There is a 
temptation to dismiss this attitude as shallow, but I think that it expresses a 
deep human need. For as human beings, we need to reconcile our identities 
as persons with our identities as animals.
The structure of human memory is such as to elicit an identification 
between the self who remembers and the self of the experience retrieved 
from memory.39 Locke thought of that identification as constituting 
personal identity. Even if his metaphysics was shaky, his phenomenology 
was impeccable: we certainly seem to have existed at whatever times and 
places we remember experiencing, so that our sense of persisting through 
time does not depend on re-identifying our bodies on different occasions. 
Our relation to our bodies can therefore seem to be contingent. We feel 
embodied in but not identical to our bodies, and so we can imagine, for 
example, swapping bodies with other people.
To be born in a human body is thus to be susceptible to alienation from 
it. We are probably the only animals capable of feeling uncomfortable 
in our own bodies, even hating them — and loving them, too, for that 
matter. Coming to terms with our bodily selves is thus a part of the human 
predicament.
A connection to biological parents helps us to cope with this aspect of 
our predicament. In infancy we learn to love human faces whose features 
will eventually be blended in the face that emerges in the mirror as we reach 
adulthood. We grow into a body akin to the bodies from which we came, 
prospects to be improved. As I explain at the end of this part, however, it would have 
been wrong of your parents to conceive a child with the intention of refusing to provide 
the relevant benefit when it became possible to provide it.
39  I discussed this phenomenon in Part I, and I have discussed it before in “Self to Self” and 
“So It Goes” (chapter 8 of this volume).
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while growing into a personality akin to the ones that animate those other 
bodies. We thus repeatedly have the sense of becoming our own parents, 
a common form of intergenerational déjà vu. Those who do not know their 
parents can only wonder who they are becoming. Hence they can only 
wonder, “How did someone like me come to be living in a body like this?”
Some people say that they have nothing in common with their parents 
and siblings. I think that they are speaking figuratively; or maybe they 
are just in denial. Almost all of us look and sound and feel and move and 
think like the people from whom we came: a genuine sport of nature is 
very rare. What is more likely is that a person’s similarities to his relatives 
lie in aspects of himself that don’t matter to him, or that he dislikes and 
rejects. Not valuing commonalities is indeed a way of not having anything 
in common, figuratively speaking; it just isn’t a way of literally having 
nothing in common.
Someone who doesn’t value what he has in common with his relatives 
may think that he need never have known them in order to forge his 
independent identity. I doubt it. This person is likely to have defined 
himself as different from his relatives precisely because they exemplified 
aspects of himself that he would otherwise have been unable to discern 
clearly enough to disdain. Learning not to be like his relatives has still 
involved learning from them: if he had never known them, he might well 
have ended up more like them.
The point is that biological origins needn’t be worth embracing in order 
to be worth knowing. Someone who doesn’t know his relatives cannot even 
turn up his nose at them. The question for him is not “Shall I follow my 
progenitors?” but “Am I following them?” and to this latter question he can 
never know the answer. He can have neither the satisfaction of continuing 
in their footsteps nor that of striking out on his own, because their footsteps 
have been effaced.
Even if a child never knows its biological parents, they usually remain 
significant figures in its life, figures to whom the child is likely to develop 
an attachment. That’s why roughly half of adopted children search for 
their biological families at some point, and it is why the children of donor 
conception are now starting to search for their families as well.40 In my view, 
40  See footnote 2 of “Family History”, chapter 5 of this volume.
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the tendency to become attached to unknown parents bears on whether 
parental obligations are transferable, a question to which I now turn.
Why do these children search for absent parents who can no longer 
rear them and are unlikely to form a significant relationship with them? 
Having reached adulthood, haven’t they finally made these parents 
redundant? Apparently not, although we can only speculate why. Here are 
my speculations.
Humans are unlike other creatures in being at risk for feeling 
unmoored. We have both an egocentric conception of the world and an 
objective conception of a creature whose conception it is, a creature who 
is identical with the “I” at the center of that egocentric conception. Seeing 
the world from within our own point of view and also from without makes 
us susceptible to a sense of alienation. Unless we can reconcile these two 
conceptions of ourselves, we may suffer what might be called existential 
insecurity — an insecure sense of our own concrete reality.
The creature who I am is securely rooted in the objective order. It is 
rooted in the objective order not only by being located in time and space 
but also by its location in the web of causality. It didn’t just appear out 
of nowhere: it is the result of causal antecedents that tie it to the rest of 
spatiotemporal existence. Of course, I am that creature, and so I didn’t just 
appear out of nowhere, either: I came from the same origins. Yet in order 
to feel that its connections to the rest of reality are mine, I must find a way 
of translating them into my egocentric perspective — a way of seeing them 
from my point of view.
The challenge, in other words, is to identify subjectively with the 
objective reality of the creature who I am, by seeing how that creature’s 
place in reality can possibly be mine. In order to make that identification, 
I must see how the connections anchoring that creature in the objective 
order can have, from my personal point of view, the subjective significance 
of connections.
But of course, the “I” of my egocentric perspective is a person, for whom 
connections are most real when they are personal connections, consisting 
in felt attachments. The way to identify subjectively with the creature who 
I am objectively is to see its place in the objective world as my place in 
a personal world. Personal attachments to my causal origins, in the form 
of my biological parents and ancestors, enable me to experience firsthand 
the objective reality of the creature who I am. If I lack such subjective 
correlates for the connections anchoring that creature in objective reality, I 
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am existentially insecure, because I am unable to see from my perspective 
how its place in reality is mine. That’s why people who don’t know their 
origins speak of feeling adrift in the cosmos, out of place in the world.
This sense of rootlessness is especially acute in light of elementary 
knowledge about the realm of living things. That realm is structured by the 
life-function of self-replication, which locates every living thing in a chain 
of progenitors and progeny. To be a living thing is to be a link in that chain. 
Not to experience oneself as located in that chain is to lack a sense of one’s 
membership in the realm of life, which is the locus of one’s membership in 
reality.
Most people feel a need for a connection to that realm. It can be expressed 
as a need for roots, for a home — for a family. It is manifested in religious 
creation stories and cosmologies, in the perpetuation of traditions, and 
in the ceremonies surrounding ancestors and memorials. The same need 
naturally leads children to seek an attachment to their biological parents. 
And it is another peculiarity of human beings to be capable of becoming 
attached even to figures with whom they are not acquainted.
Many animals become attached to members of their family or group, 
and they appear to experience grief when these attachments are severed. 
But they become attached only to others with whom they are acquainted 
and whom they can recognize by sight or sound or smell. Humans, too, 
become attached to one another by acquaintance, of course; but they have 
the unique capacity for attachment to others whom they have never met 
and wouldn’t recognize.
Those who study and counsel adoptees believe that they feel the loss of 
the birth parents they never knew, and that their sense of loss is comparable 
to that of children who experience parental death or divorce.41 How can a 
child experience the loss of parents with whom it has had no relationship to 
begin with? The answer is that a child is capable of forming attachments to 
absent figures, provided that they are present to its thoughts as real objects.
Typically, an object is first presented in thought when it is perceived, 
whereupon a mental file may be opened to store information received from 
41  See David M. Brodzinsky, “A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment”, in The 
Psychology of Adoption, ed. David M. Brodzinsky and Marshall D. Schechter (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 3-24; and Steven L. Nickman, “Retroactive Loss in 
Adopted Persons”, in Continuing Bonds: New Understandings of Grief, ed. Dennis Klass, 
Phyllis R. Silverman, and Steven L. Nickman (Washington, DC: Taylor & Francis, 1996), 
pp. 257-272.
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it via perception.42 Such a file is used for thinking about the thing directly, 
in a way that is not mediated by a description or a concept. One does not 
merely have an existentially quantified belief to the effect that something 
satisfies various predicates; one does not merely have various beliefs whose 
subject-terms pick out the same thing under various descriptions; one has 
a mental file that stands for the thing and collects predicates descriptive of 
it, much as the thing itself unifies a bundle of properties.
Though a mental file is typically connected to its object by a channel 
of perceptual information, it can also stand for an object without such a 
connection.43 If a creature can have intentions with respect to its own 
mental representations, then it can open and maintain a file intended to 
stand for a single thing. It must somehow pick out what the file is to stand 
for, but thereafter it can use the file to treat the thing as an immediate object 
of thought.
Of course, there is no point in opening a mental file for something that 
probably doesn’t exist or cannot be picked out as its intended referent. But 
no such risks can deter a child from opening mental files for a biological 
mother or father with whom it is unacquainted. Every child can be certain 
of having one and only one such mother and father, to whom it can refer 
as “my mother” and “my father”, and for whom it can therefore open files 
in the assurance of their standing for unique individuals. The child can fill 
these files with speculations about its parents, and it can become attached 
to those parents by thinking about them in this distinctively objectual way.
These considerations about the need and the capacity for attachment to 
biological parents are what lead me to think that parental obligations are 
nontransferable. The obligations are nontransferable, I think, because they 
arise in the context of a personal relationship.
Let us consider the daughter of a sperm donor, so that we can rely on 
pronomial gender to keep the parties straight. If the mother is like other 
recipients of donated sperm, she may insist that the girl has no use for 
her biological father, because he is “nobody to her”. This statement is 
demonstrably false. The daughter may be nobody to him, because he can 
42  See Robin Jeshion, “Acquaintanceless De Re Belief”, in Meaning and Truth: Investigations in 
Philosophical Semantics, ed. Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and David Shier 
(New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002), pp. 53-74. I am grateful to Jeshion for suggesting 
this way of expressing what was a vague intuition on my part.
43  Again, see Jeshion, “Acquaintanceless De Re Belief”.
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think of her only under the description “my possible children”, never 
knowing whether he is referring to anyone at all. But to her he is a real 
person, locatable in thought, no matter how elusive he may be in time and 
space. Like every human child, she knows that with the word ‘father’, she 
can reach down a causal chain to address a single other human who is 
partly responsible for her existence.
In trying to cope with the predicament entailed by her existence, the 
daughter can want to be helped, not just by some paternal figure or other, 
but by the particular father who introduced her into that predicament; 
who links her to humanity, the realm of life, the causal order; who is her 
prototype and precursor in personal development; and who could give her 
a hint of how psyche and soma might be reconciled in her case. Out of those 
needs, the child can establish a mental representation capable of sustaining 
an emotional attachment to her father, and she can then frame a demand 
addressed directly to him, whether or not she knows his earthly address. 
So personal a demand, so obviously justified, deserves to be answered in 
person.
I know that my view seems grossly unenlightened. What passes for 
enlightenment today, however, strikes me as the mirror image of the 
purported enlightenment of the eugenics movement a century ago. Back 
then, the people who claimed to know better than common sense believed 
that a person’s biological heritage was all-important; today they believe 
that it is utterly insignificant. Neither belief is true; either belief can lead to 
a wholesale violation of rights. The rights violated in the present case are 
the rights of children.
One objection to arguments like mine is that they seem to cast aspersions 
on donor-conceived children, by implying that they should never have been 
born. I do not think that my arguments yield that implication in a form 
that should give offense; in Part III of this series, I explain why. Another 
objection is that the children of donor conception are likely to waive any 
claims they may have on their biological parents. I deal with this objection 
in Part III as well.
A final objection to my arguments is that donor-conceived offspring 
have received the gift of life, which they wouldn’t have received without 
the help of a sperm or egg donor. But I have argued that life is not a 
gratuitous benefit but a predicament with which the recipients require a 
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kind of assistance that they will justifiably call on their biological parents 
to provide.
Note, moreover, that an obligation undertaken in bad faith cannot be 
excused by the fact that the party to whom it is owed was better off for its 
having been undertaken. If my promise to assist you with a risky project 
gives you the necessary confidence to begin it, then I am still obligated to 
assist you even if, in retrospect, my defaulting on the promise would not 
cause you to regret having begun. And if I know in advance that I am going 
to default on my promise, then I cannot justify issuing it on the grounds 
that it will induce you to begin a project that you will subsequently be glad 
to have begun, despite my expected default.
In this last example, my behavior is somewhat analogous to that of 
a sperm donor, only not quite as bad. The sperm donor doesn’t induce 
his offspring voluntarily to enter the predicament of human life, on the 
grounds that they will be glad to have entered it; and he doesn’t just expect 
to have an all-things-considered reason to default on those obligations. 
The sperm donor throws his offspring into the human predicament willy-
nilly, on the basis of a positive intention to default on the obligations that 
he thereby undertakes, since he wouldn’t have undertaken them, in the 
first place, if he hadn’t planned to default on them. I don’t think that he is 
morally entitled to bank on his children’s forgiveness in this way, even if 
they do eventually forgive him.
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III. Love and Nonexistence44
The birth of a child can move us to value judgments that seem inconsistent. 
Consider, for example, a fourteen-year-old girl who decides to have a 
baby.45 We think that the birth of a child to a fourteen-year-old mother will 
be unfortunate, even tragic, and hence that she should not decide to have 
one. But after the birth, we are loath to say that the child should not have 
been born. Indeed, we now think that the birth is something to celebrate — 
once a year, on the child’s birthday.
We may be tempted to say that we have simply changed our minds in light 
of better information. Before the birth, we didn’t know how things would 
turn out and now we know more. But the birth did not bring to light any 
previously unknown information relevant to our judgments.46 Or, at least, I 
mean to restrict my attention to cases in which it didn’t. There may be cases 
44  This part was presented to the graduate student colloquium at New York University 
(February 2008); at The Fourth Steven Humphrey Excellence in Philosophy Conference 
at the University of California, Santa Barbara (February 2008), where the commentator 
was Mark Schroeder; to an ethics conference at Northwestern University (May 2008), 
where the commentator was Richard Kraut; to a seminar on the ethical significance 
of emotions at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (Oslo, June 2008); and to 
the philosophy department of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. For 
comments and suggestions, I am grateful to the participants in these events and to Paul 
Boghossian, Caspar Hare, Robin Jeshion, Nishi Shah, and Sharon Street.
This part bears some similarity to Larry S. Temkin’s “Intransitivity and the Mere 
Addition Paradox”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 16 (1987): 138-187. Both seek to show 
that a combination of views about future persons is not as paradoxical as it seems. The 
difference between the papers is this: Temkin focuses on failures of transitivity among 
comparative judgments; I address a different problem, in which the value of a general 
state of affairs appears inconsistent with the values of all possible instances. I am unsure 
whether the metaethical solution that I propose for the latter problem is called for by 
the former.
The paper also overlaps in important respects with Caspar Hare’s “Voices from 
Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, 
Exist?”, Ethics 117 (2007): 498-523. In the last section of that paper, Hare discusses the 
difference between de re and de dicto concern for persons, which is more or less the same 
difference that I discuss here.
Finally, Jeff McMahan discusses many of the same issues in “Preventing the Existence 
of People with Disabilities”, in Quality of Life and Human Difference: Genetic Testing, Health 
Care, and Disability, ed. David Wasserman, Jerome Bickenbach, and Robert Wachbroit 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 142-171. My approach to these issues 
is similar to McMahan’s in some respects and different in others. The closest similarity 
is to remarks that he makes about “attachments” on pp. 159ff. The greatest difference is 
that McMahan analyzes cases of this kind as involving changes of evaluative judgment, 
whereas I analyze them as involving pairs of judgments that seem inconsistent only if 
understood in mistakenly realist terms.
45  This case is discussed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons, chapter 16.
46  McMahan makes the same point, on p. 155.
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in which we feared specific calamities, such as a birth defect or a descent 
into juvenile delinquency; and then if such possibilities don’t materialize, 
we change our minds. I am not speaking of such cases; I am speaking of 
cases in which we disapproved of the girl’s decision for reasons that are not 
falsified by subsequent developments and yet we are subsequently glad 
about the birth. The child is raised under serious disadvantages of the very 
sort that we anticipated, but the severely disadvantaged child is still a child 
to be cherished. 
We knew in advance how we would feel. Even as we deplored the girl’s 
decision, we knew that we would welcome the child. We may even have 
cited this prospect to ourselves as a reason for softening our opinion: “Don’t 
condemn her for deciding to have a child,” we might have said, “Once it is 
born, you’ll be delighted.” But such arguments could not dispel our sense 
that something was wrong.
One might think that these judgments can be reconciled, after all, 
because their objects are not the same. When we think that the girl should 
not have a baby, the object of our judgment is a quantified proposition, 
about her having some baby or other, whereas it is the birth of a particular 
baby that we will celebrate.47 And of course we can consistently think that 
her having a baby is unfortunate in general but not in the case of her having 
some particular one, since the general rule affirmed by our first judgment 
may allow for an exception noted by the second.
Yet the attempted reconciliation appears to be blocked by the fact, which 
was known to us in advance, that any baby she had would be welcomed. 
How can we judge that a fourteen-year-old’s having a baby would be 
unfortunate as a rule if we also judge that any particular instance of the 
rule would be an exception?
I do not think that we actually change our minds after the birth of this child, 
if a change of mind would entail giving up our antecedent judgment. We 
still think that the girl should not have had a baby, delighted though we are 
with the baby she has had. That one judgment predominated beforehand 
and the other afterward should not be allowed to obscure the fact that we 
are of two minds about the case.
One might hope to dispel the appearance of inconsistency by claiming 
that the former is a prima facie judgment, deploring any birth only insofar 
47  This reconciliation is the one that I propose in “Family History”, chapter 5 of this volume. 
I now regard it as inadequate.
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as the mother was underage and thus leaving open the possibility of 
mitigating circumstances. But we don’t just think that the girl should not 
have had a baby insofar as she is underage; we think that she should not 
have had a baby all things considered; and yet we are glad about the birth 
of this baby all things considered as well.
The mother herself may regret her decision. She may wish that she 
hadn’t had a baby, may believe that she shouldn’t have had one. But of 
course she still loves the baby and is thankful that it was born. As in our 
case, her judgments persist in light of one another. That is, she regrets 
having had a baby when she did even though it was this baby; and she is 
thankful for this baby even though she had it when she did.
This conundrum is one of several that Derek Parfit considers in Part IV 
of Reasons and Persons, the part devoted to “Future Generations”. I want 
to suggest a solution that Parfit doesn’t consider. Parfit’s entire discussion 
presupposes that our value judgments must be consistent as descriptions 
of the things they evaluate: they must be satisfiable by some distribution of 
positive and negative value across the possibilities. I think that the present 
case gives us reason to reject this assumption.
How could it be rational to have such different attitudes toward one and 
the same event? The answer lies in the different modes of presentation 
under which the event is viewed.
Our unfavorable judgment is about the baby under a description. What 
makes this judgment tenable despite our countervailing judgment is not, as 
we initially suspected, that it is general rather than singular. We think not 
only that the girl should not have had a baby at fourteen but that she should 
not have had the baby she had at fourteen, thus considered under a definite 
description that picks it out uniquely. The reason why these judgments 
withstand our favorable judgment about the baby is that, whereas they 
rely on descriptions, the favorable judgment is about the baby considered 
demonstratively, as “this baby”, “him”, or “her”.
Why does it matter whether we can make judgments about the baby 
considered demonstratively? The reason is that such judgments are guided 
by emotions that depend on acquaintance-based thought. One such 
emotion is love.48 In the context of its mother’s love, the child is presented 
to her mind as it is known to her directly via sight and touch. She does 
48  On the role of perception in love, see my “Love as a Moral Emotion”, Ethics 109 (1999): 
338-374, reprinted in Self to Self, pp. 70-109, and “Beyond Price”, chapter 4 of this volume.
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not love it under descriptions of the form “such-and-such a child” or “the 
so-and-so” or even as “Fred” or “Sue”. The latter modes of presentation 
would have been available to her even if she had merely heard the child 
described or referred to by name, in which case she would be in no position 
to love it. Unlike those modes of presentation, acquaintance-based thought 
is a way of being mentally in touch or en rapport with an object; and the 
rapport it entails is prerequisite to the emotion of love.49
Our mental relation to something can determine which attitudes toward 
it are rational. Before we are acquainted with a baby, we can approve or 
disapprove of it, but loving it is quite impossible, in my view, and hence 
not rational, either; whereas loving a baby after being acquainted with it is 
the easiest thing in the world; rational, too. 
The different responses that are rational to have toward the baby, as we 
think of it under different modes of presentation, account for our different 
value judgments about its birth. We should feel free to experience these 
responses and hold the corresponding judgments, because value is the 
shadow of such attitudes, not an independent standard of their correctness. 
If the attitudes make sense, then the fact that they cast conflicting shadows 
cannot undermine their authority. And they make sense, despite the conflict 
between their shadows, because their intentional objects are different in 
ways that rationally affect the emotions informing our judgments.50
49  Thus, an expectant mother who says that she already loves her future child may not be 
speaking the truth, in philosophical strictness. She may be imagining how she will love 
the child, mentally simulating what it will be like to love the child, or having fantasies of 
loving it. But until she becomes acquainted with it, her emotion cannot be love.
When does a prospective mother become acquainted with her child? I would say 
that she becomes acquainted with it when she first perceives it. And when does she first 
perceive her child? I would say that she perceives the child at the point traditionally 
called quickening, when the fetus begins to make movements that she can feel. Thus, 
the tradition that interpreted quickening to be a morally relevant threshold was not just 
a superstition, in my view; it drew what may indeed be a morally relevant distinction.
50  This dissolution of the problem would be unnecessary if our emotions led us to 
judgments positing distinct and incomparable values. If we judged merely that the girl’s 
initial decision was imprudent, whereas the baby is beautiful, then we could interpret 
our judgments as descriptions satisfiable in the one and only actual world, on the 
grounds that beauty has nothing to do with prudence. Pluralism about values could 
thus spare us from resorting to antirealism.
But I am imagining us as drawing — as I think we do draw — all-things-considered 
conclusions about whether a baby, or this baby, should have been brought into existence. 
And I am imagining that, whereas we still think that the girl shouldn’t have had the baby 
she did, we think otherwise about this baby’s having been had. Pluralism about value 
won’t render these judgments compatible.
Parfit considers other ways of dealing with the conflict, but none strikes me 
as satisfactory. For example, Parfit claims that, were he the child of a birth that was 
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The child may see his mother’s regret, and as he approaches adulthood, 
he may find the words for what he sees: “You wish you hadn’t had a baby 
when you were so young, don’t you?” If the mother is wise enough to 
realize that she cannot hide her feelings, her answer will be “Yes.” “So you 
wish that I hadn’t been born?” No, not at all.
What does the child’s second question mean? He is asking whether his 
mother loves him and is thankful that he exists. But what he wants to hear, 
in wanting to hear that she loves and cherishes him, is that she loves and 
cherishes him as the child of her acquaintance, the child she sees and hears 
and held as a baby in her arms. He doesn’t care how she feels about the 
child she had when she was fourteen, under that description. Let her regret 
having had the child so described, so long as he himself, as he is known to 
her directly, can still be sure of her love.
The child may be similarly ambivalent about his own birth considered 
under different modes of presentation. If he has grown up disadvantaged 
by his mother’s immaturity, as I have imagined, he may conclude from his 
own experience that the child born to his mother when she was fourteen 
should not have been born. And yet he may have a healthy self-love that 
makes him thankful for having been born.
I think that similarly conflicted reactions can arise in the parents of 
children who are born severely disabled. These parents are, so to speak, 
doomed to love a child such as is regrettable to have or to be — regrettable, 
that is, when considered as such a child, not, of course, as this child. In this 
respect, the parents are caught in a bind partly created by their love for their 
own child, a bind of a sort that makes the birth of such a child all the more 
tragic. Similarly, a child born into unfortunate circumstances is doomed to 
be attached to a particular existence such as is regrettable to have. As an 
adult, he may resent the fact that his inevitable self-attachment forces him 
to be thankful for having been given a life of such an unfortunate kind.
Obviously, all-things-considered judgments had better not conflict if they 
are to provide practical guidance. Before conceiving her child or carrying 
unfortunate when viewed prospectively, he would agree in retrospect that he shouldn’t 
have been born. I think that he might indeed hold this judgment, but I think that he 
would also be glad to have been born, so that the former judgment doesn’t settle the 
issue.
I also prefer this solution to the one favored by McMahan, according to which we 
change our minds about the girl’s decision to have a baby. McMahan considers a solution 
like mine, when discussing the evaluative import of “attachments to particulars”, but he 
ultimately drops the solution in favor of one based on a change of mind.
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it beyond the point where abortion became unavailable, the girl had to 
choose one way or the other, and we may have been called upon to advise 
her. Under those circumstances, being of two minds would have been 
problematic.
Under those circumstances, however, grounds for ambivalence were 
lacking. Before the child existed, he was not available to be loved or valued 
in other acquaintance-based ways. The mother’s potential love for her child, 
or his potential self-love, were not antecedent grounds for choosing to 
create him, since she could not choose to create him in particular, considered 
demonstratively, as he would subsequently be loved.51 Her choice was not 
whether to create him but whether to create a child. And of course she 
should have waited to create a child until she was better prepared to care 
for it.
Our conflicting value judgments are rationally tolerable because they 
are retrospective and hence not action-guiding.52 Given that there is no 
longer any occasion to make a decision, we can afford to hold conflicting 
judgments about the decision that was made. The pragmatic drawbacks of 
ambivalence have fallen away, and the only remaining drawback would be 
a need to make judgments that reflect some real distribution of value among 
the former options. In my view, however, there is no such distribution of 
values, and so ambivalence about the case can be perfectly rational.
My view leads me to question a term that figures prominently in Parfit’s 
work and the literature that it has spawned. The term is ‘a life worth living’. 
I believe that there is no coherent concept attached to this term. 
Ordinarily, when we ask whether a life is worth living, we are asking 
whether it is worth continuing. Then our question is whether the benefits 
of continuing to live will adequately repay the subject for the associated 
burdens. An apparent problem with even this ordinary sense of the term 
is that it requires a comparison where comparison seems impossible. For 
51  See Matthew Hanser, “Harming Future People”, Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (1990): 
47-70, p. 61.
52  I do not accept Allan Gibbard’s conception of value judgments as hypothetical plans for 
what to do if in the relevant agent’s circumstances (Thinking How to Live [Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003]). Plans are not evaluative, and evaluations are not 
plans. When the girl decided to have a baby, the natural expression of her plan would 
have been “I’m going to have a baby” — not “Having a baby is the thing for me to do.” 
And if she had said, “Having a baby is the thing for me to do,” a natural rejoinder would 
have been “So are you going to have one?” — which would have been an inquiry as to 
her plan.
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whether the benefits of continued life are worth the burdens must depend 
on the alternatives: any balance of benefits to burdens may in principle 
be worthwhile if all of the alternatives would be worse. But in the case of 
continued existence, there is no balance of benefits and burdens with which 
to compare, since the alternative is nonexistence, in which there would be 
no subject to whom benefits or burdens could accrue. How, then, do we tell 
whether life is worth continuing?53
This problem is easily solved. When we ask whether a life is worth 
continuing, we are asking whether the subject has good reason to go on, 
and such a reason would consist in some event whose inclusion in his life 
would make it better as a whole. When someone wants to live long enough 
to finish an important project or have some meaningful experience, he 
probably thinks that doing so would help to complete his life or bring it 
closer to perfection.54 And in that case, he is making a comparison for which 
the requisite alternatives are to hand — namely, his life extended to include 
the valued event, on the one hand, and his life cut short without including 
it, on the other. He can consider whether the one life would be a better life 
to have lived than the other. If the answer is yes, then he will say that the 
prospect of the event gives him a reason to live. 
But this sort of reason for him to live is not necessarily a reason to be 
glad that he was born. Having started an important project, he may judge 
that he will have lived a much better life if he finishes it than if he dies 
leaving it unfinished; and yet he need not think that his finishing the project 
will justify his very existence, since the value of finishing the project may 
be contingent on his having started it. If he had never existed to start the 
project, his not existing to finish it might have been neither here nor there.
Of course, a life may qualify as not worth living at all if it is not worth 
continuing from the very outset, in the sense that every increment to its 
duration makes it a worse life on the whole. But the opposite of being not 
worth living at all in this sense cannot serve as a standard for which lives 
are worth living, if that standard is to guide procreative decisions. For we 
can hardly justify initiating a life on the mere grounds that there would 
53  Some think that a life is definitely not worth continuing if the benefits of each additional 
moment are less than the burdens. I do not believe that the value of continuing a life 
can be reduced to a balance of these momentary values. See my “Well-Being and Time”, 
chapter 7 of this volume.
54  See Bernard Williams’s discussion of “categorical desires” in “The Makropulos Case: 
Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality”, in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 
1956–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 82-100.
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not immediately be reason to terminate it. Thus, which lives are worth 
continuing cannot tell us which lives are worth creating.
Unfortunately, Parfit uses the term ‘a life worth living’ in the latter sense, 
and this sense of the term gestures toward a truly impossible comparison. 
A person cannot compare the value that his life has for him to the value that 
nonexistence would have had, since nothing has value for the nonexistent.
Parfit offers a solution to this problem. His solution is to ask whether 
the person, if born, would live to regret it. According to Parfit, the subject’s 
retrospective preference, actual or ideal, between his existing and his never 
having existed determines whether his life is worth living.55
But as I have pointed out, the child of a fourteen-year-old mother may 
regret the birth of the child his mother had at fourteen while being thankful 
that he was born. He thus regrets his birth under one mode of presentation 
but not under another. The question is which attitude determines whether 
his life is worth living, according to Parfit. My sense is that Parfit wants to 
give the benefit of the doubt to lives whose subjects would be thus conflicted. 
That is, he judges a life to be worth living unless the person living it would 
regret his own birth even when thinking of himself demonstratively. The 
result is that Parfit takes sides with the inevitable attachment that a person 
feels for himself by acquaintance — the very attachment that may force 
him to be thankful for an existence that he thinks undesirable for anyone 
to have.
My own inclination is to see this preference as rather cruel. I am inclined 
to say that we should not bring people into lives that they can be thought 
of as forced to be thankful for. In any case, we cannot assume that there is 
a fact of the matter as to which criterion of regret we should apply when 
judging whether lives are worth living. Hence we still lack a determinate 
comparison that would give a clear meaning to the term ‘a life worth living’.
55  See p. 487: “[A person] might … decide that he was glad about or regretted what lay 
behind him. He might decide that, at some point in the past, if he had known what lay 
before him, he would or would not have wanted to live the rest of his life. He might thus 
conclude that these parts of his life were better or worse than nothing. If such claims can 
apply to parts of a life, they can apply, I believe, to whole lives.” In my view, Parfit here 
misinterprets the comparison that is made by someone who regrets having continued to 
live after some point in the past. According to Parfit, the person is judging his life since 
that point to have been “worse than nothing” — worse, that is, than nonexistence. I 
would say that the person is judging his life with its recent continuation to be worse than 
the life he would have had without it.
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My explanation of our value judgments also bears on the problem that 
dominates Part IV of Parfit’s book, the so-called non-identity problem. In 
the case of the fourteen-year-old girl, the non-identity problem is supposed 
to be this: If she postpones motherhood until she is older, she will not have 
the same child. So the child she has at fourteen cannot be harmed by being 
born to an underage mother, since he cannot be born to a mother who is 
mature. How, then, can his mother’s decision be wrong?
Parfit fleetingly considers what I believe to be the correct solution to 
this problem. The solution is that a child has a right to be born into good 
enough circumstances, and being born to a fourteen-year-old mother isn’t 
good enough.
This solution relies on an understanding of rights as including more 
than morally protected interests.56 As I argued in Part I, a child’s initial 
provision in life makes no difference to his interests, because he cannot 
identify his interests with those of the children he would have been if 
differently provisioned. In Part II, I considered the standard of adequacy 
for a child’s initial provision, arguing that the appropriate standard reflects 
our obligation to show due consideration for the importance of human life 
itself. Human life is best seen as a predicament, and the creature thrown 
into that predicament is a creature that matters, because of being a person, 
whose success or failure at coping with the predicament will entail the 
flourishing or withering of personhood.
In creating human lives, then, we must take care that they afford the 
best opportunity for personhood to flourish. We are obligated to give our 
children the best start that we can give to children, whichever children we 
have; and so we are obligated to have those children to whom we can give 
the best start. A child to whom we give a lesser initial provision will have 
been wronged by our lack of due concern for human life in creating him — 
our lack of concern for human life itself, albeit in his case. 
If the fourteen-year-old girl decides to have a child, he will probably 
grow up to be glad that he was born, but he may also feel that he was not 
given due consideration at his conception. What will have been slighted, 
from his perspective, is not his well-being but rather the importance of 
humanity in him — in him, that is, as the instance of humanity that ended 
up being involved, not as the antecedent target of the slight. For a person 
56  For this point, and its application to the non-identity problem, see Rahul Kumar, “Who 
Can Be Wronged?”.
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can be wronged by being the one who ends up at the receiving end of 
disregard for the value of humanity in general. 
A person suffers such a wrong, for example, when he meets the fate 
that others risked imposing, not on him in particular, but on someone 
or other, say, when they chose to dispense with expensive provisions 
for public safety. And he suffers that wrong even if his interests are not 
adversely affected — say, because he happens to be nearing the end of a 
terminal illness. Personhood has been disrespected, and he turns out to 
be the instance of personhood involved. Such is the wrong suffered by 
a child who ends up at the receiving end of a mother’s disregard for the 
personhood of her unspecifiable future children. 
The child may therefore blame his mother, despite being glad to exist. 
And whereas his reason for blaming her was available to her antecedently 
as a reason against having a child, his reason for being glad to exist was 
not available to her as a reason in favor of having one, since it consists in 
an attachment that depends on his existence. Hence no considerations of 
identity or non-identity should have confused the girl about whether to 
have a child.
Parfit initially seems to think that the right to have been created with 
due consideration for humanity is a right whose violation can always be 
excused, on the grounds that the holder of this right wouldn’t exist if it 
hadn’t already been violated. Parfit then realizes that it may be wrong to 
create someone holding an already violated right. 
Yet Parfit dismisses this solution to the non-identity problem on the 
grounds that the child, being glad that it was born, is likely to “waive” its 
birthright. Since the violated right created by the mother is bound to be 
waived, he thinks, she is off the hook. Here Parfit’s reasoning is confused in 
two respects, one of which involves the nature of acquaintance-based value 
judgment. (I’ll discuss the other confusion in a footnote.)57
57  Ordinarily, the prospect of waiving a right arises in the context of three possible 
outcomes. We can (1) retain the right in order to ensure either (a) that it will be fulfilled or 
(b) that we will have legitimate grounds to protest its nonfulfillment; or we can (2) waive 
the right. Entertaining all three outcomes, we may prefer to retain the right, even though 
we would prefer to waive it if outcome (1)(a) were excluded. That is, we may think that 
retaining the right for the sake of possibly having it fulfilled would be sensible, but that 
retaining it merely for the sake of having grounds for protest would be petty and foolish.
Given our preferences, the party against whom we hold the right can induce us 
to waive it if he can manage to take outcome (1)(a) off the table. But surely a waiver 
obtained by such means would not be normatively valid. He cannot gain release from 
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The fact that a child would be glad to have been born does not entail 
that he would excuse his mother from her procreative obligations. He 
can reasonably say to his mother, “I’m glad that I was born, but you were 
wrong to have a child in my case.” Not only can he reasonably say this; he 
probably will say it, once he realizes that other children have been given, 
and sensibly regard themselves as entitled to, the best start in life that their 
parents could provide to a child. He will continue to assert his birthright, 
despite being glad that he was born.
My attempt to vindicate these seemingly inconsistent judgments 
depends on the claim that they are based on a rational pair of attitudes. Yet 
the attitudes themselves may seem irrational precisely because they support 
conflicting judgments about one and the same event. How can it be rational 
for a person to be glad, all things considered, about his mother’s having 
done something that he regards, all things considered, as regrettable?
Let me outline a conception of value that supports this claim.58 I’ll start with 
the relation between value and evaluative response.
There are people whom I like despite knowing that they aren’t very 
likeable, and then there are people whom I know to be likeable even 
though I just don’t like them. Similarly, there are some jokes that I laugh 
at while judging that they aren’t funny, and other jokes in which I can see 
the humor without being at all disposed to laugh. But when I say that I 
find someone likeable, or find something funny, I am doing some third 
thing. On the one hand, I am not just liking or laughing; I am discovering 
— “finding” — some quality that merits a response. On the other hand, I am 
not simply judging that the relevant quality is present; I am finding it with 
the relevant sensibility, precisely by responding. I am detecting likeability 
or humorousness with the appropriate detector, namely, liking or laughter.
fulfilling our right by confronting us with the fact that he isn’t going to fulfill it, so that 
our only alternative to waiving the right is to retain it for the petty purpose of lodging 
a protest.
To be sure, the child of a fourteen-year-old mother cannot exactly claim that she has 
taken outcome (1)(a) off the table: it was never on the table for this particular child. And 
yet the child may still waive his birthright because his only alternative is to complain 
that it cannot be fulfilled. And such a waiver is granted less voluntarily, because it is 
granted in the presence of fewer relevant alternatives, than the waiver of a right that can 
still be fulfilled. Its validity is therefore questionable.
58  This conception of value is defended at greater length in my “A Theory of Value”, Ethics 
118 (2008): 410-436, and in Lecture 2 of How We Get Along (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).
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To find someone likeable or admirable or enviable, to find something 
interesting or amusing or disgusting — these are what might be called 
guided responses, responses that are somehow sensitive to indications of 
their own appropriateness. Guided responses are not value judgments or 
evaluations, since they are still conative or affective rather than cognitive. 
But they resemble judgments in being regulated for appropriateness, and 
so they are more than mere responses. Finding someone likeable is more 
judgmental than merely liking him, but it need not entail passing judgment 
on his likeability. It is rather a matter of liking him in a way that is sensitive 
to what makes him worth liking. We can mark the partial similarity of such 
guided responses to value judgments, or evaluations, by describing them 
as instances of valuing.
My analysis of valuing resembles a familiar analysis of action.59 According 
to the latter analysis, action differs from mere bodily movement in virtue 
of being performed for reasons. Bumping into someone, for example, can 
be an accidental bodily movement, but if one bumps into him for a reason, 
then it’s not just a movement but an action. This analysis of action can be 
taken as a clue to the nature of reasons for acting. It implies that reasons for 
acting are considerations such that, when bodily movement is regulated 
in accordance with them, it rises to the status of action. That is, reasons 
are considerations whose regulatory influence can make the difference 
between an accidental collision and a shove.
My analysis of valuing offers a similar clue about reasons for valuing. 
I have said that finding someone likeable is not just liking him but liking 
him in a manner sensitive to whatever makes liking him appropriate. But 
if anything makes liking him appropriate, then it qualifies as a reason 
for liking him. To find someone likeable is thus to like him for a reason. 
59  When I speak of action, I mean specifically human action. I agree with Harry Frankfurt 
that the concept of human action may be “a special case of another concept whose range 
is much wider”, in that it encompasses action on the part of nonhuman organisms (“The 
Problem of Action”, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 [1978]: 157-162; reprinted in The 
Importance of What We Care About [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 69-79, 
p. 79). As Frankfurt explains, the generic concept is that of behavior controlled by the 
organism, not just one of its constituent subsystems or parts. On this subject, see my 
“What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind 101 (1992): 461-481; and “Identification 
and Identity”, in The Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah 
Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 91-128, reprinted in Self 
to Self: Selected Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 330-360. See 
also my “The Way of the Wanton”, in Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, ed. Kim 
Atkins and Catriona MacKenzie (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 169-192, reprinted in The 
Possibility of Practical Reason, second edition (Ann Arbor, MI: Maize Books, 2015).
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What makes for the guided response that amounts to valuing, in other 
words, is that the response is guided to its target by reasons. And the 
relevant reasons are those considerations whose guidance would make the 
difference between merely responding to it and valuing it — between, say, 
liking someone and finding him likeable, or laughing at something and 
finding it funny.60
If my next step were to say that reasons for liking someone consist 
precisely in his likeability — that reasons for valuing something, in general, 
consist in its value — then my analysis would be fairly pointless. No 
philosophical work would have been done, since value is the term most in 
need of analysis. My aim is to fill that need, by proposing the opposite order 
of constitution. Something’s value, I want to say, consists in there being 
reasons for valuing it, which are considerations whose regulatory influence 
would turn a brute response to it into an instance of valuing. Whatever it is 
about someone, consideration of which would guide us to like him in a way 
that amounted not just to liking him but to finding him likeable — that is 
what constitutes likeability. Likeability is that whose detection amounts to 
finding someone likeable rather than merely liking him; humorousness is 
that whose detection amounts to finding something humorous rather than 
merely laughing at it.
The question, then, is how responses are regulated when they are more 
than casual or haphazard. What is guided laughter or guided liking?
Experimental psychologists have shown that we actually do regulate our 
responses in accordance with an identifiable set of conditions. We tune our 
responses so that they make sense in light of our conception of ourselves 
and our circumstances.
In one experiment, male subjects approached by an attractive female 
interviewer on a long, wobbly footbridge over a deep canyon showed greater 
signs of being attracted to her — were more likely to telephone her afterward 
for a promised debriefing, for example — than subjects approached by 
the same interviewer on a solid wooden bridge farther upstream.61 These 
60  Here I am ignoring the case of acting or responding for bad reasons, which do not actually 
make the action or response appropriate. The case of bad reasons must be analyzed in 
terms of good ones, which must therefore be analyzed first.
61  Donald G. Dutton and Arthur P. Aron, “Some Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction 
Under Conditions of High Anxiety”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 30 (1974): 
510-517. I review related research in “From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy”, 
Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 349-377, reprinted in Self to Self, pp. 224-252. Among 
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subjects appear to have perceived their anxiety as attraction and acted on 
that perception. The converse effect has also been demonstrated: subjects 
are less likely to report or display an emotional response if they have been 
given an alternative explanation for its symptoms. For example, shy people 
placed in a socially awkward situation do not feel or act shy if told that they 
have been exposed to a stimulant that tends to cause the heart to pound.62
How does this mechanism work? Attribution theorists generally explain 
it in terms of a drive toward self-understanding — or, as they prefer to 
say, toward “cognitive consistency”. This cognitive drive gives us a strong 
incentive to react in ways that we can explain in light of the circumstances, 
and to behave in ways that we can explain in light of our reaction. Feeling 
stirred, we look to our circumstances to suggest an interpretation, and we 
then behave accordingly. In doing so, we can shape an inchoate disturbance 
into a specific response, or transform one response into another.
Initially we may feel excitations that could be symptomatic, say, of 
nervousness, fear, or awe. Which of these responses we interpret ourselves 
as having depends on which response would make sense to us under 
the circumstances; how we go on to behave depends on how it would 
make sense for us to behave, given the response we interpret ourselves as 
having; and we thereby give our initially ambiguous feelings the stamp 
of nervousness, fear, or awe, depending on which would maximize the 
overall intelligibility of situation, self, and behavior.
Why do our excitations come to fulfill our interpretation of them? The 
reason is that our actions feed back into their psychological sources both 
causally and conceptually. Fearful actions can turn our response into fear 
partly by shaping the response itself, in the way that smiling has been 
shown to affect our mood.63 Fearful actions can also help to constitute which 
response we are having, since part of what makes the difference between 
nervousness and fear is how it is manifested in behavior.
my claims in that paper is that various disagreements among researchers in this field — 
which I am glossing over here — are based on misunderstandings that obscure broad 
areas of agreement.
62  Susan E. Brodt and Philip G. Zimbardo, “Modifying Shyness-Related Social Behavior 
Through Symptom Misattribution”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 41 (1981): 
437-449.
63  See James D. Laird, “The Real Role of Facial Response in the Experience of Emotion: 
A Reply to Tourangeau and Ellsworth, and Others”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 47 (1984): 909-917; and Sandra E. Duclos, James D. Laird, Eric Schneider, 
Melissa Sexter, Lisa Stern, and Oliver Van Lighten, “Emotion-Specific Effects of Facial 
Expressions and Postures on Emotional Experience”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 57 (1989): 100-108.
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Rather than accept our response as fear, we can even say, “I refuse to be 
afraid,” meaning that we are interpretively marshalling our excitations into 
awe or nervousness — or perhaps even shyness — by crediting ourselves 
with one of those attitudes and following suit in our behavior. If we succeed 
in making the alternative interpretation stick, then we may indeed have 
implemented a decision as to our response.
Having noted this way of regulating our responses, we need look no further, 
I suggest, for the kind of regulation that turns our emotional responses into 
valuations rather than brute reactions.64 Reacting becomes valuing when 
it is regulated by the subject’s conception of what it would make sense 
for him to feel. The considerations whose influence turns reaction into 
valuation are reasons for valuing, and they turn out to be considerations 
of intelligibility. So the considerations that make something valuable, by 
providing reasons to value it, are considerations in light of which valuing 
it makes sense.
Here I may seem to have turned an obvious explanation on its head. 
The obvious explanation is that conditions make a response intelligible 
because they make it appropriate, whereas I have said that conditions 
make a response appropriate because they make it intelligible.65 I am well 
aware of reversing this explanatory order. I do so without apology, on 
the methodological grounds that it assigns to the explanandum that term 
which is more in need of explanation. We can explain our responses without 
invoking evaluative notions, whereas we have difficulty explaining the 
nature of values at all. If the former explanations can help to provide the 
latter, progress will have been made.
This methodology is especially helpful, I think, in accounting for the 
subtle shades of objectivity and subjectivity in our guided responses. On the 
one hand, the conditions of appropriateness for a response appear to depend 
on the sensibility that is capable of it. What makes something appropriate 
to admire depends somehow on what an admiring sensibility is attuned 
64  For an insightful description of this process as it may take place in child development, 
see Barbara Herman, Moral Literacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 13-18.
65  In “The Authority of Affect”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2001): 181-214, 
Mark Johnston argues that the positive or negative affect involved in a desire can render 
its motivational force intelligible by presenting its object as “appealing” or “repellent”. I 
am not speaking of intelligibility in this sense; I am speaking instead of the psychological-
explanatory intelligibility of a response, in light of its role in a person’s mental economy.
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to, which is what tends to elicit admiration from a sensibility equipped for 
that response. On the other hand, the conditions of appropriateness for a 
response cannot be read off the actual responses of the relevant sensibility. 
What’s appropriate to admire isn’t merely what admiring subjects actually 
do admire. So how can what’s admirable depend on the responsiveness of 
an admiring sensibility without collapsing into whatever actually elicits the 
admiring response? 
This problem comes in varying degrees. To begin with, some things just 
aren’t likeable or admirable, and their lack of likeability or admirability 
seems to be independent of the subject’s perspective. But then we allow 
for individual differences of taste, which entail that what is likeable or 
admirable for me needn’t be so for you. Even these person-relative values 
seem to transcend the actual responses of the relevant persons, however, 
since my likes and dislikes can fail to detect what is really likeable from my 
perspective. Then again, you and I can criticize one another’s sensibilities as 
needing cultivation or refinement, as if there were an objective criterion of 
good taste. And yet different values appear to differ in their susceptibility 
to such a criterion, since we allow more leeway for tastes in liking than in 
admiration.
How can the conditions of appropriateness for a response be objective 
in some cases and relative to individual sensibilities in others, while also 
allowing for rational criticism of those sensibilities, and to different degrees 
for different reactions? The answer, I suggest, is that the fundamental 
standard of appropriateness for a response is its intelligibility, which is 
determined partly by the psychological nature of the reaction itself and 
partly by differences among individual sensibilities, which can themselves 
be compared and criticized on grounds of intelligibility.
Consider what makes it intelligible to admire someone. Admiration has a 
distinctive functional role: it disposes one to emulate the admired person, 
to defer to him, and to approve of his words and actions. In acquiring these 
dispositions, one may become either more or less intelligible to oneself, 
depending on one’s other attitudes: beliefs with which the person’s 
opinions may harmonize or clash; ideals that he may or may not exemplify; 
interests that he may or may not share; likes and dislikes of other people 
whom he may resemble.
If someone falls short of one’s own ideals or ambitions, specializes in 
what strike one as trivialities, espouses what seem like idiocies, reminds one 
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of a hated foe, and resembles no one else whom one admires, then admiring 
him would make no sense, and in two respects. First, it’s hard to explain 
why one would acquire a disposition to emulate and defer to someone of 
that kind; and second, acquiring that disposition would make it hard to 
figure out how it made sense to behave. Would it make sense to emulate 
the person’s failure in the very pursuits at which one otherwise hopes to 
succeed? Would it make sense to defer to his judgments contradicting one’s 
deepest beliefs? These questions would have no clear and uncomplicated 
answers, if one really came to admire him. That’s why he isn’t admirable, 
whether or not one admires him in fact. 
As this example illustrates, the criterion of appropriateness for a 
response is holistically interdependent with those for other responses, as 
are the corresponding values. Whether it makes sense to admire someone 
who excels at a pursuit to which one has hitherto been indifferent may 
depend on whether it makes sense to begin taking an interest in that 
pursuit, which may of course depend on whether it makes sense in other 
respects to admire the person. Similarly, a state of excitation may need to 
be diagnosed as either fear or awe or nervousness, but it is unlikely to be all 
three at once. What’s frightening may therefore depend on what’s awesome 
or unnerving, and vice versa. That is, what it makes sense to interpret as, 
and thereby resolve into, awe may depend on what it makes sense to treat 
as fear or nervousness instead.
Sometimes different responses may be simply incompatible. Fear, anger, 
ennui, and disgust tend to dampen amusement, and so it can be difficult to 
understand why we are laughing at things that would ordinarily frighten, 
offend, bore, or sicken us.66 We say, “That’s not funny,” though sometimes 
we are laughing as we say it; and then we may add, “So why am I laughing?” 
This rhetorical question confirms that the unfunny is that which we don’t 
understand laughing at. The reason why we don’t understand laughing at 
something is not that it is unfunny; rather, we don’t understand laughing at 
it because it’s boring or offensive or disgusting — or utterly unlike the other 
things that amuse us — and the resulting incongruousness of laughing at it 
is the reason why we think it isn’t funny, despite our laughter.
66  I don’t mean to deny the possibility of sick and offensive humor. But these forms of 
humor usually work by testing the limits of the disgusting or offensive; they fall flat as 
soon as they cause genuine disgust or offense. We laugh partly out of surprise at what 
we can see or hear without becoming sick or angry; beyond that point, the laughing 
stops.
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Thus, what it makes sense to be amused by depends in part on what 
it makes sense to be disgusted, bored, or offended by. And each of these 
latter responses has its own functional profile, determining how it fits into 
our self-understanding, perhaps in conjunction with yet other responses. 
What’s admirable or desirable may therefore bear indirectly on what’s 
amusing, by way of what is or isn’t boring.
These examples illustrate, further, the idiosyncratic nature of responses 
and the corresponding values. What makes sense for me to admire is not 
necessarily what makes sense for you to admire, in light of the functional-
explanatory connections between admiration and other responses such 
as belief, desire, love, hate, fear, and awe, in which you and I may also 
differ. Each of us can thus have sensibilities in light of which things can 
be valuable for one of us without necessarily being valuable for the other, 
because valuing them makes sense for one but not for both.
Idiosyncrasy has its limits, however. There are many responses that all 
of us tend to have by virtue of our common human nature. Such nearly 
universal responses include an array of physiological appetites; an aversion 
to pain, separation, and frustration; an inclination toward pleasure, 
connection, and the fluid exercise of skill; the inborn and automatic fight-
or-flight response; an interest in the human face and form; an initial dislike 
of snakes, spiders, blood, and the dark; and so on. Given the holism of 
what makes sense in our responses, these fixed points of human nature 
constrain most if not all of our values. Some things are desirable for any 
human being, because desiring them will make sense for anyone; other 
things simply cannot be desirable, because desiring them won’t make sense 
for anyone. That’s not to say that everyone desires the former and doesn’t 
desire the latter; rather, it’s to say that everyone would make more sense 
to himself desiring the former and not desiring the latter, given his natural 
endowment as a member of the species.
The fixed points of human nature place different degrees of constraint on 
the intelligibility of different responses. Disgust is directly plugged in to the 
physiological reactions of gagging and retching; desire is regularly sparked 
by the appetites, but it can also flare up independently, in response to just 
about anything; there may be nothing that human nature determines us to 
admire, and yet admiration is deeply embedded in the network of other 
attitudes; whereas amusement mostly floats free of the network, except for 
the few connections through which it is inhibited by fear, disgust, anger, 
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and boredom. What makes sense by way of each response is consequently 
more or less constrained, depending on its degree of natural connectivity.
I believe that the previously noted shades of objectivity and subjectivity 
can be explained by these considerations — idiosyncratic differences in 
how it makes sense to respond, commonalities based in our shared nature, 
the possibility of responding incongruously and of cultivating more 
intelligible responses. As the intelligibility of a response is more closely tied 
to our individual characters, the response is susceptible to more specific 
guidance from a personal standard of appropriateness; as the intelligibility 
of a response is more closely tied to our common nature, the response is 
susceptible to more specific guidance from an interpersonal standard; and 
a standard of appropriateness may itself be improved, as the corresponding 
sensibility is rendered more intelligible. 
A sensibility can become more intelligible, for example, by following 
recognizable regularities. Practical reasoning therefore favors cultivating 
appreciative responses to things that belong to general kinds, kinds that 
are recognizable, if not by explicit description, then at least by family 
resemblance. Whatever makes it intelligible for me to laugh at a particular 
joke — thereby making the joke amusing, at least for me — would make 
it intelligible for me to laugh at any relevantly similar joke, which would 
therefore qualify as amusing for me, too.67 Insofar as I can generalize about 
what kinds of jokes amuse me, or what kinds of people I admire, I can 
better understand why I am laughing at a particular joke or emulating a 
particular person.
Practical reason thus encourages me to identify kinds of jokes, 
recognizable by family resemblance if not by description, that constitute 
what is amusing for me. It thereby pushes me toward a position that 
67  On a particular occasion, of course, the relevant similarity may not be an intrinsic quality 
of the joke itself: what makes it intelligible for me to laugh on this occasion may be 
that I’m drunk or nervous, which would make it intelligible for me to laugh at just 
about anything. Yet I am also under rational pressure to identify kinds of jokes that 
regularly tend to amuse me by themselves, so that I can comprehend my responses to 
jokes more generally, without reference to the circumstances. And a joke that’s amusing 
for me on this occasion because I’m drunk or nervous may not be intrinsically amusing 
for me — not “really” amusing, I might say — because it is not the kind of joke that 
generally makes it intelligible for me to laugh. This notion of what is “really” amusing 
(or desirable or admirable or whatever) solves a problem raised by Justin D’Arms and 
Daniel Jacobson in “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65-90.
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appears to confirm the view that being amusing-for-me is a real, descriptive 
property of things. The reason why amusingness-for-me comes to seem 
like a real property, however, is that I have cultivated a sense of humor 
that is regularly responsive to jokes of recognizable kinds, so that I can 
understand being amused, when I am amused. The same goes for my senses 
of admiration, inspiration, disgust, and so on: they have been cultivated 
under rational pressure to be responsive to recognizable kinds of things, 
which constitute what is admirable, inspiring, or disgusting for me.
Thus, the notion that values are properties distributed consistently among 
things or states of affairs is actually the reflection of a pattern into which our 
evaluative responses tend to fall when regulated in accordance with reasons 
for responding, which are conditions in light of which a response would 
make sense. The ultimate criterion of appropriateness for an evaluative 
response is intelligibility, which can be characterized independently of any 
postulation of values and can therefore be constitutive of values instead.
Although the most intelligible responses are usually those which are 
consistent across recognizable kinds of things and coherent with our other 
responses, departures from this pattern can be more intelligible in isolated 
cases. After all, intelligibility is a holistic matter of overall explanatory 
coherence, which sometimes requires trade-offs between alternative 
marginal gains or losses. And because values are constituted by intelligible 
responses rather than vice versa, we should tolerate cases in which the most 
intelligible responses cannot be modeled by a consistent distribution of 
values: they are simply cases in which the normal pattern of intelligibility 
doesn’t hold.
As I have pointed out, conflicting attitudes can undermine intelligibility 
by making it difficult to identify an intelligible course of action. But in 
the case of procreative decisions, some of the most significant attitudes 
are essentially retrospective — such as love for a particular child, which 
is not available antecedently to guide the decision. It makes no sense to 
conceive a child out of love for it, an attitude that will not be possible until 
it exists. After the child exists, both thankfulness and regret may make 
sense as responses to it under different modes of presentation; and they 
may make sense all things considered, as parts of a holistically intelligible 
set of responses.
Consider again the parents of a severely disabled child. These parents 
may feel that if they truly love their child, as they unquestionably do, 
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then they cannot lament the fact of having had a disabled child, all things 
considered; and yet they cannot help lamenting what is unquestionably 
a lamentable fact. The resulting sense of emotional dissonance can wreak 
additional damage on the child and the family. In my view, however, 
there is no dissonance between the emotions themselves; the dissonance is 
between values that the emotions are mistakenly taken to reflect.
The parents should therefore forget about evaluating their child’s 
existence and feel the emotions that clearly make sense for them to feel. 
What’s intelligible in their responses may cast an inconsistent set of 
shadows on the world, but they are, after all, only shadows.
Let me turn, finally, to the topic with which I started this series: our 
obligations to future generations. In Part I, I argued that the inheritance 
we pass on to future generations cannot harm or benefit them, and that 
our moral relations to them must therefore be conceived in different 
terms. In Part II, I argued that our moral relations to future people should 
be conceived in terms of an obligation to take due consideration for the 
importance of human life, as the context in which personhood is realized 
or damaged. In this part, I have argued that the gratitude felt by future 
persons for their existence will be rationally compatible with resentment 
over their progenitors’ lack of due consideration for human life in their 
case. The supposed gift of life will therefore be no compensation for the 
wrong we do in disregarding the possibilities for human flourishing or 
suffering in the future.

7. Well-Being and Time1
A person can fare well either over an extended period or at a particular 
moment. We evaluate how well a person fares over an extended period 
when we speak of him as having a good day, a good year, or a good life, 
or when we speak of such a period as going well for him. We evaluate how 
a person fares at a particular moment when we say that he is doing well 
just then. We favor different idioms in these two kinds of evaluation: we 
are more inclined to speak of a person as having a good life than as having 
a good moment; and, conversely, we are more inclined to use the terms 
‘welfare’ or ‘well-being’ to express how well things are going for him at 
a particular moment than to evaluate how well his life goes as a whole. 
Nevertheless, evaluations of both kinds are judgments of relational value 
— of what’s good for the person or good in relation to his interests — and 
so they are both judgments of the person’s welfare.2 
1  This chapter originally appeared in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1991): 48-77 and was 
reprinted in The Metaphysics of Death, ed. John Martin Fischer (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 329-357. For comments on earlier drafts I am indebted to 
Elizabeth Anderson, Fred Feldman, Jonathan Lear, Brian Leiter, Peter Railton, Connie 
Rosati, Michael Slote, and Nicholas White.
2  In this chapter I assume that a person’s welfare is defined by his interests, or what’s good 
for him. According to some theories of the good, however, a person can have interests 
that do not bear on his well-being, since his interests are not all self-regarding, and his 
well-being depends only on the fulfillment of self-regarding interests. These theories 
imply that what has value for a person and what improves that person’s welfare are 
not necessarily coextensive. In my view, proponents of such theories should recognize 
two distinct ways of measuring the relational value attaching to a person’s life: first, the 
extent to which the life fulfills the person’s interests, broadly construed; and second, the 
extent to which the life fulfills the person’s self-interest, or welfare interests. Although I 
ignore this distinction, I believe that it could be introduced into my arguments with only 
a loss of simplicity. (Thanks to Peter Railton for bringing this point to my attention.)
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.07
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What is the relation between the welfare value3 of a temporal period in 
someone’s life and his welfare at individual moments during that period? 
And what is the relation between the value of a period and that of the 
shorter periods it comprises? Is a good day just a day during which one 
is frequently well-off?4 Is a good week just a week in which the good days 
outweigh the bad? Is a good life just a string of good years? 
The answer to these questions would be yes if well-being were additive. 
If the welfare value of a time-period in one’s life were equivalent to the 
sum of momentary well-being that one enjoyed during that period, then a 
good period would indeed be a period during which one was, on balance, 
well-off, and a good life would be a life composed, on balance, of good 
periods. But I doubt whether well-being is additive in this way. Of course, 
I do not mean to rule out the possibility that the amount of momentary 
welfare accruing to someone during his life and the welfare value of that 
life might turn out to be the same. I am simply saying that their being the 
same would ordinarily be an accident, because the welfare value of a life is 
not in general determined by, and cannot be inferred from, the amount of 
momentary well-being that the life contains.5 
Here I am not merely denying that the value of a life can be computed 
by the addition of values antecedently assigned to its constituent moments. 
Computing the value of the whole in this manner, by composition, might 
be impossible only because the values of the parts had to be computed, 
inversely, by decomposition. If the only way to assess someone’s well-being 
3  Henceforth I shall frequently drop the modifier and speak simply about the value of 
someone’s life. In all cases, however, I shall be referring to the welfare value of the life 
— that is, how well it goes for the person living it — rather than to its being morally 
praiseworthy, aesthetically pleasing, or endowed with significance. (See also ns. 8 
and 18 below.) I shall also refer to the welfare value of someone’s life as his “lifetime 
well-being”.
4  Amartya Sen interprets the phrase ‘being well-off’ as referring to something other than 
well-being. “The former,” he says, “is really a concept of opulence” (“Well-Being and 
Freedom”, the second lecture in “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 
1984”, The Journal of Philosophy 82 [1985]: 169-221, 195 ff.). Without necessarily rejecting 
Sen’s intuitions about the meanings of these terms in ordinary parlance, I shall stipulate, 
for the purposes of the present paper, that ‘being well-off’ refers to the state of having 
well-being.
5  This statement requires one minor qualification. I can imagine a kind of life whose 
welfare value would be determined by the amount of momentary welfare accruing to 
its subject. This would be a life with virtually no narrative structure at all — say, the 
life of someone who is maintained, from birth to death, in a state of semiconsciousness 
and inactivity. That this particular life would be only as good as the sum of its good and 
bad moments is perfectly compatible with my claim that a life’s value is not in general a 
function of momentary well-being.
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at a particular moment were to compute the fraction of his life’s value that 
was being realized at the time, then the value of the whole would have to 
be computed first, and couldn’t be derived from the values of the parts.6 
In that case, however, well-being might still be additive in the sense that 
interests me, since the values of the parts and the value of the whole might 
still be such that the latter had to equal the sum of the former. What I wish 
to deny is that well-being is additive in even this sense. 
My claim thus militates equally against evaluating a whole life by 
composition and evaluating its parts by decomposition. In my view, just as 
assigning values to someone’s moments of existence and adding them will 
not necessarily yield the value of his life, so assigning a value to his life and 
dividing it among his moments of existence will not necessarily yield their 
values, either. 
My strategy will be to criticize these alternative computations in turn. 
First I shall presuppose a rough understanding of momentary well-being, 
and I shall argue, on rather intuitive grounds, that the value of a life need 
not be the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed within it. Then I shall 
argue, on more theoretical grounds, against regarding a person’s well-being 
at a particular moment as a currently realized fraction of his life’s value. In 
neither phase of the argument will I presuppose any particular theory of 
individual well-being; rather, I’ll apply what I take to be common-sense 
notions of faring well, either over one’s entire life or within the confines of 
a particular moment. 
Intuitively speaking, the reason why well-being isn’t additive is that how 
a person is faring at a particular moment is a temporally local matter, 
whereas the welfare value of a period in his life depends on the global 
features of that period. More specifically, the value of an extended period 
depends on the overall order or structure of events — on what might be 
called their narrative or dramatic relations.7 
6  I believe that James Griffin denies additivity in this sense. He initially says, “We can never 
reach final assessment of ways of life by totting up lots of small, short-term utilities…. It 
has to take a global form: this way of living, all in all, is better than that” (Well-Being: Its 
Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986], pp. 34-35). 
But Griffin then goes on to say that the values of a life’s components should be assessed 
in terms of the components’ contributions to the value of the whole, in such a way that 
“aggregation” is preserved (see esp. p. 36). Thus, Griffin’s objection to the “totting-up 
model”, as he calls it, is an objection to computing values by composition rather than 
decomposition. (See also pp. 88, 104-105, 144-146.)
7  The notion that the value of a life depends on its narrative structure appears in many 
works, including Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, 
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Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in the 
depths but takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled 
youth, struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by 
success and satisfaction in middle age and a peaceful retirement. Another 
life begins at the heights but slides downhill: a blissful childhood and 
youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in early adulthood, followed by a 
midlife strewn with disasters that lead to misery in old age. Surely, we can 
imagine two such lives as containing equal sums of momentary well-being. 
Your retirement is as blessed in one life as your childhood is in the other; 
your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage is in the other. 
Yet even if we were to map each moment in one life onto a moment of 
equal well-being in the other, we would not have shown these lives to be 
equally good. For after the tally of good times and bad times had been rung 
up, the fact would remain that one life gets progressively better while the 
other gets progressively worse; one is a story of improvement while the 
other is a story of deterioration. To most people, I think, the former story 
would seem like a better life story — not, of course, in the sense that it 
makes for a better story in the telling or the hearing, but rather in the sense 
that it is the story of a better life.8 
Note that I am not committed to the truth of this value judgment in 
particular. I offer it merely as an intuitively plausible illustration of the 
possibility that periods containing equal sums of momentary welfare 
can have different overall welfare values. (The same goes for most of the 
value judgments offered below.) Even those who don’t agree with the 
present value judgment, or can imagine disagreeing with it, will at least 
acknowledge that it is a reasonable judgment to entertain; whereas it would 
be ruled out a priori if well-being were additive. 
One who thinks that a life’s value is the sum of the momentary well-being 
enjoyed therein may seek to explain the outcome of this thought experiment 
as due to subconscious assumptions that violate the experiment’s terms. 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chapter 15; and Charles Taylor’s Sources of 
the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 47 ff.
8  Michael Slote has pointed out to me that my view is at risk of being confused with a view 
sometimes attributed to Nietzsche, to the effect that literary or aesthetic considerations 
determine the value of a life. (See Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985].) I am grateful to Brian Leiter for 
guidance on this subject.
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That is, one may claim that a preference between lives stipulated to contain 
equal amounts of momentary well-being must arise from a silent refusal 
to grant the stipulation. Those who prefer the uphill climb to the downhill 
slide, one may say, are simply assuming that the highs and lows encountered 
in maturity are more extreme than those encountered in childhood, and 
that the intensifying effects of age, or mitigating effects of youth, make the 
goods of one life better and the evils of the other life worse. 
But I doubt whether our preference between these lives can be traced to 
a denial of their supposed symmetry. We don’t necessarily assume that the 
best retirement is better than the best childhood, or that the miseries of age 
are worse, at their worst, than the miseries of youth. If asked why we prefer 
the life of improvement, we would be unlikely to express such views; we 
would be more likely to say, “A life that gets better is, other things being 
equal, better than a life that gets worse.”9 We would then be expressing a 
preference between trends, as opposed to sums, of momentary well-being, 
a preference that is entirely natural and yet at odds with the view that a 
life’s value is the sum of the values of its constituent moments. 
This preference can be further sustained by reflection on the 
counterintuitive consequences of the opposing view.10 If the value of a life 
9  Our preferences among trends in well-being are not confined to that for improvement 
over deterioration. I think that one may have reason to prefer variety and intensity 
to consistency and moderation — that is, a life of great joys and sorrows to one of 
uninterrupted contentment — even if the sum of momentary well-being were the same 
in both lives; or there may be reasons supporting the opposite preference. (Amartya 
Sen favors equality of well-being among the different moments in one’s life. See 
“Utilitarianism and Welfarism”, The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979): 487 f.) As I have 
said, my argument doesn’t depend on showing one such preference to be more rational 
than another. I am arguing against a view that would deny the possibility of reasons 
supporting either preference, given the equal amounts of momentary well-being 
accumulated in the two lives.
10  The point made in this paragraph is borrowed from Connie S. Rosati, who makes it in 
a somewhat different context. See her “Mortality, Agency, and Regret,” Poznan Studies 
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (2007): 231-259. Rosati has pointed 
out to me that people sometimes regret having started too late on a particular career or 
relationship, as if the value of their lives has been permanently reduced by this delay 
in their success or happiness. But I am not committed to denying that there can ever 
be a bad start that permanently depresses the value of one’s life. I am committed only 
to denying that early misfortunes necessarily depress the value of one’s life, as they 
necessarily would if well-being were additive. What’s more, I suspect that the view of 
well-being as additive cannot properly account for the cases that Rosati has in mind. 
What these people regret is not the level of well-being that they enjoyed in youth but 
rather their delay in embarking on a particular project that (as they now realize) will 
provide an important theme or plot for their life’s story. Hence their regret can be 
understood only as an attitude toward the narrative structure of their lives.
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were additive, then a life could be forever spoiled or saved by its initial 
segment. Every year of well-being would raise the minimum value to 
which one’s life could possibly fall; every year of suffering would lower 
the maximum value to which one’s life could possibly rise. An unfortunate 
childhood would therefore make for a bad start in life, not only by leaving 
one emotionally or physically ill-equipped for future challenges, but also 
by permanently lowering the level of lifetime well-being to which one 
could reasonably aspire. Conversely, a fortunate childhood would provide 
not only the personal resources with which to succeed in the future but also 
so much lifetime well-being in the bank, so to speak, insuring the value of 
one’s life against subsequent reverses. But surely we do not think, after 
reading the first few chapters of a biography, that they have placed limits 
on how well or how badly the subject’s life might possibly turn out. We 
don’t think, “He’s already fifteen years to the good,” or “… fifteen years in 
the hole,” as if registering credits or debits that will necessarily be reflected 
in the subject’s final accounts. Yet we do think that we know how well the 
person fared during the first fifteen years of his life. 
My remarks thus far may differ only slightly from, and add only slightly to, 
what Michael Slote has said in his essay “Goods and Lives”.11 There Slote 
offers an example closely resembling the cases I have discussed:12 
A given man may achieve political power and, once in power, do things 
of great value, after having been in the political wilderness throughout his 
earlier career. He may later die while still “in harness” and fully possessed 
of his powers, at a decent old age. By contrast, another man may have a 
meteoric success in youth, attaining the same office as the first man and also 
achieving much good, but then lose power, while still young, never to regain 
11  In Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983); originally published in Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982): 311-326. Recently the additivity of well-being has also 
been challenged by John Bigelow, John Campbell, and Robert Pargetter in “Death and 
Well-Being”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1990): 119. Nicholas White has pointed out 
to me that an early argument against the additivity of well-being appears in C. I. Lewis’s 
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 
1946), chapter XVI. In reading Lewis, I have difficulty separating (1) the claim that the 
juxtaposition of events in a life affects the value of the whole; (2) the claim that it affects 
the intrinsic character of the events themselves, which are colored by the recollection 
and anticipation of other events; and (3) the claim that the value of a life depends on its 
character as a diachronic experience that is not reducible to a succession of momentary 
experiences. My defense of (1) does not depend on claims like (2) or (3). My argument 
can thus be viewed as a generalization of Lewis’s, in which I abstract from Lewis’s 
experiential conception of value.
12  In Goods and Virtues, pp. 23-24.
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it. Without hearing anything more, I think our natural, immediate reaction 
to these examples would be that the first man was the more fortunate….  
Slote goes on to say that our natural reaction to such a case “seems to 
suggest a time preference for goods that come late in life”. 
Whether Slote is describing the phenomenon that I have in mind 
depends on how this last remark is to be interpreted. On the one hand, 
a preference for goods that come late in life may reflect the view that one 
and the same commodity, as measured in purely descriptive terms, often 
adds more to one’s well-being if it is received later. In that case, however, 
the preference in question is perfectly compatible with the view that a life’s 
value is the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed therein. For even if 
a particular quantity of pleasure or money or fame gives a greater boost to 
one’s momentary welfare if it is received later in life, what the commodity 
adds to one’s total momentary welfare, whenever it is received, may still 
exhaust its contribution to the value of one’s life overall. On the other hand, 
the goods among which Slote’s temporal preference discriminates might 
be equilibrated as goods rather than as commodities — that is, in terms 
of their impact on one’s welfare at the time of their receipt. In that case, 
the preference reflects the view I am defending, that one and the same 
increment in one’s momentary well-being may have greater or lesser effect 
on the value of one’s life, depending on when and how it occurs. Although 
Slote sometimes appears to favor the former view,13 only the latter would 
place him in disagreement with Sidgwick’s principle that “a smaller present 
good is not to be preferred to a greater future good”14 — a principle with 
which Slote claims to disagree. I shall therefore interpret Slote’s “pure time 
preference” as implying that a life’s value is not equivalent to a sum of 
momentary well-being. 
I hope to build on Slote’s observations in two ways. First, I would like 
to suggest a deeper explanation than Slote’s for the preferences cited in 
his article. While I agree with Slote that two benefits of equal momentary 
value may contribute differently to the welfare value of one’s life, I doubt 
whether they can do so merely because of their timing. They can do so, I 
think, because they can belong to different life stories, which coincidentally 
place them at different times. 
13  E.g., when saying that “a good may itself be greater for coming late rather than early in 
life” (ibid., p. 25).
14  The Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981), p. 381.
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Second, I hope to draw out the consequences of this phenomenon for 
various issues in moral psychology and moral philosophy. Among the 
issues I shall discuss are the evil of death, the nature of prudence, and the 
value of desire-satisfaction.
Consider the theoretical conclusion that Slote hopes to illustrate with the 
case cited above:15 
When a personal benefit or good occurs, [it] may make a difference to how 
fortunate someone is (has been), quite independently of the effects of such 
timing in producing other good things and of the greater importance we 
attach to the distinctive goals and interests of certain life periods. And 
I believe, in particular, that what happens late in life is naturally and 
automatically invested with greater significance and weight in determining 
the goodness of lives. 
While I agree with Slote’s evaluative intuitions about the case, I do not agree 
with this explanation of them. The reason why later benefits are thought to 
have a greater impact on the value of one’s life is not that greater weight is 
attached to what comes later. Rather, it is that later events are thought to 
alter the meaning of earlier events, thereby altering their contribution to the 
value of one’s life. 
Suppose that we drew one of Slote’s politicians behind a veil of 
ignorance about his life and put to him the following proposition. He is to 
have ten years of political success, but he can choose whether his fortunate 
decade is to occur in his fifties or his thirties. How strong a preference 
would he have between the alternatives thus described? I suspect that he 
would be indifferent.16 If he had any preference at all, it would be neither 
15  Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues, p. 23.
16  Here I am assuming that the veil of ignorance deprives the subject of information about 
his current age. For if he knew that he was currently in his forties, then he might have 
a preference arising out of what Derek Parfit calls the bias toward the future (Reasons 
and Persons [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984], 165 ff.). Note, then, that the time 
preferences considered by Slote are different in structure from those considered by 
Parfit. Parfit is concerned with a preference between past and future, whereas Slote is 
concerned with a preference between early and late. As the subject’s temporal relation 
to an event changes, the former preference yields a different attitude toward the event, 
but the latter does not. Connie Rosati has suggested to me that a person might prefer 
earlier success because it would be a sign of genius. But this suggestion strikes me as 
only proving my point. The person so described would not prefer earlier success merely 
by virtue of its timing; he would prefer it only because he values the meaning of some 
story that its early occurrence would subserve.
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as strong nor as stable as the preference he would have if we described 
the alternative careers more fully, as they are described in Slote’s example. 
Merely postponing a fixed amount of well-being until later in life wouldn’t 
strike him as an obvious means of making it more valuable; indeed, he 
might reasonably regard well-being as more valuable if enjoyed in youth. 
Surely, then, the preference elicited by Slote’s example must depend on 
something other than the effects of mere timing.17 
In order to reproduce the preference elicited by Slote’s example, we 
would have to tell the aspiring politician that the later successes being 
offered to him would be the culmination of a slow ascent, whereas the 
earlier successes would be the prelude to a sudden decline. That is, we 
would have to tell him, not only about the timing of the rewards in question, 
but also about their place in a larger trend. He wouldn’t care whether a 
particular bundle of goods was to be encountered early or late in the game; 
what he would care about is whether they were to be encountered at the 
top of a chute or the top of a ladder. 
Why would a person care about the placement of momentary goods on 
the curve that maps his changing welfare? The answer, I believe, is that an 
event’s place in the story of one’s life lends it a meaning that isn’t entirely 
determined by its impact on one’s well-being at the time. A particular 
electoral victory, providing a particular boost to one’s current welfare, can 
mean either that one’s early frustrations were finally over or that one’s 
subsequent failures were not yet foreshadowed, that one enjoyed either 
fleeting good luck or lasting success — all depending on its placement in 
the trend of one’s well-being. And the event’s meaning is what determines 
its contribution to the value of one’s life.18 
17  Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter also express doubts about Slote’s treatment of this 
case. See “‘Death and Well-Being”, pp. 122-123.
18  To say that the meaning of an event determines its contribution to the value of one’s life 
is not to equate a valuable life with a meaningful one. To be sure, meaningfulness is a 
valuable characteristic in a life, and it, too, is probably a function of the life’s narrative 
structure. But we can conceive of meaningful lives that aren’t particularly good ones 
for the people who live them; and we may be able to conceive of good lives that aren’t 
particularly meaningful. What’s more, the meaning, or narrative role, that determines an 
event’s contribution to a life’s value, in my view, must not be confused with the event’s 
meaningfulness in the evaluative sense. To say that a particular increment in momentary 
well-being adds more to the value of a particular life if it has the meaning of a well-
earned reward than that of a windfall is not to say that rewards are necessarily more 
meaningful events; it’s simply to say that their contribution to the life’s value depends 
on their being rewards.
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The meaning attached to a quantity of momentary well-being is 
determined only in part by its place in the overall trend.19 The meaning 
of a benefit depends not only on whether it follows or precedes hardships 
but also on the specific narrative relation between the goods and evils 
involved. Slote’s politician would have experienced an improvement in his 
well-being whether his years of toil were capped by electoral victory or 
merely cut short by his winning the lottery and retiring young. But the 
contribution of these alternative benefits to the overall value of his life 
wouldn’t be determined entirely by how well-off each would make him 
from one moment to the next. Their contribution to his life’s value would 
also be determined by the fact that the former would be a well-earned 
reward, and would prove his struggles to have been a good investment, 
whereas the latter would be a windfall in relation to which his struggles 
were superfluous. Thus benefits that would effect equal improvements in 
his momentary well-being might contribute differently to the value of his 
life, by virtue of lending and borrowing different meanings in exchange 
with preceding events. 
The most familiar illustration of this principle is the commonly held belief 
in the importance of drawing lessons from one’s misfortunes. If a life’s 
value were a sum of momentary well-being, learning from a misfortune 
would be no more important than learning from other sources, since 
every lesson learned would add so much value and no more to the sum of 
one’s well-being. On being invited to learn from a personal tragedy, one 
would therefore be entitled to reply, “No, I think I’ll read a book instead.” 
Edification would offset the losses incurred in the tragedy, but its having 
been derived from the tragedy wouldn’t render edification more valuable, 
either intrinsically or extrinsically. Any lesson of equal value would offset 
one’s losses equally.20 
19  Here I disagree with Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter, who believe that the value of 
someone’s life, though not reducible to the sum of the momentary well-being enjoyed 
throughout that life, nevertheless supervenes on the pattern of the person’s momentary 
well-being through time. (See “Death and Well-Being”, pp. 127-128, 136-137.) Indeed, 
these authors believe that momentary well-being just is that property — whatever it may 
be — whose profile through time determines the value of a person’s life (ibid., p. 128). 
My reasons for rejecting this view are expounded in greater detail below.
20  In some cases, of course, what we hope to learn from a misfortune is how to avoid 
repeating some mistake that occasioned it. But why do we think it more important to 
learn how to avoid repeating a past mistake than to learn a different lesson, about how 
to avoid committing a novel mistake? The reason isn’t that we regard the consequences 
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The point of learning from a misfortune, surely, is to prevent the 
misfortune from being a total loss. Learning from the misfortune confers 
some value on it, by making it the means to one’s edification. But how could 
this be the point? The instrumental value of a means is not to be counted as 
additional to the intrinsic value of the end. Otherwise, we would be obliged 
to pursue our ends as circuitously as possible, so as to accumulate the 
most instrumental value along the way. Since the value of a means is not 
additional to that of the end, turning a misfortune into a means of learning 
a lesson doesn’t produce any more value than that inherent in the lesson 
itself, a value not necessarily greater than that of any alternative lesson one 
might have learned. So how can the point of learning from a misfortune, in 
particular, be to confer instrumental value on it? 
The answer, I believe, is that conferring instrumental value on a 
misfortune alters its meaning, its significance in the story of one’s life. 
The misfortune still detracted from one’s well-being at the time, but it no 
longer mars one’s life story as it formerly did. A life in which one suffers a 
misfortune and then learns from it may find one equally well-off, at each 
moment, as a life in which one suffers a misfortune and then reads the 
encyclopedia. But the costs of the misfortune are merely offset when the 
value of the latter life is computed; whereas they are somehow cancelled 
entirely from the accounts of the former. Or rather, neither misfortune 
affects the value of one’s life just by adding costs and benefits to a cumulative 
of a repeated mistake as necessarily worse than those of a mistake committed for the first 
time. We might prefer committing a novel mistake to repeating a past mistake even if 
their consequences would be equally bad. Surely, the reason is that we regard the story 
of committing the same mistake repeatedly as worse than that of committing different 
mistakes — a value judgment that depends on more than the momentary costs of the 
mistakes themselves. One might think that our interest in learning from misfortunes, 
and the mistakes that occasion them, is based on the assumption that the mistakes a 
person has already committed are the ones that he’s most likely to commit in the future, 
and hence that lessons learned from them are the ones that are most likely to be useful. 
I disagree. We value learning from mistakes even if we know that the opportunity to 
repeat them will never arise. And we value learning from misfortunes, such as grave 
illnesses or freak accidents, that are not in any way attributable to mistakes. Finally, 
one might think that learning from a misfortune is valuable only because it is a means 
to a more pleasant consciousness of the misfortune — a means of “coming to terms” or 
“making peace” with it. But why not simply forget about the misfortune entirely, or turn 
one’s thoughts to something else? If making peace with a misfortune were valuable only 
as a means to pleasurable consciousness, then any alternative pleasure would serve just 
as well. Making peace with a misfortune is valuable not just because it entails acquiring 
so much peace of mind but because it entails acquiring peace of mind in a way that 
draws a fitting conclusion to one’s past. (All of the objections considered in this note 
were suggested to me by Connie Rosati.)
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account. The effect of either misfortune on one’s life is proportionate, not 
to its impact on one’s continuing welfare, but to its import for the story. 
An edifying misfortune is not just offset but redeemed, by being given a 
meaningful place in one’s progress through life.21 
The same point can be illustrated with other examples. In one life 
your first ten years of marriage are troubled and end in divorce, but you 
immediately remarry happily; in another life the troubled years of your 
first marriage lead to eventual happiness as the relationship matures. Both 
lives contain ten years of marital strife followed by contentment; but let 
us suppose that in the former, you regard your first ten years of marriage 
as a dead loss, whereas in the latter you regard them as the foundation of 
your happiness.22 The bad times are just as bad in both lives, but in one 
they are cast off and in the other they are redeemed. Surely, these two 
decades can affect the value of your life differently, even if you are equally 
well-off at each moment of their duration. From the perspective of your 
second marriage, you may reasonably think that your life would have gone 
better if you could have made your first marriage work out; and you may 
reasonably think so without thinking that the first marriage, if successful, 
would have been better from day to day than the second. You can simply 
think that a dead-end relationship blots the story of one’s life in a way that 
marital problems don’t if they lead to eventual happiness. 
Of course, your desire for a successful first marriage is fulfilled in the latter 
life, whereas in the former it is given up and replaced by the desire for a 
successful second marriage. In a sense, then, the former life differs from 
the latter by virtue of containing more unfulfilled desires. Doesn’t this 
21  Charles Taylor remarks on our concern for whether the past “is just ‘temps perdu’ in the 
double sense intended in the title of Proust’s celebrated work, that is, time which is both 
wasted and irretrievably lost, beyond recall, in which we pass as if we had never been” 
(Sources of the Self, p. 43). Taylor goes on to say that our desire to prevent the present 
from becoming lost in this sense is a desire for “the future to ‘redeem’ the past, to make 
it part of a life story which has sense or purpose”. Taylor continues: “In the scene in the 
Guermantes’s library, the narrator recovers the full meaning of his past and thus restores 
the time which was ‘lost’ in the two senses I mentioned above. The formerly irretrievable 
past is recovered in its unity with the life yet to live, and all the ‘wasted’ time now has a 
meaning, as the time of preparation for the work of the writer who will give shape to this 
unity” (pp. 50-51).
22  Of course, we can also imagine a life in which an unsuccessful first marriage teaches you 
lessons instrumental to the success of your second. But in that case, I would claim, your 
life would be better than it would have been if the first marriage had been a dead loss.
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difference in desire fulfillment explain the difference in perceived value 
between these lives? 
I doubt whether a difference in desire fulfillment can do this explanatory 
job. Suppose, for example, that in both versions of the story your early 
desire to achieve happiness with your first mate was accompanied by an 
equally strong, competing desire to start afresh with someone else. The 
only difference between these desires, let us say, was that during your ten 
years of trying to fulfill the former, the latter remained an idle yearning on 
which you never acted. Now the two endings of your story no longer differ 
in respect to the fulfillment of your youthful desires: each ending fulfills 
one and frustrates one of the desires that you harbored throughout your 
first marriage. Do they consequently result in equally valuable lives? I am 
inclined to say not. For I am still inclined to prefer the ending in which your 
initial efforts are redeemed over the ending in which they are abandoned. 
Fulfilling a desire on behalf of which you have struggled may be more 
important than fulfilling a desire in which you have made no investment. 
Hence desire fulfillment per se is not what’s valuable; what’s valuable is 
living out a story of efforts rewarded rather than efforts wasted.23 
Insofar as the fulfillment of one’s past desires is valuable, I am inclined to 
say, its value depends on that of life stories in which desires are eventually 
fulfilled. For I cannot see how a difference in the fulfillment of past desires 
can yield any difference in momentary well-being. Let us cancel the 
assumption that you always wanted to change mates, and return to the 
assumption that the beginning of your story, in either version, includes 
only a desire to make a go of your first marriage — a desire that’s fulfilled 
in one version but abandoned in the other. The question remains when 
you are rendered worse off, in the version that involves a second marriage, 
by the abandonment of your hopes for the first. Once you abandon those 
hopes, you acquire new ones — for success in the second marriage — and 
these are richly fulfilled. You are therefore just as well-off in your second 
marriage, from day to day, as you would have been in your first, had it 
flourished. To be sure, you are no longer achieving what your former self 
wanted you to achieve — namely, success in the first marriage — but this 
23  Peter Railton has pointed out to me that I seem to be appealing to a desire that was 
omitted from my calculation of desire fulfillment — namely, your desire for a life in 
which your efforts are rewarded. But I do not think that your desire for a life in which 
your efforts are rewarded is contingent on the assumption of your having that desire in 
the life under consideration.
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failure can hardly make your former self worse off retroactively. The daily 
well-being of your former self is a feature of the past, beyond alteration. 
Failure to fulfill your previous desires thus impinges on your interests 
without affecting your welfare at any particular moment. 
Oddly enough, several philosophers have asserted the possibility of 
retroactive effects on well-being — often in order to explain when a person 
suffers the evil of death.24 According to these philosophers, a person’s death 
can make him worse off during the immediately preceding portion of his 
life, by preventing the fulfillment of the desires he has during that period. 
These philosophers argue that our resistance to the idea of being 
currently harmed by future events is based on the false assumption that one 
cannot be harmed by things that don’t affect one’s conscious experiences. 
But acknowledging the possibility of unexperienced harms should not 
necessarily lead us to acknowledge the possibility of present harms due 
to future events. For even if a person’s current welfare is not determined 
entirely by facts within his experience, it may still be determined entirely 
by facts within the present. 
This restriction on the determinants of momentary well-being cannot 
be inferred directly from the impossibility of backward causation. Future 
events could affect one’s present well-being if present well-being were a 
relation between one’s present desires and the states of affairs that fulfilled 
or failed to fulfill them. In that case, retroactively harming someone would 
no more require retrograde causation than retroactively “making a liar” 
of him. But momentary well-being is ordinarily conceived as a temporally 
local matter, determined by a person’s current circumstances, whether 
experienced or unexperienced. We think of a person’s current well-being 
as a fact intrinsic to the present, not as a relation that he currently bears 
to his future. We don’t say, of a person who dies in harness, that he fared 
progressively worse toward the end, simply because he was acquiring more 
and more ambitions that would go unfulfilled. Nor do we say, of a person 
raised in adversity, that his youth wasn’t so bad, after all, simply because 
his youthful hopes were eventually fulfilled later in life.25 We might say 
24  These philosophers include Joel Feinberg (Harm to Others [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984], 79 ff.) and Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter (“Death and Well-Being”, pp. 134-
135, 138). Note that in rejecting the notion of retroactive effects on a person’s momentary 
well-being, I do not necessarily reject the notion that the value of a person’s life can be 
influenced by events after his death. The reason is that I regard the value of a person’s life 
as a feature of his life story, and a person’s life story may not end at his death.
25  Indeed, I don’t see how Feinberg or Bigelow et al. can say that such a person’s life gets 
better at all if, in adulthood, he desires that his youth had gone differently.
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that such a person’s adulthood compensated for an unfortunate youth, but 
we wouldn’t say that it made his youth any better. Because the belief in 
retroactive welfare effects would entail such judgments, it strikes me as 
highly counterintuitive. 
Thus, the reason why it is generally in your interests to promote the 
fulfillment of your current desires for the future cannot be that their future 
fulfillment will make you better off now. Nor can it be that their future 
fulfillment will make you better off then — that is, better off than you 
would be if you replaced them with different desires that got fulfilled.26 The 
reason why it is in your interests to promote the fulfillment of your current 
desires for the future is rather that a life story of ambitions conceived, 
pursued, and fulfilled may be a better life story than one of ambitions 
conceived, discarded, and replaced. And the one life is better than the other 
even though they may include equal amounts of momentary well-being.27 
My view of lifetime well-being provides a different explanation from 
Slote’s for the discrepancy in our attitudes toward early and late stages in 
life. My explanation begins with the observation that events in a person’s 
life can borrow significance from both preceding and succeeding events. 
A particular success can be either a windfall or a well-earned reward, 
depending on the amount of effort that preceded it; the expenditure of a 
particular effort can be either a good investment or a waste, depending 
on the degree of success that ensues. Retrospective significance — that 
which is gained from subsequent events — is often responsible for the 
discrepancy between total momentary well-being and lifetime value. For 
when subsequent developments alter the meaning of an event, they can 
alter its contribution to the value of one’s life, but they cannot retroactively 
change the impact that it had on one’s well-being at the time. 
26  Many philosophers have noted the absence of any rational requirement to satisfy 
desires that one had in the past (Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, chapter 8; Richard 
B. Brandt, “Two Concepts of Utility”, in The Limits of Utilitarianism, ed. Harlan B. Miller 
and William H. Williams [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982], p. 180). 
To my knowledge, these philosophers do not raise the further question of why one has 
any present reason to promote the fulfillment of one’s desires for the future, given that 
one may have no reason to promote their fulfillment at the time. See also Amartya Sen, 
“Plural Utility”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1980-1981): 202-204.
27  C. I. Lewis offers many suggestive remarks to the effect that striving and achieving 
have value only as related to each other in a diachronic whole (Analysis of Knowledge and 
Valuation, 498 ff.). As I have noted, however, Lewis’s remarks often rely on the notion that 
the experiences of striving and achieving suffuse one another or add up to an irreducible 
diachronic experience.
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From the perspective of practical reasoning, in which the past is fixed 
but the future remains open, earlier events seem more susceptible to 
retroactive changes of significance. Even after the events of one’s youth 
have occurred, their import for one’s life story remains undetermined, since 
the events from which they will gain significance or to which they will 
lend significance lie primarily in the future. By contrast, the events of one’s 
old age occur in the determinate context of one’s past, with which they 
exchange fixed implications that are unlikely to be significantly modified 
in what remains of one’s life. Thus, one looks forward to a lifetime in which 
to redeem one’s youth, but confronts events of middle age as having a 
single, determinate significance once and for all. 
The result is, not that later events are more important, but that one sees 
less latitude for arranging them within the requirement of a good life. By 
middle age, one finds oneself composing the climax to a particular story 
— a story that is now determinate enough to be spoiled. Virtually any 
beginning might have been the beginning of a good life; but given one’s 
actual beginnings, there may now be only a few good ways of going on.28 
Because one will confront one’s prime with relatively narrow criteria of 
success, one is required to devote more care to planning it and to ensuring 
that it turns out as planned. The extraordinary attention paid to this stage in 
life may be misinterpreted as indicating that it is more important — that the 
events of middle age contribute more to a life’s value than events at other 
stages. The reason for paying more attention to one’s prime, however, is 
not that the possibilities at middle age are worth more than at other stages 
but rather that, in relation to a fixed youth, fewer of the possibilities will 
result in a life that’s any good at all. 
My account of the value judgments canvassed above amounts to the claim 
that the value of one’s life is what might be called a strongly irreducible 
second-order good.29 A second-order good is a valuable state of affairs 
consisting in some fact about other goods. Of course, corresponding to 
28  Subsequently, such constraints may relax to some extent, since the events of one’s 
retirement may be less intimately related to the other events in one’s life than those 
occurring at the culmination of one’s active career. A life story that has only one fitting 
climax may have more than one fitting denouement.
29  As Michael Stocker points out, the value of a life is what G. E. Moore would have called 
an “organic whole” (Plural and Conflicting Values [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990], 
pp. 300-302, 323).
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every good that someone might attain is the potential fact of his having 
thereby attained something good; and his having attained something good 
would undeniably be a good state of affairs consisting in a fact about other 
goods. There is therefore a second-order good corresponding to every 
attainable good of the first order. But such a second-order good is reducible 
to the first-order good implicated in it, in the sense that it has no value over 
and above that of the implicated first-order good. That is, when someone 
attains a good, he is not enriched by its value plus some additional value 
attaching to the fact of his having thereby attained something good. If he 
were, then he would be infinitely enriched, since the second-order good 
would generate a good of the third order, and so on ad infinitum. 
In order for a second-order good to be irreducible, it must at least 
possess value over and above that of its component first-order goods. 
A possible example of such a good in the realm of social value is that 
of a just distribution of benefits. Some people think that there can be 
value in redistributing benefits among the members of a society even if 
the redistribution doesn’t increase the total amount of good accruing to 
individuals. This thought implies that the resulting distribution has a value 
over and above that of the goods being distributed, and hence that the new 
distribution is an irreducible second-order good. 
There is yet a stronger form of irreducibility that may or may not 
attach to a second-order good whose value is additional to that of its 
components. Consider two possible views about the second-order value of 
a just distribution. On the one hand, we might judge that a distribution of 
individual benefits has a second-order value that depends entirely on the 
proportions among the shares of benefits distributed; on the other hand, we 
might judge that the justice of a distribution, and hence its value, depends 
on whether individuals deserve their shares by dint of their actions or 
characters. The first view implies that the value of a just distribution, 
though additional to that of the benefits distributed, can still be computed 
from the amounts in which those benefits are distributed. The view thus 
implies that facts about second-order value are still, in a sense, reducible 
to facts about mere quantities of first-order goods. By contrast, the second 
view implies that no facts about quantities of first-order goods can fully 
determine the facts about second-order value, since the latter also depend 
on facts about the conduct and characters of individuals. The second view 
thus implies that the second-order value of a just distribution is irreducible 
in a stronger sense. 
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The existence of second-order goods that are irreducible in either sense 
entails the existence of more than one dimension of value. If social justice 
is an irreducible second-order good, for example, then there must be a 
dimension of value other than total individual welfare — a dimension of 
social value, as it might be called — along which value can be produced 
even while total individual welfare remains constant. 
In the case of distributing benefits among the periods in someone’s 
life, however, the corresponding implication may initially seem odd. 
If we regard a particular temporal distribution of well-being as having 
irreducible second-order value for a person, we would seem committed 
to claiming that its value lies along a dimension distinct from that of total 
individual well-being, since we shall have said that value can be produced 
by a redistribution that leaves total well-being constant. Yet the distribution 
in question is supposed to be good specifically for the person, and so its 
value would seem to lie along the dimension of individual well-being rather 
than along any alternative dimension. We are therefore confronted with 
a puzzle. If a temporal redistribution of benefits produces no additional 
benefits for the person, how can it be beneficial to him? How can a person 
be better off under an arrangement that affords him no additional benefits? 
The answer to this question is that the value of a temporal distribution 
of benefits needn’t lie along a dimension of value distinct from that of 
individual well-being; its dimension of value must be distinct only from 
that of momentary individual well-being, since momentary benefits are the 
benefits whose total remains constant under the envisioned redistribution. 
Thus, regarding a temporal distribution of benefits as an irreducible 
second-order good requires the assumption that a person’s well-being has 
both a synchronic and a diachronic dimension. The value of someone’s life 
lies along the dimension of diachronic welfare, which is distinct from, and 
irreducible to, how well off he is at each moment therein. 
Here we find, in a new guise, the value judgment with which I began 
— namely, that two lives containing equal sums of momentary well-
being need not be equally good lives if their momentary benefits stand in 
different temporal or, more generally, different narrative relations. We can 
now see what this intuitive judgment implies: it implies that self-interest is 
not a unitary dimension of value. Rather, a person has two distinct sets of 
interests, lying along two distinct dimensions — his synchronic interests in 
being well off at particular moments, and his diachronic interests in having 
good periods of time and, in particular, a good life. 
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Although Slote regards a life’s value as weakly irreducible, he doesn’t 
regard it as irreducible in the stronger sense.30 Slote analyzes the values 
of lives in terms of weights assigned to momentary goods in accordance 
with the time of their occurrence. He says that some periods of life are 
more important than others, and hence that the goods and evils occurring 
in those periods are accorded greater weight when the value of a life is 
computed. His view therefore amounts to the claim that facts about the 
value of a life can be reduced to facts about the amounts and temporal 
order of the momentary benefits enjoyed therein — in short, to facts about 
temporal patterns of momentary benefits. 
In my view, however, the facts about a life’s value are not even 
reducible to this extent. Some of the value judgments considered above are 
incompatible with any reduction of diachronic well-being to synchronic 
well-being, no matter how sophisticated an algorithm of discounting and 
weighting is applied. Because an event’s contribution to the value of one’s 
life depends on its narrative relation to other events, a life’s value can never 
be computed by an algorithm applied to bare amounts of momentary well-
being, or even to ordered sequences of such amounts, in abstraction from 
the narrative significance of the events with which they are associated. 
How the value of one’s life is affected by a period of failure combined 
with a period of success, for example, cannot be computed merely from 
the timing of these periods and the amounts of well-being they contain. 
Their impact on the value of one’s life depends as well on the narrative 
relations among the successes and failures involved. Were one’s travails 
in the political wilderness ended by ascent to high office? or were they 
ended by a lucky ticket in the lottery and a round-the-world cruise? Was 
one’s perseverance through rocky times vindicated or discredited by the 
particular way in which one eventually attained domestic happiness? Our 
evaluative intuitions about the importance of learning from misfortunes, 
or of salvaging one’s projects, thus imply that the value of a life is more 
strongly irreducible than Slote suggests. 
30  The same goes for Bigelow, Campbell, and Pargetter, who argue that the value of 
someone’s life supervenes on the pattern of his momentary well-being through time. 
They say, “Surely if two people have had the same temporal well-being at all times of 
their life-spans of equal length, they are to be seen to have had equal global well-being” 
(“Death and Well-Being”, p. 137). I say: Surely not. For if one person’s later good fortune 
redeemed his earlier sufferings and the other’s did not, the value of their lives might well 
differ.
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The degree of irreducibility between second- and first-order goods 
determines the degree of independence between the corresponding 
dimensions of value. If we analyze the second-order value attaching to 
different patterns of benefits in terms of weights attached to those benefits, 
we shall continue to regard diachronic well-being as reducible to synchronic 
well-being, albeit by means of a time-weighted algorithm. The implication 
will therefore remain that the greater weight attached to some goods and 
evils, because of their occurring at important times, can be offset by a 
greater amount of goods and evils occurring at times of less importance. 
The second-order value of a benefit’s timing will thus be conceived as 
exchangeable for a greater amount of that or any other first-order benefit. 
Thus, if the problem with a downward trend in well-being were that 
more importance attached to what happens in one’s prime, then there 
would have to be some amount of childhood happiness that was sufficient 
to compensate for midlife misfortunes even after the appropriate weights 
had been applied. Childhood well-being would still amount to so much 
credit earned toward a good life, even if that credit was computed at a 
discounted rate. Hence a life that took a slide would still be a good one if it 
started from a sufficient height. 
If we suppose, however, that the second-order value of a life is simply 
not computable from the amounts and temporal order of the momentary 
benefits that it contains, then we must conclude that some second-order 
goods may not be exchangeable for goods of the first order (and vice 
versa). That is, there may be some undesirable turns of plot whose disvalue 
simply cannot be offset by greater amounts of momentary well-being 
in the associated prelude or denouement. I find this implication more 
consonant with our evaluative intuitions than the implications of Slote’s 
view. It explains why we think that the value of someone’s life remains 
almost entirely undetermined even after he has passed an especially happy 
or unhappy childhood; and why we are inclined to perceive some wisdom 
in Solon’s refusal to declare Croesus happy without knowing how his life 
would ultimately turn out.31 
I therefore favor the principle that a person’s self-interest is radically 
divided, in the sense that he has an interest in features of his life that 
31  Herodotus, I. 30-33. This story is cited by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics I.x. 1-2), whose 
final definition of happiness (at I.x. 15) also betrays an inclination to agree with Solon to 
some extent.
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aren’t at all reducible to, and hence cannot be exchanged with, patterns of 
momentary well-being. Let me briefly suggest two possible applications 
for this principle. 
First, I think that this principle, if correct, justifies a revision in the 
philosophical conception of prudence and imprudence.32 Imprudence has 
traditionally been conceived as an irrational preference for momentary 
goods that are closer in time, and prudence as a rational indifference 
toward the timing of such goods. Prudence and imprudence have thus 
been conceived as dispositions to value momentary goods differently. In 
my view, however, we should consider the hypothesis that imprudence 
is rather an undue concern for momentary goods altogether, and 
prudence, a rational appreciation for the second-order value of a good 
life — a disposition that cannot be constituted out of any appreciation for 
patterns of momentary goods. According to this hypothesis, a person can 
be imprudent no matter how carefully he balances momentary goods of 
the present against those of the future if he does so without regard to the 
value of the resulting life, a value not reducible to temporal distributions of 
momentary goods; and a person can be prudent even if he pursues present 
benefits at the expense of future benefits, so long as the value of his life is 
thereby enhanced. Preferring the lesser but nearer good to that which is 
greater but more remote may sometimes be the prudent thing to do, if done 
in the service of one’s irreducible second-order interest in a good life. 
A second application for the principle of divided self-interest has to do 
with the evil of death. A prevalent view about death is that it is bad for a 
person if, but only if, his continued survival would add to his accumulation 
of momentary well-being. The choice between heroic medical treatment and 
passive euthanasia is therefore frequently said to require so-called quality-
of-life considerations. Whether days should be added to or subtracted from 
a patient’s life is to be judged, according to the prevalent view, by whether 
the days in question would be spent in a state of well-being or hardship.33 
32  Some philosophers seem to regard ‘prudence’ as synonymous with ‘self-interested 
rationality’ or ‘practical wisdom’. In this paragraph I am discussing prudence in a 
narrower sense, in which it denotes a specific aspect of practical wisdom — namely, a 
rational attitude toward the future.
33  For a clear presentation of this view, see Fred Feldman, “Some Puzzles About the Evil of 
Death”, The Philosophical Review 100 (1991): 225-227. Feldman’s own view on the matter 
may not correspond to the view that he presents in this paper, since the paper adopts a 
simplistically additive hedonism merely for the sake of arguing with Epicureans. What 
Feldman does believe is that the evil of a particular death must be computed as the 
difference between the value of the actual life in which it occurs and that of the same 
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In my view, however, deciding when to die is not (despite the familiar 
saying) like deciding when to cash in one’s chips — not, that is, a decision to 
be based on the incremental gains and losses that one stands to accumulate 
by staying in the game. It is rather like deciding when and how to end a 
story, a decision that cannot be dictated by considerations of momentary 
well-being. Hence a person may rationally be willing to die even though 
he can look forward to a few more good weeks or months;34 and a person 
may rationally be unwilling to die even though he can look forward only 
to continued adversity. The rationality of the patient’s attitude depends on 
whether an earlier or later death would make a better ending to his life story. 
Thus far I have presupposed a prior understanding of what it is to be well-
off at a particular moment, and I have argued that the value of a person’s 
life is not reducible to his momentary well-being, so understood. The 
reader might be moved to object, however, that I am not entitled to my 
initial presupposition. One might think that the only legitimate conception 
of a person’s well-being is that of his life’s value, and that any conception of 
his well-being at a particular moment must therefore be illegitimate insofar 
as it fails to capture the portion of his life’s value being realized at that 
moment. 
I shall argue against this suggestion on grounds more theoretical than 
those of my previous arguments. First I shall offer a more theoretical 
explanation of why a person’s momentary well-being might fail to be 
additive. The reason, I shall claim, is that a person’s well-being at each 
moment is defined from the perspective of that moment, and values defined 
from different perspectives cannot necessarily be added together. This 
explanation will prompt the suggestion that the successive perspectives 
defining momentary well-being simply distort the true values of things, 
which are properly defined from the comprehensive perspective of an 
entire life. I shall then argue against this suggestion, by defending the 
independent validity of momentary perspectives. Finally, I shall explore 
some further implications of these theoretical results. 
life in the nearest possible world in which the death doesn’t occur. I do not in general 
accept this method of computing the value of events in someone’s life, since I believe 
that events have a momentary value that’s distinct from their contribution to the value of 
the subject’s life as a whole. Since death has no momentary disvalue, however, my view 
about it coincides with Feldman’s. I discuss this subject further below.
34  Griffin expresses doubts about this view in n. 33, p. 355, of Well-Being.
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That momentary well-being might not add up should come as no surprise: 
values are rarely additive. Notoriously, the value of two things together 
need not be the sum of their individual values.35 The value of having two 
egg rolls on one’s plate is less than the sum of the values of having one or 
the other of them; and the value of having one egg roll and a dollop of plum 
sauce is more than the sum of the values of having either an egg roll or plum 
sauce alone. To be sure, the value of having two egg rolls is indeed the sum 
of their marginal values: marginal values are additive. But marginal values 
are additive only because they are defined by decomposition of total value, 
to begin with. That is, the marginal value of one’s second egg roll is defined 
as the amount by which its acquisition increases one’s total well-being; and 
this definition guarantees that the acquisition of a second egg roll increases 
one’s well-being by the addition of its marginal value. The point previously 
made by saying that the values of egg rolls aren’t additive can then be made 
by saying that the marginal values of two successive egg rolls aren’t the 
same. 
Of course, what’s currently at issue is not additivity in the value of some 
commodity such as food but additivity in well-being itself. The question 
is not whether two egg rolls are twice as good as one but whether being 
well-off at two different times is twice as good as being well-off at one time. 
And we might have thought that although successive helpings of food can 
vary in their impact on one’s well-being, and hence in their marginal value, 
successive helpings of well-being cannot. 
This thought might have been correct if the helpings in question were 
defined in relation to the same context of evaluation. But since helpings of 
momentary well-being are defined in relation to different contexts, they 
aren’t additive at all. Let me explain. 
The reason why the marginal value of successive egg rolls varies is that 
the value of acquiring an egg roll depends on the context in which the 
acquisition occurs. One’s second egg roll is worth less than the first because 
it is acquired in the context of one’s already having the first. Of course, 
once the second egg roll is assigned a marginal value, that value needn’t 
be further adjusted because of its being acquired in the context of the well-
being that’s already, so to speak, on one’s plate; the egg roll’s marginal 
value already reflects the only adjustment necessitated by the context. 
35  See Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 36, 144-146.
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Nevertheless, we often restrict the context in which judgments of value 
are made. For example, we make distinct assessments of how well-off 
someone is in different respects — assessments of his financial well-being, 
say, or his emotional well-being, and so on. And such evaluations are made 
within restricted contexts. An assessment of someone’s financial well-being 
may take account of the diminishing marginal value of dollars:36 his second 
million needn’t be thought to make him twice as well-off, financially 
speaking, as the first. But our assessment of someone’s financial well-being 
does not take account of interactions between his finances and other goods. 
The impact of a million dollars on someone’s overall well-being may depend 
not only on how much wealth he already has but also on his emotional state 
or his health. But the potential interactions between wealth and these other 
goods are screened off from assessments of specifically financial well-being. 
Two people with equal assets and liabilities (and, perhaps, similar attitudes 
toward money) are judged to be equally well-off, financially speaking, even 
if those assets and liabilities affect their overall welfare differently by virtue 
of their differing emotional or physical circumstances.37 
Consequently, we cannot compute a person’s overall well-being at 
a particular moment by adding up his concurrent financial well-being, 
emotional well-being, physical well-being, and so on. The problem is not 
simply that we don’t know how to commensurate among wealth, health, 
and sanity — that is, how to bring these commodities under a common 
unit of value for the purposes of addition and subtraction. The problem 
is that such restricted assessments of well-being are made in isolation 
from potential interactions among the goods involved. Our assessment 
of the person’s financial well-being doesn’t reflect how his emotional 
and physical circumstances affect the marginal value of his wealth; our 
assessment of his emotional well-being doesn’t reflect how his physical 
and financial circumstances affect the marginal value of his sanity; and so 
forth. Thus, even if we could establish an equivalence of value between a 
36  In speaking of financial well-being, of course, I am assuming that wealth has intrinsic 
value for a person. Nothing in my argument depends on this assumption. Emotional, 
social, or physical well-being can be substituted in my arguments, mutatis mutandis, for 
financial well-being.
37  Assessments of emotional, physical, and professional well-being thus involve what 
Sen would call “informational constraints” — that is, constraints on which sorts of 
information are relevant. In Sen’s terms, the reason why people with equivalent financial 
holdings have the same level of financial well-being is that they belong to the same 
“isoinformation set” as defined by the applicable informational constraint. See “Moral 
Information”, the first lecture in “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom”, pp. 169-184.
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helping of financial well-being and a helping of physical well-being, we 
wouldn’t have established that the combination of the two was worth twice 
as much as either one alone, since our measures of financial and physical 
well-being would not reflect potential interactions between the values of 
the underlying commodities. 
We can easily forget this limitation on evaluative calculations if we 
imagine value itself to be a commodity. If we picture financial well-being 
as an elixir distilled from piles of money, we shall think of it as having an 
independent existence; and we shall then be inclined to think that when 
financial well-being is added to the values distilled from physical health 
or emotional stability, the resulting brew must simply be the sum of its 
ingredients. But an amount of financial well-being is not a quantity of stuff; 
it is rather a property of one’s financial state. Indeed, it’s a property that 
one’s financial state possesses only in relation to other possible financial 
states, just as one’s overall well-being at a particular moment is a relation 
of one’s overall state to the other states that one might be in. And there is 
no reason to assume that the relation of one’s overall state to its possible 
alternatives can be computed from the relations of its parts or aspects to 
theirs. 
The problem of compounding values is analogous, in many respects, to 
problems in the compounding of chances. Notoriously, the probability of 
a person’s having the trait p or q is not necessarily equal to the probability 
of having p plus that of having q, since the latter probabilities may not be 
independent; and for the same reason, the probability of having the trait p 
and q is not necessarily equal to the product of the probabilities of having 
the component traits. Consequently, we cannot estimate how unusual a 
person is by compounding the degrees to which he is physically unusual, 
psychologically unusual, socially unusual, and so on. The product of these 
probabilities may not reflect the extent to which the person possesses 
physical and psychological traits that are individually rare but often 
combined, or vice versa. This computation would therefore count someone 
with red hair and a hot temper as doubly unusual,38 even if these two 
unusual traits tend to go hand in hand; and it would correspondingly 
underestimate the rarity of someone who is both beautiful and modest. 
In estimating how physically unusual a person is, we do take account 
38  For ease of expression, I have chosen to compare probabilities on a logarithmic scale. 
That is, I call p doubly unlikely in relation to q if the probability of p is equal to the 
probability of q squared.
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of interactions among the probabilities of physical traits (red hair and 
freckles); in estimating how psychologically unusual he is, we take account 
of interactions among the probabilities of psychological traits (hot temper 
and romantic passion); but in neither case do we consider interactions 
between physical and psychological probabilities. Because these estimates 
of probability are thus confined to different contexts, they cannot be added 
or multiplied together. 
In short, calculating someone’s overall well-being by adding up his 
physical and emotional welfare is no more appropriate than calculating 
how unusual he is by compounding his physical and emotional quirkiness. 
My view is that momentary well-being lacks additivity for the same reasons. 
Estimates of momentary well-being are made within a restricted context — 
namely, the context of the events and circumstances of the moment. How 
well-off someone is judged to be at one moment doesn’t reflect potential 
interactions between the value of what obtains and happens then and the 
value of earlier or later events. Hence evaluations made in the context of 
one moment cannot be added to evaluations made in the context of another. 
Being well-off on two occasions doesn’t necessarily make a person doubly 
well-off, any more than being both physically and psychologically unusual 
makes him doubly unusual.39 
Again, we shall tend to forget this limitation on evaluative calculations 
if we imagine an amount of momentary well-being as a quantity of stuff, 
derived from the facts of the moment but then having an independent 
existence of its own. In reality, one’s well-being at each moment is a relation 
between the facts of the moment and alternative possibilities; and there is 
no reason to assume that the relations of successive facts to their alternatives 
determine the relation of the entire succession to its alternatives. 
My claim that momentary well-being is assessed from a restricted perspective 
might seem to undermine my earlier claim that a person’s self-interest is 
divided. Doesn’t my latest argument show that a person’s synchronic 
interests are divided from his diachronic interests only in the sense that 
his financial interests, say, are divided from his interests as a whole? Either 
division, one might think, is merely an artifact of the restrictions placed on 
the context in which synchronic or financial interests are assessed: a person’s 
interests, comprehensively considered, are still unified. 
39  See the preceding note.
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Although I agree that the division between synchronic and diachronic 
interests results from the difference between the perspectives from which 
they are assessed, I hesitate to assume that the more comprehensive 
of these perspectives has exclusive authority. In the case of a person’s 
financial interests, of course, I am inclined to say that insofar as they 
diverge from his interests overall, they should be regarded as a figment 
of a restricted perspective and should be ignored. Although a person can 
limit his attention and concern to financial matters from time to time, the 
resulting value judgments, even if correct, have no independent authority 
on which to stand in competition with more comprehensive judgments of 
his interests. 
A person’s synchronic interests, however, strike me as having an 
independent claim that is not necessarily overridden by that of his 
diachronic interests. The reason, I think, is that a person himself has both 
a synchronic and a diachronic identity. The perspectives from which 
synchronic interests are assessed, unlike the financial perspective, are not 
optional points of view that a person may or may not adopt from time 
to time. They are perspectives that a person necessarily inhabits as he 
proceeds through life, perspectives that are partly definitive of who he is. 
An essential and significant feature of persons is that they are creatures 
who naturally live their lives from the successive viewpoints of individual 
moments as well as from a comprehensive, diachronic point of view. 
To think that the more comprehensive of these perspectives must 
have greater authority is, I believe, to mistake how perspectives bear on 
questions of relational value. When we choose between competing theories 
about one and the same phenomenon, the more comprehensive theory 
may be preferable, other things being equal. But the different perspectives 
currently in play aren’t competing theories about the same phenomenon: 
they’re partly constitutive of different phenomena — that is, different modes 
of relational value. Because well-being is a relational value, it is constituted, 
in part, by a point of view — namely, the point of view inhabited by the 
creature whose well-being is in question. What’s good for that creature, in 
particular, depends on what point of view it inhabits by virtue of being the 
particular creature it is. 
Thus, although the perspective of a particular creature is less 
comprehensive than that of the entire universe, evaluations relative to the 
creature’s perspective aren’t any less authoritative than those relative to 
the universe’s point of view. Evaluations relative to a particular creature’s 
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perspective are authoritative about what’s good for that creature; and 
what’s good for a particular creature is really and truly good for that 
creature, even if it isn’t good for the universe. These two perspectives aren’t 
two competing theories about one and the same mode of value; they’re 
constitutive of two different modes of value. 
Similarly, evaluations from the perspective of a single moment in 
someone’s life needn’t be less authoritative than those which are relative 
to the perspective of his life as a whole. Both are judgments of relational 
value, which is constituted in either case by a particular point of view; and 
evaluations relative to either point of view are authoritative about what’s 
good from that point of view. 
The question, then, is not whether what’s good from the perspective of 
a moment in someone’s life is really good, since it really is good from that 
perspective. The question is rather whether the perspective in question has a 
subject — whether there really is a creature whose perspective it is and who 
therefore is the subject of the values it constitutes. To this latter question, I 
think, the answer is yes. By virtue of being who you are, you unavoidably 
occupy successive momentary viewpoints as well as a diachronic one; and 
just as what’s good from the latter viewpoint is good for you as protagonist 
of an ongoing life, so what’s good from the former viewpoints is good for 
you as subject of successive moments within that life.40 
Note that in arguing for the validity of synchronic perspectives, I am 
not defending or attacking any thesis about time preferences.41 I am not 
trying to show that one is entitled to take a greater interest in the present 
moment than in other moments in one’s life. In my view, no one momentary 
40  This argument is in the same spirit as the following remarks of Thomas Nagel’s: “Human 
beings are subject to … motivational claims of very different kinds. This is because they 
are complex creatures who can view the world from many perspectives … and each 
perspective presents a different set of claims. Conflict can exist within one of these sets, 
and it may be hard to resolve. But when conflict occurs between them, the problem is 
still more difficult. …[Such conflicts] cannot, in my view, be resolved by subsuming 
either of the points of view under the other, or both under a third. Nor can we simply 
abandon any of them. There is no reason why we should. The capacity to view the world 
simultaneously from [different points of view] is one of the marks of humanity” (“The 
Fragmentation of Value”, in Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979], p. 134). (Here I have made strategic deletions from Nagel’s remarks in a way that 
may exaggerate their similarity to my view.)
41  I am therefore making a somewhat different point from one made by Bernard Williams. 
When Williams says, “The correct perspective on one’s life is from now”, he is criticizing 
the principle that one should “distribute consideration equally over [one’s] whole life” 
(“Persons, Character and Morality”, in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty [Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1976], pp. 206, 209).
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perspective takes precedence over any other. My brief is on behalf of 
all momentary perspectives equally, against the assumption that their 
deliverances are to be overridden by those of the diachronic perspective 
that subsumes them. I am trying to show that the value something has 
for someone in the restricted context of a single moment in his life is a 
value that genuinely accrues to him as the subject of that moment, even if 
interactions with events at other times result in its delivering a different 
value to him in his capacity as the protagonist of an entire life. The good 
that something does you now is not just the phantom of a restricted method 
of accounting; it’s an autonomous mode of value. 
If I am right about the autonomy of synchronic interests, then a person’s 
well-being at a particular moment cannot be computed from the fraction 
of his life’s value being realized at the time, any more than the value of the 
whole can be computed from the values of its parts. To assess the benefits 
that someone is currently receiving in terms of their share in the value of 
his life would be to evaluate everything in the more comprehensive context. 
Such a method of evaluation might be appropriate for Tralfamadorians, 
who don’t live one moment at a time,42 but it isn’t appropriate for human 
beings. Just as evaluating a life by adding up the values of its component 
moments entails neglecting the perspective that encompasses the unity 
of those moments, so evaluating moments in a life by dividing up the 
value of the whole entails neglecting the perspectives that preserve their 
individuality. Each moment in a life is, momentarily, the present. And for a 
human being, the present is not just an excerpt from a continuing story, any 
more than the story is just a concatenation of moments.43 
What if a creature cannot adopt a perspective that encompasses a particular 
combination of goods? How then do we assess what value the combination 
has for him or how the values of its components interact? 
Consider a nonhuman animal such as a cow or a pig. I assume that a 
cow cannot conceive of itself as a persisting individual and consequently 
42  Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Slaughterhouse-Five or, The Children’s Crusade: A Duty-Dance with 
Death (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), p. 23: “The Tralfamadorians can look at all 
the different moments just the way we can look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains. 
… They can see how permanent all the moments are, and they can look at any moment 
that interests them. It is just an illusion we have here on Earth that one moment follows 
another one….”
43  C. I. Lewis also defends the autonomy of momentary value (Analysis of Knowledge and 
Valuation, 503 ff.). Again, Lewis’s argument is based on an experiential conception of 
value.
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cannot conceive of itself as enjoying different benefits at different moments 
during its life. What the cow cannot conceive, it cannot care about; and so 
a cow cannot care about which sequences of momentary goods it enjoys. 
The cow cannot care twice as much about faring well at two distinct times 
than it cares about faring well right now — not because it can care only less 
than twice as much, but rather because it cannot care at all, being unable to 
conceive of itself as persisting through a sequence of benefits. 
The upshot is that any judgment we make about the value that a 
particular sequence of benefits has for a cow will bear no relation to how 
the cow would or should or even could feel about that sequence of benefits. 
And this result seems incompatible with even a weak form of internalism 
about value, which would at least rule out the possibility that something 
can be intrinsically good for a subject if he is constitutionally incapable of 
caring about it. I am not sympathetic to stronger versions of internalism, 
which make a thing’s intrinsic value for someone contingent on his being 
disposed to care about it under specified or specifiable conditions; but I am 
inclined to think that unless a subject has the bare capacity, the equipment, 
to care about something under some conditions or other, it cannot be 
intrinsically good for him.44 
Of course, we can adopt yet a weaker form of internalism, which allows 
for intrinsic goods that the subject cannot care about, so long as they are 
compounded out of goods that he can. But this version of internalism will 
be unstable, for two reasons. 
One reason is that this version will commit us to constrain some of our 
judgments about intrinsic relational value within the bounds of internalism 
and yet to make other, similar judgments that exceed the same bounds. If 
we assume that what cannot be of concern to a creature can nevertheless 
have intrinsic value for that creature provided that it is divisible into 
components that can be of concern, then we shall need to adopt some 
method for combining the values of the components. In order to add 
up the momentary goods enjoyed by a cow, for example, we shall have 
to make some assumption about how the values of those goods interact, 
so that we can compute their combined value. And this assumption will 
constitute another judgment of intrinsic relational value. To suppose that 
a cow’s momentary well-being consists in this or that feature of its current 
44  Note that internalism applies only to matters of intrinsic value. Obviously, something 
that’s beyond a person’s powers of comprehension can still be good for him extrinsically, 
since it can be conducive to things that are good for him intrinsically.
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circumstances is one value judgment; but to suppose that the values of 
the cow’s good moments can be combined in this or that way is a further 
value judgment, a judgment to the effect that two moments containing the 
relevant feature are this much or that much better for the cow than one.
Whether we say that one moment of such-and-such a kind is good for 
a cow, or that two such moments are thus-and-so much better for the cow, 
we are making a judgment of intrinsic relational value. Yet the proposed 
version of internalism will say that the validity of the former judgment 
depends on the cow’s ability to care about the object of evaluation, whereas 
the validity of the latter does not. On what grounds can this distinction 
be drawn? Surely, whatever intuitive reasons we have for applying the 
internalist constraint to the first value judgment are likely to be reasons for 
applying it to the second. 
Another, related instability in the resulting view is that it is at odds 
with a fundamental intuition about relational value — namely, that the 
value something has for a particular creature is somehow grounded in 
or determined by that creature’s point of view.45 Insofar as we commit 
ourselves to combining the values accruing to a subject from goods whose 
combinations exceed his comprehension, we shall find ourselves making 
relational value judgments that are not appropriately related to the subject’s 
perspective. There is nothing about the perspective of a cow that supports 
one assumption rather than another about how the value of two momentary 
benefits stands to the value of either benefit alone, given that sequences of 
such benefits are beyond the cow’s ken and thus, as it were, nothing to 
the cow. The combined value would therefore have no claim to represent 
what’s good for the cow, or what’s good from the cow’s perspective.46 
45  Of course, the intuition expressed here may not be independent of that expressed in 
internalism. Indeed, there are some interpretations of internalism according to which the 
two intuitions are one and the same. I separate them here because I regard internalism as 
resting on a rather different intuition. 
46  This point follows most clearly from desire-based conceptions of well-being, which 
will define how valuable different sequences of harms and benefits are for a cow in 
terms of how much the cow wants those sequences, or would want them under some 
ideal conditions. Since a cow cannot care about sequences of harms and benefits, and 
wouldn’t be able to care about them except under conditions that transformed it into 
something other than a cow, these definitions imply that temporal sequences cannot 
be assigned a value specifically for a cow. Although my point thus follows from desire-
based conceptions of relational value, it does not presuppose that relational value is 
desire-based. Judgments of relational value must somehow be relativized to the subject’s 
perspective — if not by being made to depend on the subject’s actual or counterfactual 
desires, then by some other means. And any strategy for relativizing evaluations 
of temporal sequences to the perspective of a cow will run into the same obstacle — 
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Note that this problem is equally acute for all possible assumptions 
about how the cow’s momentary benefits should be combined. Even 
the assumption that two equally good moments in the cow’s life are 
twice as valuable as one presupposes a flat curve of marginal value;47 
and this presupposition has no basis in the cow’s point of view. Such a 
straightforward method of adding benefits may have the advantages 
of simplicity and salience in comparison with other methods, but these 
advantages shouldn’t be mistaken for truth. In respect to truth, any method 
of combining the values of a cow’s good and bad moments will be purely 
arbitrary and consequently defective, insofar as it fails to represent what 
values things have specifically for the cow rather than from some other 
perspective. 
I therefore think that we should refuse to combine the momentary 
benefits and harms accruing to a cow; we should conclude, instead, that a 
cow can fare well or ill only at particular moments. Good and bad things 
can befall a cow, but they are good or bad for it only at particular times and 
thus bear only a time-indexed sort of value. There is no timeless dimension 
of value along which the cow progresses by undergoing successive benefits 
and harms. Hence the various benefits accruing to a cow at different 
moments must not add up to anything at all, not even to zero: they must 
simply be unavailable for addition. 
As before, if we imagine the cow’s momentary well-being as a commodity, 
then we shall be puzzled by the claim that amounts of this commodity 
cannot be added together. But once we realize that the cow’s momentary 
well-being is a relation that the cow’s current state bears to other possible 
namely, that the perspective of a cow doesn’t encompass temporal sequences at all. (One 
might think that Peter Railton’s version of the desire-based conception would have the 
resources to circumvent this problem, since it would define what’s good for the cow in 
terms of what an idealized cow would want its actual self to desire [“Moral Realism”, 
The Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 163]. The idealized cow, one might think, could 
acquire the ability to conceive of, and form preferences among, temporal sequences of 
harms and benefits while still doing so on behalf of its cognitively limited and hence 
fully bovine self. This suggestion strikes me as out of keeping with Railton’s theory, for 
various reasons, of which one will suffice for now: The cognitively enhanced cow, once 
fully informed, would realize that its actual self was unable to want temporal sequences 
of harms and benefits, and would therefore not bother wanting its actual self to have any 
such desires.)
47  See Griffin, Well-Being, p. 145: “Even when one does tot up, say, many small-scale 
pleasures to get an overall aggregate value, the value of the life containing these many 
local pleasures is fixed in comparison with competing forms of life, and so the finally 
effective magnitudes are fixed by global desires.” My point is that a cow is incapable of 
having the requisite global desires.
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states, the air of mystery is dispelled. For there is nothing odd about the 
suggestion that a relation obtaining between momentary states of a cow 
cannot obtain between sequences of those states. One moment can be better 
or worse for a cow than another moment, but one sequence of moments 
cannot be better for a cow than another sequence, because a cow cannot 
care about extended periods in its life. This conclusion seems mysterious 
only if we imagine one moment as better for the cow than another by virtue 
of containing more of a special stuff that cannot help but accumulate. 
For a lower animal, then, momentary well-being fails not only of additivity 
but of cumulability by any algorithm at all. Consequently, the totality of 
this subject’s life simply has no value for him, because he cannot care about 
it as such, and because its constituent moments, which he can care about, 
have values that don’t accumulate. 
This conception of a lower animal’s interests is supported, I think, by 
its fruitfulness in accounting for our intuitions about the moral difference 
between killing animals and killing people. For in relation to an animal’s 
interests, as I have now described them, the traditional Epicurean arguments 
about death are correct. That is, there is no moment at which a cow can be 
badly off because of death, since where death is, the cow isn’t; and if there 
is no moment at which a cow is harmed by death, then it cannot be harmed 
by death at all. A premature death doesn’t rob the cow of the chance to 
accumulate more momentary well-being, since momentary well-being isn’t 
cumulable for a cow; nor can a premature death detract from the value of 
the cow’s life as a whole, since a cow has no interest in its life as a whole, 
being unable to care about what sort of life it lives. 
Of course, a person can care about what his life story is like, and a 
premature death can spoil the story of his life. Hence, death can harm a 
person, but it cannot harm a cow.48
48  Here I am not saying that a premature death is bad for a person because he wants or 
would want his life to be longer. Rather, I am saying that because a person can want 
his life to be longer, the judgment that a premature death is bad for him satisfies the 
requirements of internalism. To cite a person’s actual or potential desires as evidence 
that a value judgment is compatible with internalism is one thing; to cite those desires 
as the value judgment’s truth-makers is quite another. These brief remarks on the evil 
of death were inspired by Thomas Nagel’s essay “Death”, in Mortal Questions, pp. 1-10. 
Nagel points out that the Epicurean argument assumes that if death harms its victim, it 
must harm him at a particular time. Nagel argues that this assumption is false. (So does 
Fred Feldman, in “Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death”.) My claim is that although the 
assumption is indeed false in application to persons (which is the application that Nagel 
has in mind), it is true in application to lower animals.

8. So It Goes1
Change presupposes a certain position which I take up and from which I 
see things in procession before me: there are no events without someone 
to whom they happen and whose finite perspective is the basis of their 
individuality. Time presupposes a view of time. It is, therefore, not like 
a river, not a flowing substance. The fact that the metaphor based on this 
comparison has persisted from the time of Heraclitus to our own day is 
explained by our surreptitiously putting into the river a witness of its course. 
… Time is, therefore, not a real process, not an actual succession that I am 
content to record. It arises from my relation to things.
— M. Merleau-Ponty2
I believe that the existence of an enduring self is an illusion and that this 
illusion is the root of the suffering inherent in the human condition. I am not 
1  This chapter was presented as the first Amherst Lecture in Philosophy on March 9, 
2006 and published at http://www.amherstlecture.org/velleman2006/index.html. It 
was reprinted in Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. 
John Perry, Michael Bratman, and John Martin Fischer (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), pp. 371-382. I am grateful to Amherst College; its philosophy department; 
and the department’s then-chair, Alex George, for organizing the lecture series and 
inviting me to inaugurate it. The chapter was also presented to the graduate students 
in philosophy at New York University and to the philosophy departments of Wake 
Forest University, the Graduate Center at The City University of New York, Dartmouth 
College, Georgetown University, the University of Melbourne, Monash University, and 
the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University. The chapter 
was written during my term as a visiting professor in the philosophy department at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. My visit was funded by a grant from the 
Mellon Foundation to Susan Wolf. Some of the ideas were developed in a reading group 
on the metaphysics of time, led by Thomas Hofweber. My thanks go to Susan, Thomas, 
the Mellon Foundation, and the UNC department for a very stimulating semester. For 
comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to John Bigelow, Jay Garfield, Thomas 
Hofweber, Joel Kupperman, Peter Ludlow, and Daniel J. Velleman.
2  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. 411-412.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.08
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a scholar of Buddhism or a practitioner, and this lecture is not an exercise in 
Buddhist studies. I merely want to explore whether this particular Buddhist 
thought can be understood in terms familiar to analytic philosophy. How 
might the illusion of an enduring self lie at the root of human suffering?
One of my reasons for wanting to understand this thought is that it 
challenges an attitude shared by several philosophers who might otherwise 
seem sympathetic to the Buddhist conception of the self. Philosophers as 
diverse as Christine Korsgaard and Daniel Dennett have claimed that the 
self is something that we must invent or construct.3 But these philosophers 
believe that inventing or constructing a self is a wonderful accomplishment 
of which we should be proud, whereas the Buddhists believe that it is a 
tragic mistake that we should try to undo. Can Western philosophers make 
sense of the Buddhist attitude? That’s what I want to know.
One philosopher who professes to embrace the Buddhist attitude is 
Derek Parfit, reflecting on his own neo-Lockean theory of personal identity.4 
Locke argued that our past selves are the people whose experiences we 
remember first-personally. Parfit points out that the experiences of a single 
person in the past might in principle be remembered by more than one 
of us in the present — if, for example, the hemispheres of the person’s 
brain had been transplanted into two different bodies. In that case, there 
would be more than one of us with a claim to a single past self, a situation 
incompatible with the logic of identity. Hence connections of memory do 
not necessarily trace out the career of a single, enduring object, and they are 
unsuited to serve as the integuments of an enduring self.
Parfit suggests that giving up our belief in an enduring self would be 
beneficial. Of the time when he believed in his own endurance, he says, “I 
seemed imprisoned in myself”:5
3  See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, ed. Onora O’Neill (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); idem., “Self-Constitution: Action, Identity, and 
Integrity”, The Locke Lectures, 2002; Daniel C. Dennett, “The Origins of Selves”, Cogito 3 
(1989): 163-173; idem., “The Reality of Selves”, in Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1991), pp. 412-430; idem., “The Self as the Center of Narrative 
Gravity”, in Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, eds. Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. 
Cole, and Dale L. Johnson (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1992), pp. 103-115.
4  One might think that Parfit’s arguments militate not just against the self’s endurance 
but also against its persistence in any sense, including perdurance. (For the difference 
between endurance and perdurance, see below.) But as David Lewis showed, Parfit’s 
arguments do not necessarily militate against perduring selves. (See Lewis, “Survival 
and Identity”, in The Identities of Persons, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty [Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1976], pp. 17-40, reprinted in Philosophical Papers, vol. I 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983], pp. 55-77.)
5  Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 281.
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My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every 
year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, 
the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air.
Parfit elsewhere describes this liberation in less metaphorical terms:6
Egoism, the fear not of near but of distant death, the regret that so much of 
one’s only life should have gone by — these are not, I think, wholly natural 
or instinctive. They are all strengthened by the beliefs about personal 
identity which I have been attacking. If we give up these beliefs, they should 
be weakened.
Parfit explicitly notes the similarity between his view of personal identity 
and that of the Buddhists,7 but he does not directly compare the consolations 
claimed for these views. Such a comparison might have suggested to Parfit 
that he underestimates the revolution in attitude that his view of personal 
identity can produce. For he claims that the consolations of his view can be 
obtained by attending to the philosophical arguments for it,8 whereas the 
Buddhists believe that they can be obtained only through long and arduous 
meditational practice.
I will argue that shedding our belief in an enduring self would have 
consequences far more radical than Parfit has imagined — results that 
cannot be obtained by philosophical argument alone. Breaking out of a 
glass tunnel is not the half of it.
In order to understand how belief in an enduring self could lead to suffering, 
we have to understand the ontological status of the self believed in. What 
exactly would it be for the self to endure?
Metaphysicians have defined two distinct conceptions of how objects 
persist through time.9 Under one conception, objects are extended in time 
as they are extended in space. Just as a single point in space can contain 
only part of an extended object, a spatial part, so a single point in time can 
contain only part of a persisting object, a temporal part. The object fills time 
by having one temporal part after another, just as it fills space by having 
6  Parfit, “Personal Identity”, The Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 27.
7  See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 273, 280, 502-503.
8  Ibid., p. 280.
9  See Sally Haslanger, “Persistence Through Time”, in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, 
ed. Michael J. Loux and Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
pp. 315-354.
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one spatial part next to another. An object that persists through time in this 
way is said to perdure. 
Under the alternative conception, an object’s extension in time is different 
from its extension in space. Whereas only part of an object can be present at 
a single point in space, the object can be wholly present at a single point in 
time. An object that persists through time in this way is said to endure.
But what does it mean to say that the object is wholly present at a single 
point in time?10 To be sure, all of its spatial parts can be present at a single 
instant, but all of its spatial parts are conceived to be simultaneously present 
under the conception of it as perduring, too. And saying that the object is 
wholly present at a single point in time cannot mean that all of its temporal 
parts are present. For how can all of the object’s temporal parts be present 
at a single point in time if the object also exists at other times?
According to some philosophers, saying that an object is wholly present 
at a single point in time means that it does not have temporal parts at all. Yet 
what is to prevent us from considering the object as it is at a single moment 
and then denominating that aspect of it as a temporal part? If the object 
is extended in some dimension such as time, and that dimension is itself 
divisible into smaller and smaller regions, such as hours and minutes and 
seconds, then nothing can prevent us from abstracting temporal parts from 
the object by prescinding from its existence beyond one of those regions. 
The nature of endurance thus appears mysterious. And the suspicion arises 
that we couldn’t possibly believe in an enduring self, because we have no 
coherent idea what it would be for the self to endure.
These brief considerations fall far short of proving that no coherent idea 
of an enduring self can be found. But rather than pursue a coherent idea of 
an enduring self, we should consider the possibility that an incoherent idea 
will do. An incoherent idea will certainly do if the enduring self is just an 
illusion. Maybe if we figure out how such an illusion might arise, we will 
understand the resulting idea, coherent or not.
In my view, the idea of an enduring self arises from the structure of 
experience and experiential memory, just as Locke first suggested.11 When I 
10  The following objections to the traditional conception of endurance are developed more 
fully in Thomas Hofweber and J. David Velleman, “How to Endure”, The Philosophical 
Quarterly 61 (2011): 37-57. These objections would not apply under the theory of time 
known as presentism. I discuss presentism briefly below.
11  This paragraph and the four that follow summarize a lengthy argument presented in my 
“Self to Self”, The Philosophical Review 105 (1996): 39-76; reprinted in Self to Self: Selected 
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remember a past experience, I remember the world as experienced from the 
perspective of a past self. My memory has an egocentric representational 
scheme, centered on the person who originally had the experience 
from which the memory is derived. That person’s standpoint lies at a 
spatiotemporal distance from the present standpoint that I occupy while 
entertaining the memory. But the mind is not especially scrupulous about 
the distinction between the subjects occupying these distinct points of view.
Consider, for example, my memory of blowing out the candles on a 
particular birthday cake in 1957. This memory includes an experiential image 
of a cake and candles as seen by a five-year-old boy. Now, if I invite you to 
imagine that you are that birthday boy, then you will conjure up a similar 
image in your imagination. You might report this thought experiment by 
saying, “I’ve just imagined that I am the birthday boy at David Velleman’s 
fifth birthday party.” The first occurrence of the pronoun ‘I’ in this report 
would of course refer to you, whoever you are: let’s say you’re Jane Doe. 
But what about the second occurrence of ‘I’? Have you imagined that you, 
Jane Doe, are the birthday boy? Surely, you haven’t imagined a bizarre 
scenario in which the five-year-old David Velleman is somehow identical 
with a completely unrelated woman (as we are supposing) named Jane 
Doe. Rather, you have simply imagined being the five-year-old David 
Velleman, by imagining the birthday party as experienced by him.12 You 
have formed an experiential image whose content might be summed up by 
the statement “I am the birthday boy” as uttered in the imagined scene by 
the five-year-old David Velleman — a statement in which ‘I’ would refer 
to him, the one experiencing the scene, rather than you, the one who has 
imagined it.13 When you say, “I’ve imagined that I am the birthday boy,” 
you should be interpreted as saying, “I’ve imagined an experience with 
the content ‘I am the birthday boy’,” or “I’ve imagined ‘I am the birthday 
boy’,” where the first occurrence of ‘I’ refers to you but the second refers 
to him.
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 170-202. See also “The 
Identity Problem”, part 1 of chapter 6 in this volume.
12  This point was made by Bernard Williams in “Imagination and the Self”, in Problems of 
the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
pp. 26-45. I discuss Williams’s paper in “Self to Self”.
13  The second ‘I’ functions as what Héctor-Neri Castañeda called a quasi-indicator — a 
pronoun in indirect discourse that takes the place of what was a first-personal pronoun 
in direct discourse. For an explanation of quasi-indicators (clearer than Castañeda’s), 
see John Perry, “Belief and Acceptance”, in The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other 
Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 53-68.
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What then of my experiential memory? When I say, “I remember that I 
was the birthday boy,” I am making a report similar to yours. That is, I am 
reporting an experiential memory whose content would be expressed by 
the statement “I am the birthday boy” as uttered in the remembered scene 
by the five-year-old who experienced it. But whereas you may be aware 
that you haven’t imagined the birthday boy’s being you, Jane Doe, I am 
strongly inclined to think that I have remembered his being me, the present 
subject of this memory.14 I thereby conflate my remembering self with the 
self of the experience remembered. When I say, “I remember that I was 
the birthday boy,” I take myself to be referring twice to my present self. I 
who remember the experience and the “I” of the experience thus become 
superimposed, so that a single self appears to be present in both.
The selves superimposed in this appearance are two momentary 
subjects: I in my present capacity as the subject of memory, existing just in 
the moment of remembering; and the “I” of the remembered experience, 
who existed just in the moment of the experience. In either case, I am 
conceived as wholly present at a single point in time, either as me-here-
and-now, entertaining the memory, or as “me”-there-and-then, having 
the experience. Superimposing one of these momentary subjects on the 
other yields the illusion that they are numerically identical — that the 
subject whose existence was complete in the moment of the experience 
14  But isn’t it a contingent truth-condition of my memory that the remembered experience 
has been undergone by me rather than someone else? And if so, how can the second ‘I’ in 
“I remember that I was the birthday boy” refer merely to the subject of the remembered 
experience, who necessarily did undergo it, if anyone did? The answer is that the 
memory refers to the subject of the remembered experience indexically, pointing to him 
at the perspectival point of origin in the remembered experience, by pointing to him at 
the corresponding point in my memory-image, which purports to be a copy derived 
from that experience. If the image is indeed a copy derived from an experience, as it 
purports to be, then indexical reference to the “me” of that experience succeeds, and his 
being the birthday boy is what I veridically remember; if the image is not copied from 
an experience, then its indexical reference to the “me” of that experience fails — it refers 
to no one at all — and the memory is illusory. In order for the memory to be veridical, 
then, the remembered experience must have been undergone by me in the sense that its 
subject must be accessible to indexical reference as “me”.
Of course, your image of being my five-year-old self also refers to the birthday boy 
as “me”, but not in the same, genuinely indexical way. In conjuring up this image, you 
had to stipulate that its point of origin is occupied by the five-year-old David Velleman, 
thus referring to him by name before you could go on to think of him as “me”. In 
remembering the experience, I can refer to him as “me” directly, without any stipulation 
about whom the pronoun refers to, relying on the causal history of my image to secure 
my reference to the original subject. That is the sense in which I have first-personal 
access to him whereas you do not. (For further discussion of this issue, see “Self to Self” 
and “The Identity Problem”.)
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remembered was one and the same as the subject whose existence is 
complete in the moment of remembering. This appearance is already 
incoherent if one and the same thing cannot have its existence confined 
to each of two different moments. The incoherence is compounded by the 
thought that this momentary subject has persisted through the interval 
between the original experience and the memory, existing in its entirety at 
each intervening moment.15
The same effect is produced by experiential anticipation, in which I 
prefigure a future experience from the perspective that I expect to occupy 
in it. A single self appears to have its full existence both now and later, 
because I who anticipate the experience and the “I” of the anticipated 
experience become superimposed.
For a spatial analog of the resulting idea, think of the scene in which 
Woody Allen plays a spermatozoon about to be launched from the loins of 
… Woody Allen.16 In reality, of course, a person occupies different points in 
space with different parts of himself, none of which is identical to any other 
part or to the person as a whole. We might say, then, that a person pervades 
space. In this scene, however, Woody Allen occupies different points in 
space with a smaller self that plays the role of each spatial part of his own 
body. We might say, then, that he invades space rather than pervading it. 
Incoherent, to say the least. Yet experiential memory leads me to think 
that my own temporal extension is composed of a single momentary self 
playing the role of each temporal part of my existence.
I am tempted to say that all of my temporal parts are present at a single 
point in time because I tend to think of myself as my present self — a 
momentary subject whose existence is indeed complete in the here-and-
now. I am tempted to say that I nevertheless persist through time because I 
tend to think of this self, complete in the moment, as nevertheless existing 
at other moments. And because I therefore conceive of each moment in my 
15  I find indirect evidence for these claims about autobiographical memory in the 
experience of reading truly gifted autobiographical novelists, such as Laura Ingalls 
Wilder (Little House on the Prairie) or Elspeth Huxley (The Flame Trees of Thika). These 
authors were able to depict past experience as it was registered by the childish minds 
of their younger selves. Reading their work, I am struck by the contrast with my own 
childhood memories, in which the psychological distance between the mind that stored 
a memory and the mind that retrieves it is foreshortened, so that past experience seems 
to have been registered by my current, adult consciousness — the remembering “I”, who 
has been superimposed on the “I” remembered.
16  In Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex* But Were Afraid to Ask, dir. Woody 
Allen, Rollins-Joffe Productions, United Artists, 1972.
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temporal extension as containing my complete self, I am tempted to deny 
that it contains a mere temporal part of me. There I am, all of me, at my fifth 
birthday party; here I am, all of me, remembering that party; there I will be, 
all of me, on my seventy-fifth birthday — as if one and the same momentary 
subject can play the several parts of my five-year-old, sixty-two-year-old, 
and seventy-five-year-old selves. I think of myself as all of me, all the time, 
just as Woody Allen is all Woody Allen in every one of his cells.
What would be the consequences of truly shedding our sense of being 
enduring objects and learning to conceive of ourselves as perduring instead? 
I want to suggest that the existence of an enduring self, if it is indeed an 
illusion, is one of two illusions that go hand-in-hand. A consequence of 
shedding the one illusion would be to shed the other as well. The other 
illusion of which I speak has to do with the nature of time.
The concept of perdurance for objects is most at home in a conception 
of time known as eternalism. According to eternalists, all of the temporal 
facts can be expressed in terms of the temporal relations between events. 
One event can occur earlier or later than another, or simultaneously, and 
it can be closer to or further from the other in time. The relations among 
events as earlier, later, or simultaneous, and closer or further apart, exhaust 
the temporal facts, in the eyes of eternalists: there is no more to time than 
these relations.
The philosopher J. Ellis McTaggart argued that the temporal relations 
among events are not sufficient to satisfy our concept of time, although 
he also argued that the concept is incoherent.17 Temporal relations among 
events do not change, and so McTaggart argued that they cannot account 
for the passage of time — that is, for the way events draw nearer from the 
future, until they occur in the present and, having occurred, recede into the 
past. When we say that a future event is always drawing closer and closer, 
eternalists must understand us as meaning only that the event is nearer 
to our second utterance of the word ‘closer’ than it was to the first. And 
these temporal relations are as they always were and always will be; or, 
rather, they exist timelessly, constituting time itself. The future event that 
we describe as drawing closer and closer not only stands closer to the last 
word of our description than it does to the earlier words; it always has and 
always will stand in those relations, or it stands in them timelessly. Such 
17  J. Ellis McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, Mind 17 (1908): 457-474.
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unchanging relations cannot constitute time, McTaggart argued, because 
time requires change — specifically, the change that consists in an event’s 
approaching from the future, arriving in the present, and receding into the 
past.
Yet the change thus required by our concept of time struck McTaggart 
as paradoxical and hence impossible. An event’s changing from future to 
present to past must unfold in time: the event must be first in the future, 
then in the present, and then again in the past. And having added these 
temporal indices (“first”, “then”, “then again”) to our description of the 
change, we have reverted to an eternalist idiom. We have said that the 
event’s status as a future event occurs first — that is, earlier than its status 
as present and past; that its status as present occurs later than its status as 
future; and that its status as past occurs even later than the other two. Thus, 
in order to complete our description of how time passes, we have been 
forced to describe it once again in terms of those temporal relations which 
never change.
There is a temptation to say, at this point, that what moves is not the 
future or past but the present, or rather the property of being the present, 
which belongs successively to different sets of events. But if we try to 
describe how the property of being present passes from one set of events 
to the next, we will end up saying that it belongs first to one set, then to 
another, and then again to a third, as they occur in succession. We will 
thereupon have said no more than this: that the property of being present 
belongs earlier to some events than to others, always belonging to events 
simultaneously with their occurrence. So in what sense can the present be 
said to move? Every event is present sooner or later, and that fact never 
changes.
One fairly desperate attempt to solve the problem is a theory known as 
presentism. According to presentism, only the present exists; past and 
future are merely tenses modifying facts about the present.18 
Presentism is best explained by an analogy between time and modality. 
Consider the fact that John Kerry might have won the 2004 presidential 
election. We could restate this fact by saying that a Kerry victory occurs 
in a merely possible history, alternative to the one that actually unfolded 
in 2004; but perhaps we wouldn’t then be speaking with metaphysical 
18  In the following paragraphs I have drawn on John Bigelow, “The Passage of Time” (MS). 
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strictness. Perhaps we should acknowledge only one event — Kerry’s loss, 
which actually occurred — plus the subjunctively statable fact, also true 
of actuality, that Kerry might have won instead. According to this view, 
called actualism, there is no Kerry victory that occurs in a realm of mere 
possibility: actual events are the only events there are.19 
Presentism goes one step further, refusing to acknowledge even an event 
of Kerry’s losing the election. For when we describe Kerry’s loss as occurring 
in the past, the presentist claims that we are speaking just as loosely as we 
would in describing his victory as occurring in some alternative possible 
history. The only events there are, according to the presentist, are the ones 
occurring now in actuality. Just as Kerry’s possibly having won is a fact 
about actuality, statable in the subjunctive, so his previously having lost 
is a fact about the present, statable in the past tense. That he might have 
won, and that he did lose, are subjunctive and past-tense facts about the 
actual present, which is all there is for facts to be about. There is no Kerry 
victory occurring in a realm of possibility; and there is not even a Kerry loss 
occurring in a realm of the past.
The presentist claims that his view enables us to represent the passage of 
time. The occurrence of an event entails the fact that it will have occurred, 
and hence that it will later be a matter of past-tense fact. (More precisely, 
the event’s occurrence entails the future-tense fact that there will be a 
past-tense fact of its having occurred.) This entailment is said to represent 
the passage of the event from the present into the past. The occurrence of 
an event is also incompatible with the fact that it wasn’t going to occur, 
and compatible with the fact that it was going to occur. Hence its present 
occurrence entails that it was previously a subject of future-tense facts, 
an entailment that is said to represent its passage from the future into the 
present. Finally, the occurrence of an event is compatible with its being the 
case neither that the event was going to occur nor that it wasn’t going to, 
while nevertheless entailing that the event definitely will have occurred. 
That is, while there previously may have been no fact of the matter whether 
the event would occur, there will later be a determinate fact of its having 
occurred — a constellation of facts that is said to represent how an open 
future gets closed up into a fixed past.20
19  So-called modal realists, such as David Lewis, believe that there are events and things 
inhabiting such a realm, but the intuitions of most philosophers run to the contrary.
20  That there was previously no fact of the matter whether the event would occur, and 
that there will later be a determinate fact of its having occurred, are of course past- and 
future-tense facts about the present, according to presentism. The same goes for all of the 
entailments discussed in this paragraph.
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The presentist also claims that his view enables us to solve our problem 
about the concept of endurance. Just as there is no John Kerry existing in 
an alternative possible history in which he won the election, according to 
presentism, so there is no John Kerry existing in a past in which he lost: all 
there is of John Kerry is the present John Kerry. This person has the past-
tense properties of having existed in 2004 and having lost the election of that 
year, just as he has the subjunctive property that he might have won; but 
the presentist insists that these properties belong to Kerry’s actual present 
self, which is all of him that exists. Hence, the presentist can deny that John 
Kerry perdures, by denying that he has any temporal parts. According to 
presentism, Kerry’s existence is confined to the present.
One drawback of presentism is that it requires the present to bear 
sufficient features to render true not only present-tense facts but all past-
tense facts as well: the present must, as it were, bear witness to all of history.21 
A more serious problem, for my purposes, is that presentism doesn’t really 
solve the problems of endurance and the passage of time. What presentism 
describes is — not a changing prospect in which events approach from the 
future, arrive in the present, and recede into the past — but a single, static 
structure of past-prospective and future-perfect facts, all true of the present. 
Tensed facts about the present entail other tensed facts about the present, 
but nothing moves. Similarly, presentism describes objects as being wholly 
present at every moment of their existence, but only because it describes 
them as existing at only one moment, the present; and so it describes them 
as enduring in only a trivial sense. According to presentism, objects have 
past- and future-tensed properties, but the objects themselves exist only in 
the present, and so they don’t persist at all, much less endure.
Surely, we should hope for a more intuitively satisfying solution to the 
problems of endurance and temporal passage. I think that the solution is 
to recognize that both phenomena are illusions, and that these illusions 
are interdependent. I have already suggested how the illusion of an 
enduring self might arise from the structure of first-personal memory and 
anticipation. I will now suggest that the illusion of an enduring self gives 
rise to another illusion: that of movement with respect to time.
Our difficulty in characterizing such movement was that, when we tried 
to identify something toward which a future event draws nearer or from 
21  For this objection, see Simon Keller, “Presentism and Truthmaking”, in Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics, vol. I, ed. Dean W. Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 
83-106 (cited by Bigelow).
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which a past event recedes, we focused our attention on other events. Yet 
each event depends for its identity on when it occurs: it could not be closer 
to a future event, or further from a past event, without occupying a different 
temporal position and hence being a different event. This conception of the 
problem suggests the solution. Whatever the future draws nearer to, or the 
past recedes from, must be something that can exist at different positions in 
time with its identity intact. And we have already found such a thing — or 
the illusion of one, at least — in the form of the enduring self.
Suppose that I endure in the admittedly incoherent sense that is 
suggested by experiential memory and anticipation. In that case, I exist in 
my entirety at successive moments in time, thereby moving in my entirety 
with respect to events. As I move through time, future events draw nearer 
to me and past events recede. Time truly passes, in the sense that it passes 
me.
If I merely perdure, however, then I do not move with respect to time. 
I extend through time with newer and newer temporal parts, but all of my 
parts remain stationary. A perduring self can be compared to a process, 
such as the performance of a symphony. The performance doesn’t move 
with respect to time; it merely extends newer and newer temporal parts to 
fill each successive moment. The last note of the performance is of course 
closer to midnight than the first, but we wouldn’t say that midnight and 
the performance move closer together. Midnight is separated from the 
performance by a timelessly fixed but extremely vague interval, which can 
be made precise only with respect to particular parts of the performance — 
the first note, the second note, the third note — each of which is separated 
from midnight by an interval that is also timelessly fixed. Similarly, we 
wouldn’t say that the ceiling and I get closer together from my feet to my 
head. The ceiling stands above me at a fixed but vague distance, which can 
be made precise only with respect to particular parts of me — feet, waist, 
head — each of which is separated from it by a fixed distance.
But if I am an enduring thing, then midnight and I get closer together, 
and not just in the sense that I extend temporal parts closer to it than my 
earlier parts. I don’t just extend from a 9:00 p.m. stage to a 10:00 p.m. stage 
that is closer to midnight, as I extend from my feet to a head that is closer to 
the ceiling; I exist in my entirety within the stroke of 9:00, and I exist again 
within the stroke of 10:00 — the selfsame entity twice, existing once further 
from midnight and then all over again, closer. Midnight occupies two 
different distances from my fully constituted self. From my perspective, 
then, midnight draws nearer.
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If this enduring “me” is an illusion, however, then so is the passage of 
time. And ceasing to think of myself as an enduring subject should result 
in my ceasing to experience the passage of time. Coming to think of myself 
as perduring should result in my coming to experience different temporal 
parts of myself at different moments, but no enduring self past which those 
moments can flow.
Suppose that I could learn to experience my successive moments 
of consciousness — now and now and now — as successive notes in a 
performance with no enduring listener, no self-identical subject for whom 
these moments would be now and then and then again. In remembering 
a scene that I experienced in the past, I would distinguish between the 
“I” who remembers it and the “I” who experienced it; in anticipating a 
scene that I would experience in the future, I would distinguish between 
the anticipating “I” and the experiencing “I” as well. Hence, my present 
self would be cognizant of being distinct from the past subjects from 
whom it receives memories and the future subjects for whom it stores up 
anticipations. It would therefore have no conception of a single subject to 
which events could bear different relations over time, nothing to which 
they could draw near or from which they could recede. It would think of 
itself, and each of the subjects with whom it communicates by memory and 
anticipation, as seeing its own present moment, with none of them seeing a 
succession of moments as present.
The result would be that time would no longer seem to pass, because 
my experience would no longer include a subject of its passage — just 
successive momentary subjects, each timelessly entrenched in its own 
temporal perspective. I would think of myself as filling time rather than 
passing through it or having it pass me by — as existing in time the way 
a rooted plant exists in space, growing extensions to occupy it without 
moving in relation to it. Having shed the illusion of an enduring self, I 
would have lost any sense of time as passing at all.
One small bit of evidence in support of this speculation is that when I 
lose awareness of myself, by “losing myself” in engrossing activities, I also 
tend to lose awareness of time’s passing.22 With my attention fully devoted 
22  See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1990). According to Csikszentmihalyi, losing awareness of self and losing 
awareness of time are two of the characteristic features of “flow” experiences. I discuss 
these experiences further in “What Good is a Will?”, in Action in Context, ed. Anton Leist 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007); and “The Way of the Wanton”, in Practical Identity and 
Narrative Agency, ed. Kim Atkins and Catriona MacKenzie (London: Routledge, 2008), 
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to playing a sport, reading a book, writing a paragraph, I am drawn out 
of myself and, as it seems, out of the passage of time as well. Conversely, 
when I have nothing to occupy my attention — that is, when I am bored — 
my attention returns to myself, and the passage of time becomes painfully 
salient. Self-awareness and time-awareness thus seem to go hand-in-hand.
Clearly, I am nowhere near to “losing myself” in this way on a lasting 
basis, despite being convinced, by the arguments of Locke and Parfit, that 
I am in fact a perduring rather than an enduring self. Truly assimilating 
the implications of those arguments would entail radical changes in my 
experience, changes of the sort that no argument can produce. No wonder 
the Buddhists believe that dispelling the illusion of an enduring self 
requires an arduous regimen of meditation.
As we have seen, Parfit blames our belief in an enduring self for emotions 
that might well be the essence of our existential suffering: grief over time 
past and anxiety at the prospect of death. Parfit suggests that these emotions 
get their sting from our proprietary interest in our one and only life — 
that glass tunnel in which we imagine ourselves to be enclosed, when we 
believe that we have enduring selves. Parfit claims to derive consolation 
from shedding this belief because he no longer views his relation to the 
person lost in the past, or to the person who will die in the future, as a 
relation of identity. The consolation comes when he escapes from seeming 
imprisoned in an enduring self.
Yet I don’t see why bearing a less robust relation to his own past and 
future is any consolation to Parfit. Why should a sense of partial alienation 
from past and future selves leave him feeling relieved rather than bereft? 
It’s not as if he has come to realize that this isn’t his “only life”; he has 
merely come to realize that it isn’t even his in the sense that he previously 
thought. This realization provides only the cold comfort of having nothing 
to lose.
When Parfit describes the drawbacks of believing in an enduring self, 
he speaks not only about the loneliness of proprietorship in a single life — 
being imprisoned in a glass tunnel — but also about the emotions attendant 
upon time’s passage. He complains of the sense that he is “moving faster 
and faster” through the tunnel, toward the “darkness” at its end, and of 
the sense that “so much of one’s only life should have gone by”. Surely, the 
pp. 169-192; both reprinted in The Possibility of Practical Reason, second edition (Ann 
Arbor, MI: Maize Books, 2015).
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remedy for these anxieties and regrets is not to get out of the tunnel and 
live “in the open air”; the remedy is to stop moving.
The remedy for Parfit’s distress, in other words, is to become an 
eternalist. Consider: 23
[W]hen a person dies he only appears to die. He is still very much alive in 
the past, so it is very silly for people to cry at his funeral. All moments, past, 
present, and future, always have existed, always will exist. … It is just an 
illusion … that one moment follows another one, like beads on a string, and 
that once a moment is gone is it gone forever.
The speaker here is Billy Pilgrim, relating what he learned on the planet 
Tralfamadore, where he was once on display as an intergalactic zoological 
specimen:
When a Tralfamadorian sees a corpse, all he thinks is that the dead person is 
in bad condition in that particular moment, but that the same person is just 
fine in plenty of other moments. Now, when I myself hear that somebody 
is dead, I simply shrug and say what the Tralfamadorians say about dead 
people, which is “So it goes.”
The Tralfamadorians are eternalists about time, and they have managed to 
derive great comfort from this philosophy.
Note, however, that whereas Parfit has overcome the illusion of an 
enduring self but not the illusion of time’s passing, the Tralfamadorians 
have done the reverse: they have overcome the illusion of time’s passing, 
but they still speak as if they believe in an enduring self.24 This incomplete 
disillusionment is just as unsatisfactory, to my way of thinking, as Parfit’s. 
Parfit and the Tralfamadorians have divided between them what is a larger 
truth: the enduring self and the passage of time are interdependent illusions. 
The Tralfamadorian half of the truth is more consoling than Parfit’s, to my 
mind; but taken by itself, the Tralfamadorian half of the truth is unstable.
The Tralfamadorians speak as if they occupy moments in time with their 
entire selves, not just temporal parts. Regarding themselves as enduring 
23  Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Slaughterhouse-Five or, The Children’s Crusade: A Duty-Dance with 
Death (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), p. 23. 
24  But: “Tralfamadorians don’t see human beings as two-legged creatures, either. They see 
them as great millepedes — ‘with babies’ legs at one end and old people’s legs at the 
other,’ says Billy Pilgrim” (ibid., p. 75). This suggests that Tralfamadorians see people 
as perduring space-time worms rather than enduring objects. Nevertheless, their first-
personal descriptions of their own experiences sound like those of an enduring self.
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objects, they manage to deny the passage of time only by asserting that they 
can stand outside of time and range across it at will:
The Tralfamadorians can look at the different moments just the way we can 
look at a stretch of the Rocky Mountains, for instance. They can see how 
permanent all the moments are, and they can look at any moment that 
interests them.
Billy Pilgrim never fully attains the Tralfamadorian view of time, but he 
does lose the normal human view: 25
Billy Pilgrim has come unstuck in time.
Billy has gone to sleep a senile widower and awakened on his wedding 
day. He has walked through a door in 1955 and come out another one in 
1941. He has seen his birth and death many times, he says, and pays random 
visits to all the events in between.
He says.
Billy is spastic in time, has no control over where he is going next, and 
the trips aren’t necessarily fun. He is in a constant state of stage fright, he 
says, because he never knows what part of his life he is going to have to act 
in next.
How do the Tralfamadorians manage to visit different moments in time, 
betaking their complete selves from one moment to another? This process 
would require a higher temporal order of “first” and “later” within which 
the desultory visits could occur, and across which the Tralfamadorians 
would retain their identities. A Tralfamadorian’s visits to random moments 
in ordinary time would themselves have to occur at well-ordered moments 
in a meta-time, which would constitute a temporal stream washing over the 
Tralfamadorians as relentlessly as ordinary time washes over us. Similarly, 
Billy Pilgrim is washed by a stream of meta-moments ordering his visits to 
random moments of ordinary time.
In short, “coming unstuck in time” is not as easy as it sounds. Billy 
Pilgrim may jump around in one temporal order, but he moves through 
another in sequence. Escaping the passage of time would require the 
dissolution of his enduring self. In order to come completely unstuck in 
time, Billy himself would have to come unglued.
Although the tale of Billy Pilgrim gives a partial and imperfect portrait of 
life without the illusion of temporal passage, it seems correct in portraying 
25  Ibid., p. 20.
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that life as lacking many of our ordinary worries about mortality. Even so, 
not all such worries would disappear along with the passage of time.
Billy describes the Tralfamadorians as unconcerned about being dead. 
But of course Epicurus long ago taught us that being dead is nothing — 
literally — and hence that it is nothing to worry about. The anxiety that 
makes sense, at least for those of us who live with temporal passage, is 
anxiety about the inexorable approach of death, about time’s running out. 
This anxiety would be allayed if time no longer seemed to pass. And once 
time no longer seemed to pass, the mere fact of our mortality would no 
longer seem regrettable. When time seems to be running out, we wish 
for immortality, which would amount to having infinite time left on the 
clock. But in an eternalist world, immortality would amount instead to 
a kind of temporal ubiquity — existing at every future moment. Having 
an infinite amount time left seems desirable if time is running out; but if 
time is standing still, then filling an infinite amount of it might well seem 
unattractive.
Still, those of us who die young could continue to lament the truncated 
extent of our lives: having too short a life would still be grounds for 
unhappiness. What would be groundless is unhappiness about mortality 
itself — the unhappiness that affects everyone, no matter how long-lived, 
at the sound of death’s approaching tread.
Would liberation from the passage of time free us from other kinds 
of suffering? It certainly wouldn’t spare us from physical pain or other 
unpleasant experiences. But it just might prevent pain and unpleasantness 
from being transformed into suffering.
We can undergo pain or unpleasantness without suffering under it: 
suffering is a particular way of experiencing pain or unpleasantness — 
specifically, of not coping with it.26 And I suspect, though I cannot argue 
here, that the way of not coping that’s constitutive of suffering results from 
the perception of time as passing. What undoes us, when we suffer with 
pain, is panic at the thought that it will never abate, that no end is in sight. 
Patients can learn to bear pain by “accepting” or “being with” it, focusing 
on the pain of the moment, without thinking about what’s next.27 It’s not 
26  I discuss this conception of suffering in “Beyond Price”, chapter 4 in this volume; and 
“The Gift of Life”, part II of chapter 6. 
27  Here I am merely gesturing at a large and controversial research program. For just one 
example, see Lance M. McCracken and Christopher Eccleston, “Coping or Acceptance: 
What to Do About Chronic Pain?”, Pain 105 (2003): 197-204; and Lance M. McCracken, 
James W. Carson, Christopher Eccleston, and Francis J. Keefe, “Acceptance and Change 
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the pain they’re in that makes them suffer but the prospect of its endlessly 
going on.
Perhaps, then, liberation from the passage of time would entail liberation 
from suffering altogether, though not, of course, from pain. There would be 
bad moments and good moments, but no panic about the coming moments, 
and hence no suffering.
The Tralfamadorians express the consolations of their perspective by 
saying, “So it goes.” Come to think of it, though, the point of this motto is 
less than obvious. After all, the Tralfamadorians inhabit a perspective in 
which “it” doesn’t “go” at all, since they do not experience time as passing. 
Why do they say “So it goes”? Why don’t they say “So it is”?
Maybe the Tralfamadorian motto has been translated in a manner 
suitable to us, who simply cannot escape from the illusion of time’s 
passing. “So it goes” means “so it goes for you.” They are recommending 
the attitude that is appropriate for creatures who can’t help but experience 
time as passing. Buddhism must offer similar advice, exported not from 
one planet to another but from the meditative state to the state of ordinary 
consciousness. What is the appropriate attitude to have in ordinary life, 
where the self unavoidably seems to endure and time unavoidably seems 
to pass, given that both appearances are illusions?
I think that the exportable lessons here must include something about 
the way we cope with the passage of time. We can’t stop the self from 
seeming to endure, or stop time from seeming to pass, but we can cope 
with these phenomena better, given the knowledge that they are merely 
phenomenal.
Ordinarily I cope rather badly with temporal passage and personal 
endurance. I don’t exactly live in state of Pilgrim-esque stage fright, 
continually unsure when I might find myself at my fifth birthday party or 
my seventy-fifth. In some respects, I feel like a Tralfamadorian, because I 
can choose which parts of my life to visit, in memory and anticipation. Yet 
I have a disconcerting tendency to live different parts of my life all at once 
— to relive the past and pre-live the future even while I’m trying to live in 
in the Context of Chronic Pain”, Pain 109 (2004): 4-7. One of the methods discussed 
in the latter article is “Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction”, which is described as 
“moment-to-moment observation and acceptance of the continually changing reality of 
the present” (5). For some of the methodological problems in this area, see Christopher 
Eccleston, “The Attentional Control of Pain: Methodological and Theoretical Concerns”, 
Pain 63 (1995): 3-10.
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the present. And even as I relive my past in a memory, it is at the same time 
slipping away from me, as there comes bearing down on me a future that I 
am pre-living in anticipation.
It’s as if too many parts of my life are on the table at once, and yet 
somehow they are continually being served up and snatched away like 
dishes in a restaurant whose waitstaff is too impatient to let me eat. And this 
whole grief- and anxiety-provoking conception of my life has been adopted 
out of panic over the passage of time, which requires me to anticipate the 
future precisely because it’s bearing down on me, and to remember the 
past precisely because it’s slipping away.
Once I know that the self doesn’t endure, and time doesn’t pass, then 
even when under the illusion to the contrary, I can better follow the Buddhist 
injunction to be fully aware of the present moment. The realization that I 
am of the moment — that is, a momentary part of a temporally extended 
self — can remind me to be in the moment, which draws my attention 
away from time’s passage, even if it doesn’t succeed it stopping time from 
seeming to pass. Insofar as I can be in the moment, I can perhaps gain some 
respite from the grief and anxiety of that overwhelmed diner, on whom 
loaded plates are bearing down even as uneaten dishes are being borne 
away. Each moment can be devoted to savoring the dish of the moment.

9. Dying1
Some people hope to die in their sleep. Not me. I don’t regret having been 
oblivious at my birth, but I don’t want to be napping at my death.
My birth hasn’t figured much in my life, other than having begun it, 
whereas my death will have figured far more than just ending it. It’s been 
on my mind, one way or another, ever since I learned what death is. I’ve 
wondered about it, worried about it, once or twice wished for it, and in any 
case constantly sensed its presence in my future.
One usually thinks of death in the abstract. But at some point it dawned 
on me that I will have a particular death, my very own death. Since that 
moment of clarity, I have felt possessive about my death. Death is a 
momentous life event, and I am going to get one.
The expectation of getting a death of one’s own lies behind the ancient 
belief in the Fates.
They are the guardians of the tantalizing facts as to when, where, 
and how one will die, the facts that will finally bring the abstraction of 
death down to earth. We have dispensed with the Fates but not with their 
function; we’ve merely reassigned it to the cardiologists and oncologists. 
They tell us the “how” of our deaths, and then we demand the “when” by 
asking, “How long have I got?” Of course, physicians are not the Fates, and 
trying to cast them in that role introduces unnecessary frustration into the 
doctor-patient relationship. Having a diagnosis is not enough, but it’s all 
we can get until our fate is revealed by being fulfilled.




Many philosophers think that death is a deprivation, whereas 
immortality would at worst be a bore. I see deprivation on the side of 
immortality. Being immortal would entail living forever without life’s most 
persistently anticipated consummation.
Immortality is not a deprivation for the gods, who have known literally 
forever that they would never die and who have therefore never considered 
the prospect: the gods have always planned on being immortal. Their 
immortality is quite different from what mortals would get if granted a 
reprieve. As nouveaux immortals, human beings would have spent years 
contemplating their inevitable death only to be told, “Never mind.” But I 
do mind, have minded all of my life with all of my mental strength. At this 
point, I’d rather go through with it.
Going through with it would be a bad idea if death were a significant harm. 
But I have lost my grip on the philosophical question about the harm of 
death. I’ve lost my grip because I cannot imagine an answer that would 
affect how I feel about death, and I can’t imagine how anything could count 
as an answer unless it would affect how I feel.2
When I say that my feelings wouldn’t be affected, I don’t mean that 
they are permanently settled; I mean that they are permanently unsettled. 
About death, most of us have mixed feelings most of the time.
Our feelings about death are mixed because we see it as the end of our 
life stories and we can tell those stories, and that ending, in many different 
ways.3 We can tell the story of missing out on the future; we can tell the 
story of running out of time; we can tell the story of becoming nothing but 
a memory. None of these is a good story, but they are bad in different ways 
— sad, scary, spooky. And then there are stories that aren’t bad at all: the 
old-time Christian story of laying down our burdens, the Buddhist story of 
living fully in each one of just so many moments.
What would it mean for one of these stories to be the right one and the 
others to be wrong?
What would it mean for one of the associated feelings to be right and the 
others wrong? I don’t know; and so I no longer know what’s at stake in the 
philosophical debate about the harm of death.
2  For this conception of value, see “Love and Nonexistence”, part III of chapter 6 in this 
volume. 
3  For the relation between value and narrative, see “Well-Being and Time”, chapter 7 in 
this volume.
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We can, of course, come to realize that we have spun out some of these 
stories too far. If we imagine that laying down our burdens will lead to a 
refreshing night’s sleep, then we’re making a mistake; we’re also making 
a mistake if we imagine that we’ll be disappointed at missing out on the 
future. Yet even after we adjust our stories to the realities of death, the 
adjusted stories remain compelling: we really will be relieved of our 
burdens, even if we won’t feel the relief; we really will miss out on the 
future, even if we won’t know what we’re missing. Nonexistence isn’t 
that difficult to comprehend; and no one can tell us that we’re mistaken to 
feel forward-looking relief or forward- looking disappointment about it, 
despite knowing that we won’t feel relief or disappointment at the time.
That said, I have now argued that there’s something to be learned — 
namely, that there’s nothing else to be learned. Once we realize that we’ll 
never resolve how to feel about death, we can stop trying to resolve it, stop 
feeling frustrated about not having resolved it, and hence stop feeling at 
least one of the things that we currently feel. We can also be less rigid in 
our remaining feelings, by feeling each of them in the awareness that we 
can also feel otherwise. 
They say that when you face death, your whole life passes before your eyes. 
Taken literally, the expression is ludicrous. Woody Allen:4
They took my hood off and threw a rope around my neck, and they decided 
to hang me. 
And suddenly my whole life passed before my eyes. I saw myself as a 
kid again, in Kansas, going to school, swimming at the swimming hole, and 
fishing, frying up a mess-o-catfish, going down to the general store, getting 
a piece of gingham for Emmy-Lou. And I realize it’s not my life. They’re 
gonna hang me in two minutes, the wrong life is passing before my eyes.
Having the right life pass before his eyes would not have been as funny, but 
it would have been just as absurd. A fast-forward replay of his life? With a 
noose around his neck?
If the expression is to make any sense, it has to mean that when facing 
death, you suddenly see your life as a completed whole, a particular life 
bounded at both ends. So long as your life is open-ended, it remains an 
abstraction, some completion or other of what has gone before. When your 
4  Woody Allen, “Down South”, in Standup Comic: 1964-1968 (Rhino Records, 1999), CD, 
http://www.ibras.dk/comedy/allen.htm
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life comes to a close, it becomes fully specific and hence concrete. Not to 
see your life out to its end would be never to have known it as a concrete 
particular.
In a traditional Jewish wedding, the bride walks around the groom three 
(or seven) times. As you might expect, there are all sorts of explanations 
for this custom. I like to think that it gives the bride a good look at what 
she is getting, not just in the sense of revealing a fat ass but in the sense of 
showing the groom as a fully specified individual, with all of the details 
filled in. The bride is being shown that she is marrying a particular man, 
not an abstraction.
Until people circumnavigated the Earth, they lived somewhere in the 
midst of somewhere or other. In order to see where they stood, they had 
to close the circle. Similarly, closing the circle of one’s life is necessary 
to seeing it as the particular life one has lived. And I want to know the 
particular life I’ve lived before I stop living it — which will entail fully 
living it up to the very end.
10. The Rights to a Life1
In After Long Silence, Helen Fremont tells the story of growing up in the 
Midwest as the daughter of Polish Catholic parents.2 She recounts some of 
the stories they told of their courtship in eastern Poland, which was occupied 
by the Germans, then occupied by the Soviets — who deported her father to 
Siberia — and then occupied again by the Germans. She recounts the stories 
they told of her father’s escape back to Poland and, from there, to Rome, 
where he was reunited with her mother, who had escaped from Poland 
disguised as an Italian soldier. She recounts the stories they told of their 
marriage in Rome and eventual emigration to the United States. She tells her 
own story of growing up in the shadow of her parents’ wartime ordeal. She 
tells the story of coming out as a lesbian to her parents and her Italian aunt.
Helen tells the story of discovering, in her thirties, that her parents were 
actually Polish Jews — her mother, the daughter of an Orthodox rabbi. 
She tells the story of gradually uncovering the true history of her parents’ 
separation, escape, and reunification. She recounts that hair-raising history, 
including all of the cover stories that her mother told in order to elude arrest 
by the Germans, who had reoccupied eastern Poland; including her mother’s 
new identity as a Polish Catholic girl named Maria, finally married in the 
Church to her revenant fiancé; including the cover stories that she told to her 
daughters as a way of fending off their questions about the past.
Helen tells the story of confronting her parents with what she had 
learned; she tells the story of their initial denials, their sleepless nights of 
returning memories, their grudging help in her project of reconstructing 
1  Originally published in On Life-Writing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) edited 
by Zachary Leader, using a CC BY-NC-ND licence. For permission to reuse this material 
outside the scope of the CC BY-NC-ND licence, please visit http://www.oup.co.uk/
academic/rights/permissions or contact the author.
2  Helen Fremont, After Long Silence: A Memoir (New York: Dell Publishing, 1999).
http://dx.doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0061.10
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the past. She tells the story of discovering, and then explaining to her 
mother, how her mother’s parents, Helen’s grandparents, had died — not 
“in a bomb”, as her mother had always said, but in the gas chambers of 
Belzec. And, finally, she tells the story of telling all of these stories in a book 
of which her parents disapproved.
Helen tells these stories in telegraphic, Tralfamadorian style, jumping 
from wartime Poland, to postwar Italy, to Michigan in the 1950s, to Boston 
in the 1990s, and back again, unstuck in time.
Helen also enumerates the stories that she cannot tell, because they 
have been suppressed or repressed or simply forgotten by her parents: she 
doesn’t even know her mother’s given name. And in telling the history of 
her parents’ wartime experiences, she deftly hints at the ways in which she 
is embroidering on shreds of evidence for the sake of telling a good story. 
As a child, Helen heard many true stories from her parents and very few 
lies; they denied their heritage mainly by omission. Did her parents owe 
her the full story? Was it in any sense her story as well as theirs? What right 
did Helen have to undo her parents’ repression and then to publish their 
story against their wishes? What right did she have to embellish the story 
with narrative details that were fictional, despite her insistence that they 
recreated some narrative truth?
More than most of us, Helen’s parents lived through experiences that had 
the formal structure of a story: meeting and courtship, separation and trials, 
triumph and reunion: beginning, middle, and end. These events are “their 
story” in a sense in which their later life in America is not, because the latter 
doesn’t make for a story at all; the former make a story, and it is theirs.
The historiographer Hayden White says that the story form never 
inheres in events but can only be imposed on them.3 My view is that the 
story form is in essence an emotional cadence — an arc of emotions aroused, 
complicated, and resolved — and I would say that the wartime experiences 
of Helen’s parents had an overall emotional arc of the right shape.4 These 
3  For Hayden White on the story form, see Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Tropics of 
Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); 
and The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987).
4  I present this analysis of narrative in “Narrative Explanation”, The Philosophical Review 
112 (2003): 1-25. At one point in her book, Helen says, “Something happens, then 
something happens, then something happens. This is called a story” (p. 247). I disagree.
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emotions were the main engines of her parents’ progress across Europe, 
and so the story form really was inherent in their journey.
Helen and her sister were told the outline of this story from their earliest 
childhood:
Their love story I had been fed early and often, until it seemed part of my 
bones. I knew that they had fallen in love before the war, and they had been 
separated for six years without knowing if the other was alive; my mother 
escaped Poland dressed as an Italian soldier, and my father walked across 
Europe after the war, found my mother in Rome, and married her ten years 
to the day after they had first met. That was the tale they liked to tell and 
retell, the story they used to summarize their lives. It was a good story, 
because it ran a thread across the war and connected the two lovers before 
and after. [p. 8]
Thus, Helen’s parents exploited the arc of this story to distract attention from 
matters unspoken.5 These matters included facts about the past, but they also 
included emotions that were very much in the present. Helen says: 
I had been living my life with flawed vision, stumbling in the dark, bumping 
into things I hadn’t realized were there. No one acknowledged anything. Yet 
each time I walked into my parents’ house, I fell over something, or dropped 
into something, a cavernous silence, an unspoken, invisible danger. [p. 31]
The point of this and similar passages is not that Helen was continually 
stumbling into the six-year lacuna in her parents’ story. There was indeed a 
narrative lacuna, because narrating those six years would have required her 
parents to reveal that they were Jewish; but that lacuna is not the “invisible 
danger” of which Helen speaks here. The invisible danger is not even the 
danger that her parents faced as Jews in Nazi-occupied Poland. It is rather 
the danger of unleashing the emotions they retained from that experience. 
When she says, “No one acknowledged anything,” she means that her 
parents didn’t acknowledge the grief and fear they still carried with them. 
So whereas the often-repeated love story skipped but never falsified facts 
about the past, it did falsify emotions felt in the present, since their parents 
were not in fact living happily ever after.
When Helen discovers her Jewish background, she begins attending 
synagogue, and she eventually seeks instruction in Judaism from a rabbi. 
5  “The past was always like this, an empty space in our lives, a gap in our conversations, 
into which our mother tumbled from time to time, quietly, without warning” (p. 145).
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There are many reasons why Helen might have tried to enter Judaism, 
which after all remains foreign to many who identify themselves as 
Jews. What she suggests is that she was trying to fill out a newfound 
self-understanding: “All our lives,” she tells her mother, “there’s been 
something that just doesn’t fit. This explains so much about who we are, 
our childhood, our family” (p. 45). Her sister Lara tells her, “It’s not just 
about them! … It’s about us! About who we are!” (p. 159).6 The prospect of 
explaining who she is leads Helen to embrace her Jewishness:
I had to admit, I wanted to be Jewish — if for no other reason than because 
it simply made sense. I began to recognize myself as a person with roots and 
a past, with a family history, with an identity. The stories of my childhood 
suddenly took on new meaning — everything seemed to be shifting, an 
underground movement of tectonic plates slowly clicking into place, finally 
fitting. [p. 32] 
When it comes to explaining how things suddenly began to fit, however, 
Helen can offer little more than clichés about “cultural” Jewishness. Voicing 
her first suspicions to her mother, she says, “I don’t know why … but I have 
the feeling that I’m Jewish”:
“Like that time,” I said, “I went to visit Rachel after my first year of law 
school.” Rachel’s mother was a Jewish Holocaust survivor. I’d spent a 
weekend at their house twelve years earlier. “Remember what I told you 
when I came back? That it was just like being at home. With her father 
listening to a violin concerto in the other room, and the living room filled 
with books, and all her mother’s plants in the window. And we sat at the 
kitchen counter, Rachel and her mother and I, and sipped coffee and talked 
and talked — and for a moment I thought I was with you and Dad — it was 
so much like home. I can’t explain it — but I remember I told you about it — 
there was a deep resonance somehow.” [pp. 24-25]
After these suspicions are confirmed, 
Lara and I laughed with recognition: the challah bread of our youth … the 
smoked fish that my father loved; potato pancakes. The matzos that we had 
always eaten at Easter. [pp. 34-35]
These passages fall flat. It’s hard to believe that Helen gained much self-
understanding from recognizing that her family’s potato pancakes were latkes.
6  Helen tells her aunt, “We needed to know about this, to understand our family, to know 
who we are” (p. 321).
 The Rights to a Life 203
Similarly, Helen describes her parents’ past at a level of detail that cannot 
be relevant to her self-understanding. Why does it matter to her that her 
grandfather was a rabbi? I can hardly believe that his membership in the 
clergy left any mark on Helen herself. Indeed, very little of her parents’ life 
as Jews left any mark, precisely because they suppressed, repressed, and 
forgot it. Yet Helen herself regards it as worth reporting that her mother’s 
family in Poland lit Sabbath candles, and that her grandmother shaved her 
head and wore a wig.
I doubt whether Helen’s detailed reconstruction of her parents’ past 
actually accounts for anything significant about herself or her childhood. 
When Helen says, “I began to recognize myself as a person with roots and a 
past, with a family history, with an identity,” I suspect that she is describing, 
not a recognition of who or what she already was, but a fresh cognition of 
herself, as having some roots or other, some past or other, some history 
or other — and hence some identity or other — where previously she had 
nothing at all, because of the regime of repression in which she grew up. 
Embracing Judaism may not be a way of recovering a pre-existing identity; 
it may rather be an attempt to construct an identity for the first time.
What shaped Helen as a child may have been no more than the fact 
that her parents had lived through persecution and loss, ultimately 
emerging with an iron determination to leave it all behind. Helen was also 
shaped, I think, by inheriting characteristics of her parents that made them 
survivors, starting with the sheer will to survive but also including, for 
example, a remarkable facility with languages, which enabled them to pass 
themselves off as Germans or Italians; an insight into others’ motivations, 
which enabled them to recognize who could and could not be trusted; a 
capacity for self-denial and self-control; and, finally, a talent for composing 
stories. In writing her book, I would say, Helen was employing a gift for 
self-narration that she had inherited from parents who self-narrated their 
way out of Nazi Europe.7 And in fashioning her new identity as a Jew, she 
was employing the gift that enabled her parents to fashion their identities 
as Catholics, with the difference that Helen was aiming for consistency with 
an actual past. In achieving consistency with that past, however, Helen was 
not necessarily achieving consistency with a pre-existent self.
7  Helen says that her mother escaped from the Nazis by “making up stories to save her 
life, spinning a tale of herself, shifting colors and sequences to suit her needs. She had 
invented herself a hundred times over by the time the war was over” (p. 47).
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Helen embellishes the narrative of her parents’ history with rich fictional 
details, as she herself reveals. In the midst of a fifteen-page narration of her 
mother’s escape from Poland, she remarks:
I don’t know if he said this. I don’t know Polish, or Yiddish, or whatever 
language they spoke to each other. I wasn’t there. My mother didn’t tell me. 
The way she told the story was like this: “And so I cut my hair short, dressed 
up as an Italian soldier, and marched out of Poland with the Italian army.” 
[pp. 233-234]8
Introducing the narration of her father’s arrest, she says:
It’s not clear exactly what happened. But nothing is ever exactly clear. 
History is a card table full of illusions, and we must sort through and pick 
the ones we wish to believe. And so I choose this one. [p. 130]
When Helen says, “I choose this one,” she is speaking of one among many 
versions of a particular episode, but the same statement applies to her entire 
project. Her book is subtitled “a memoir”, but the story is not her own: she 
has appropriated it — chosen it — as the narrative on which to found a 
self-conception. And this appropriation raises the question of Helen’s right 
to tell a story that had been buried by its actual protagonists. 
Maybe by embellishing her parents’ story, Helen gains the right to tell it, 
because it is now partly her creation. And maybe by revealing that the story 
is partly her creation, she blunts her parents’ objections to its being told. 
For when she confesses to embellishing some parts of the story, she casts 
doubt over every part, any one of which could be fictional, for all the reader 
can tell. Once she has undermined her own credibility with the reader, she 
can no longer give the reader credible information about her parents. She 
thereby cloaks her parents in the reader’s confusion about what to believe. 
More pressing than the question of Helen’s right to publish the story is 
the question of her right to confront her parents with repressed details of 
their past. Her mother implores her not to do the same to her Italian aunt, 
but she goes ahead anyway. These confrontations can seem like paternalistic 
“interventions” of the sort that are partly benevolent and partly hostile. It’s 
as if Helen is punishing her elders for keeping secrets from her, by forcing 
them to face the secrets that they have been keeping from themselves.
8  Also: “I can’t explain it, and I won’t stop trying. I will fill this vacuum with words until 
I recognize them as memory” (p. 186). 
 The Rights to a Life 205
That repression is enacted in the crucial scene, as Helen and her sister 
Lara reveal the fate of their grandparents:
“I wrote away for information,” Lara said, “and I got back documentation 
about our family. We know what happened to your parents. We know what 
happened to Dad’s mother.”
“What happened?” my mother suddenly cried. Her hands started 
trembling with a terrible urgency, while her face remained frozen — a 
wide-eyed mask of incomprehension. “Then you know more than I do!” she 
exclaimed.
Lara nodded slowly, confused by my mother’s sudden shift from anger 
to bewilderment.
“Tell me,” my mother cried. “What happened? I don’t even know what 
happened to my parents!” She turned desperately from Lara to me and back 
again, her hands shaking. “What happened?”
I hadn’t been prepared for this. I had expected my mother to refuse to 
talk about it; I had been prepared for her to deny it, to get angry, to scoff 
at me and dismiss it, but I did not expect her to beg us to tell her how her 
parents were killed.
“Tell me!” my mother repeated. “What happened to them?”
I screwed up my courage, looked directly in my mother’s eyes, and 
spoke as calmly as I could: “We found out,” I said evenly, “that your parents 
were gassed at Belzec.”
My sentence dropped like a bomb into a terrible silence. I bit my tongue. 
I hadn’t meant to be so blunt, so harsh. Lara kicked me under the table, 
and with growing panic I waited for my mother’s reaction. Seconds ticked 
by, and I was consumed by an excruciating sense of guilt that I had just 
shattered my mother’s world.
But my mother did not react. She stared at me with the same puzzled 
look on her face, as if I hadn’t spoken. “Tell me what happened to them,” she 
repeated, hands outstretched.
I kept quiet, shaken. I can’t continue with this, I thought. I can’t bear to 
do this … 
“I don’t even know what happened to my parents!” Mom cried. “Tell 
me!” [pp. 42-43]
“My sentence dropped like a bomb into a terrible silence,” Helen says. Her 
mother had always dismissed questions about the fate of her parents by 
saying, cryptically, that they had died “in a bomb”. Helen is now, so to 
speak, killing her grandparents all over again, by dropping a verbal bomb. 
She drops it into “a terrible silence”, a brief fragment of the “long silence” 
that had enabled her mother to un-know her parents’ deaths. And Helen’s 
mother bravely persists — perseverates — in not knowing.
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At the end of the book, Helen is visiting her Aunt Zosia in Rome, writing 
the book. So she is simultaneously writing the story and living what she 
writes. On the same visit, she reveals her discoveries about the family to her 
Roman cousin and faces the ire of her aunt for doing so. 
The reader wonders to what extent the writing of this chapter influenced 
the living of it — to what extent it was lived so as to be written. Did Helen 
tell her cousin of his Jewish background for independent reasons, or she 
did tell him in order to write about it? And this question, raised by her 
contemporaneous narration of writing the book, echoes back through the 
preceding chapters. How much of her research was undertaken by the 
daughter and how much by the aspiring writer? In plotting with her sister 
to pry information out of their parents, was she also plotting her memoir?
Could it be that Helen came out as a lesbian in order to have the parallel 
story lines of uncovering her parents’ secret and disclosing her own? Her 
mother refuses to believe that Helen is a lesbian, just as she refuses to take 
in the revelation of her parents’ murder. As they say, you couldn’t make 
that up — unless, of course, you made it up in order to make it happen in 
order to write it.
Or maybe it’s the reverse. Maybe Helen wrote it in order to motivate 
herself to make it happen. In writing the book, she wrote herself into a 
corner, so to speak, since her friends and lovers would see the hypocrisy of 
her remaining closeted while outing her parents. How better to resolve her 
own indecision about whether to come out? 
Or maybe Helen just researched her parents’ past, came out as a lesbian, 
and wrote a book about it all. 
After Long Silence is a book of stories about silence. Silence is the villain 
of the piece. The human villains, Nazis and Bolsheviks, make only the 
briefest appearance. Even Helen’s description of the Petlura Days pogrom 
in Lvov, as witnessed by her mother and aunt, reaches its climax in Helen’s 
own unwillingness to ask her mother whether she was raped. In a scene of 
horrors, silence takes center stage.
The book has many heroes: Helen’s father and mother, and those who 
helped them to escape. But the real hero of the book is the narrated truth, 
which triumphs over silence in the end. The book is one long testament to 
the healing power of The True Story. 
Yet with some truths, there is nothing to do but forget. I believe in 
virtuous Holocaust deniers — namely, the survivors, many of whom, like 
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Helen’s parents, managed to achieve a merciful forgetfulness. “Forget 
the past, live for the future,” Helen’s mother says. Hers was a past worth 
forgetting.
Once remembered, some of her mother’s past can be domesticated by 
being told as a story, especially since it has an outwardly happy ending. 
But one part cannot be told as a story, because it has no narrative ending. 
It goes: “And so they were herded into a windowless chamber and gassed 
to death.” One cannot imagine punctuating that sentence with “The End”. 
It’s a finish that isn’t an ending, because it brings no closure. In the minds 
of the survivors, the final scene never ends.
Surely, this narratively intractable passage of history is the one that 
Helen’s mother is struggling hardest to repress. Helen can’t domesticate it 
for her, and so I continue to wonder whether she was entitled to tell it at all. 
As for Helen’s right to publish the story, she says that she is honoring her 
forgotten ancestors and expressing love for her parents:
My family is greater than just my parents and Zosia — my family extends 
backward in time and space. I want to put them on record, however 
imperfectly — I want them to be seen and heard.
And strangely enough, on the page I begin to recognize myself in my 
parents — a gesture here, a question there. My attachment to them grows 
stronger with each sentence that arranges itself before me. Perhaps this is 
the ultimate irony of my family: I express my love for them in ways that are 
invariably the opposite of what they would wish. [p. 318]
A complicated passage. The declaration of wanting her relatives to be seen 
and heard is an implicit rebuke to her parents, survivors who did not bear 
witness for the dead: they lived to tell the tale and then refused to tell it. 
Helen then disclaims responsibility for this rebuke: the sentences arrange 
themselves on the page, she says, as if the tale is telling itself. Finally, she 
expresses the mixed motives behind the whole complicated project, an 
expression of love that is also an expression of defiance.
I believe Helen when she says that writing her book is an expression of 
love; I believe the same of her family interventions. Still, I finished the book 
wishing to know more about how her parents received it. We are told only 
that they did not approve. As for the details, Helen is silent.
When I was a child, I was told that my father’s sister Emma had perished 
in the Holocaust. That phrase made the Holocaust sound like a vortex into 
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which people just disappeared, like sailors who are said to have perished 
at sea. The poetic vagueness of it expressed my father’s perfect ignorance 
as to when, where, and how his sister had died. 
When Germany invaded Western Europe in May of 1940, Emma was 
living with her husband and young daughter in the Dutch village of 
Borculo, which was close to the German border and immediately overrun. 
My father was living in Antwerp and was able to escape, together with his 
other sister, Molly, and their parents. They made their way through France 
and Spain to Portugal, and thence to the United States, where my father 
spent the war working for the O.S.S. in Washington, D.C. He traveled to 
Borculo immediately after the war, on one of the first postwar visas issued 
to civilians. When he knocked on the door of Emma’s house, he found 
strangers sitting at her table, eating from her dishes — and claiming never 
to have heard of her.
In the early 1990s, an amateur genealogist in Holland wrote to my father 
in New York and to me in Ann Arbor, Michigan, seeking information about 
people with the last name of Velleman. He told us what he already knew 
about my father’s family history, including many names and dates that 
my father could confirm. He also included information that my father 
had not previously known — in particular, the names of the camps where 
various aunts, uncles, and cousins had been killed, and the dates of their 
deaths. No such information was included for Emma, but we reasoned that 
information about Emma’s death might have eluded his researches because 
it was recorded under her married name. My father wrote back, supplying 
Emma’s particulars and asking the genealogist to apply his methods to the 
question of her fate.
One day my father called to say that a letter had arrived from our 
correspondent in Holland. He then began to read: Emma, her husband, and 
their daughter had been interned at the concentration camp Westerbork, 
in Holland; they had been placed on a transport bound for Auschwitz on 
November 24, 1942; and the mother and daughter were presumed to have 
died on arrival, three days later. My father began to sob and dropped the 
phone. I had never before heard my father cry.
When my parents next visited Ann Arbor, my father silently handed 
me a manila folder full of yellowed correspondence. It had been given to 
him by his surviving sister, Molly, when he told her what he had learned 
about Emma and her family. In the years immediately following the war, 
Molly had corresponded with international relief agencies on behalf of 
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the family in America, seeking information, in particular, about Emma’s 
daughter, Rita, who might have survived without knowing how to contact 
her relatives. The folder now handed to me by my father contained carbon 
copies of Molly’s inquiries, along with the original replies. The latter 
were all dead-ends, with one exception. A letter from the International 
Red Cross, dated 1955, informed the family that Rita had been interned 
in the concentration camp Westerbork, in Holland; had been placed on a 
transport bound for Auschwitz on November 24, 1942; and was presumed 
to have died on arrival, three days later.
So my father had known Emma’s fate all along. Why, I asked, had he 
recruited the genealogist to investigate what he already knew? Why had he 
reacted to the information as if hearing it for the first time? 
He replied, “I had repressed it.”
When I was a teenager, I quizzed my father about the war, and he told me 
the story of his escape: the chance encounter with a rich uncle who owned 
a car, which carried the family to safety; the time in Bordeaux when he 
helped stamp passports for the Portuguese consul who was defying orders 
from Lisbon by issuing transit visas to thousands of refugees; the night 
they spent in a broken-down castle where the beds were full of lice; how he 
and his mother crossed the Spanish border on foot, mopping their brows 
with handkerchiefs holding diamonds from his father’s workshop. (My 
grandfather was a diamond cleaver, and his occupation was noted in his 
passport, so that he would be searched.) My father also told me about his 
trip back to Europe after the war — a long story, mainly about coincidental 
meetings on board ship. 
After learning how he had repressed his knowledge of Emma’s death, 
I realized that my father had turned his wartime experiences into a 
picaresque. Yes, his sister and her family had perished — he told that, too, 
though not, of course, the details that he had not yet recovered. But the 
central, significant event was lost in a series of adventures, all of which 
were bathed in the glow of a happy ending on the horizon. 
Our brush with genealogy prompted me to start researching the 
family’s history. This was just a few years before the Internet transformed 
genealogical research, and so I spent many hours in the basement of the 
local Mormon center, reeling through microfilmed records of mysterious 
Mormon rites performed for my ancestors. Like Helen Fremont, I had 
found religion, though in my case, it wasn’t Judaism.
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Also like Helen Fremont, I was taking on the self-image of the so-called 
second generation, whose childhoods were touched in some way by their 
parents’ brush with the Holocaust. And I was adopting that self-image by 
hitching my life story to that of my father and, more importantly, to that of 
his sister Emma, whom I could never know. I even visited Borculo during 
a break from a conference in the Netherlands. But what is it to me, what 
is it about me, that I had an aunt who died in Auschwitz ten years before I 
was born?
I think that the death of my aunt is meaningful to me because she meant 
so much to my father, who meant so much to me. I would like to say that I 
grieve for her in solidarity with him, but the fact is that I doubt whether he 
ever really grieved for her. I once asked my father whether, after receiving 
confirmation of her death, the family had held a memorial of any kind. The 
idea had never occurred to him. 
So I suspect that my father passed on to me an emotional task that he 
could not bear to do himself. And I suspect that Helen Fremont was given 
a much heavier emotional task, with the added burden of not knowing 
what it was. In this sense, discovering her parents’ history really was a 
discovery of her own identity, after all. She was Jewish despite her Catholic 
upbringing because she was carrying the unresolved grief of Jewish parents 
for grandparents who were murdered for being Jews. Even if our parents 
don’t pass on their stories, they still pass on emotions that only their stories 
can help us to resolve. To that extent, at least, their stories are ours. 
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